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VARIOUS articles have been recently written and sent to *Modern Philology* by former students and fellow-workers of Francis Asbury Wood, to commemorate his long years of teaching at the University of Chicago. As many of these articles as space permits appear in the present issue; others are to follow soon. When viewed in their entirety it is believed they offer an adequate and fitting tribute to the character of the instructor to whom they are dedicated.

This is not the place for a summary (however intelligent) of Mr. Wood's work in the field of Germanic and Indo-European linguistics. Nor is the moment one that should be seized to recite the high and evident virtues of his attainment. It seems rather to be in the spirit of our occasion to publish without comment the free-will offerings of his friends and colleagues and to let the fact of their publication in this journal speak for itself. A few words of personal reminiscence may however prove not unwelcome to the reader.

Mr. Wood received the first doctorate of philosophy granted by the Germanic Department of the University of Chicago. His dissertation on "Verner's Law in Gothic" accompanied by an article on the reduplicating verbs in Germanic was published as the second number of *Germanic Studies* in 1895. For ten years thereafter Mr. Wood was a visiting professor at the University, repeatedly supplementing the teaching of Mr. Schmidt-Wartenberg during the latter's absence from work and protracted illness.

Mr. Wood joined the University staff in 1905, and for more than twenty years from this date the Germanic Department at Chicago was

notably enriched by the results of his teaching and investigation. The greater part of his effort, so far as it appeared in print, was colored by his deep interest in etymological and semasiological developments within the Indo-European tongues, but his students, who were many and often of a high degree of efficiency, unfailingly came to realize this interest of Mr. Wood's was only a single and personal bent of his fluent, encyclopedic knowledge of linguistic factors. The Germanic Department of the University of Chicago will long remain conscious of its loss of Wood's energizing activity, but is happy in knowing that the influence of his pronouncements is an animating force in American linguistics today.

P. S. A.

## THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SUBJUNCTIVE IN THE CLASSICAL AND MODERN LANGUAGES

**I**N EARLIER years there seemed to me to be a vital relation between thought and the forms that express it. In my old age nothing seems to me surer than that there is no such vital relation. In expressing its thought the mind seizes upon any convenient means that suggest themselves. In oldest English there was no future tense. To express this idea the present tense was employed in connection with some abverb of time that pointed to the future. This old usage is still common: "The ship *sails* tomorrow." The verb employed here is a present tense, but it is used as a future. This verbal form is thus not vitally associated with a particular function. It expresses different functions. Sometimes it expresses present time, sometimes future time.

On the other hand, quite different forms may have the same function. We may say, "It *snowed heavily* last night," or "There *was a heavy snow* last night," or "We *had a heavy snow* last night." These sentences usually all have the same meaning, but the grammatical forms employed are quite different. The mind employs one or another of these forms quite capriciously, or perhaps it sometimes follows an inner impression. The noun *snow* is more concrete than the verb *snow*, bringing out the picture of the earth covered with a mantle of snow. It was once common to say, "It *dewed heavily* last night," but now we must say, "There *was a heavy dew* last night," or "We *had a heavy dew* last night," which perhaps indicates a present-day fondness for concrete expression. Under the impression of such examples we might conclude that the mind regularly chooses a form of expression that corresponds to its thought, but this is evidently not true. In Latin the distinctive vowel in the ending of the present subjunctive is *e* in the first conjugation, but *a* in second, third, and fourth conjugations: *amet*, *moneat*, *teget*, *audiat*. Thus different vowels were employed here to express the same thing. We should be able to see here more clearly if we knew the history of these different vowels.

In English we can trace the development of certain constructions in which entirely different forms have the same function. In "We desire that *they* stay away" the subject of the subordinate clause is a nominative, namely, *they*, while in "We desire *them* to stay away" the subject of the subordinate clause is an accusative, namely, *them*. Historically, the accusative here was originally the object of the principal verb, but it was also at the same time the subject of the infinitive. This old construction is still common: "We begged *them* to go." In older English there arose the feeling that the accusative, which was so often used as the subject of an infinitive, was an appropriate form for the subject of an infinitive in general, even where it was not used also as the object of the principal verb. This older feeling has been crystallized into actual usage after a number of verbs. The example given above, "We desire *them* to stay away," is an example of this usage. Here *them* is not the object of *desire* but serves only as the subject of the infinitive *to go*. Here we see that form is not intimately associated with function. For subject we sometimes use the nominative, sometimes the accusative. It is evident here that historical factors have produced the different forms, but it is just as evident that the mind has seized upon the different forms as convenient means of expressing the same function, for the mind is always ready to seize upon any available means to express its thought.

In current English we often use one form for quite different functions—even where in older English different forms were employed to express the different functions. In "He *struck* me" *struck* is a past indicative pointing to the past, while in "If he *struck* me I would strike him" *struck* is a past subjunctive pointing to the future. In older English the past indicative and the past subjunctive had distinctive forms. Again, in "They chose *him* king" *him* is an accusative, while in "They chose *him* a wife" it is a dative in spite of the fact that the word-order is the same. Thus in modern English we do not feel distinctive form as absolutely necessary. The context usually makes the thought clear.

But this use of one form for different function is not always something modern resulting from a decay of our English forms. It is in certain constructions as old as our language. In oldest English it was common to employ the copula *be* to predicate of a subject that it is



in a certain state as the result of having been previously acted upon. This usage survives: "The house *is* painted." The past participle here has strong passive force. The copula *be* is put before it to indicate that the subject is now in a state that has resulted from having been acted upon. This is a statal passive predicating of the subject that it is in a certain state. In oldest English the passive force here was felt so strongly that this form was often used also as an actional passive, that is, was employed to predicate of the subject that it is acted upon. This actional passive form is still our common literary actional passive: "The house *is* painted every year." In Gothic there was alongside of this new actional passive an old synthetic passive form, as found in Latin and Greek. But in the oldest English the synthetic passive form was breathing its last. The new analytical form with the past participle and the copula *be* had already become the common actional passive. It was felt as having a more vivid passive force than the pale old synthetic form. And yet this new actional passive is one of the most inaccurate means of expression in our language, for it indicates either a state or an act. The connection alone reveals the meaning from case to case. This development, which has taken place in historic times, shows clearly that there is no vital relation between thought and the form that expresses it. A form that usually conveys another thought may in a favorable environment express a new thought that arises in the mind. Today we often feel the incongruity of using *be* to express the conception of a subject being acted upon and employ in our colloquial speech *get* instead of *be*: "The house *is* painted" (state), but "The house *gets* painted every year" (action). Similarly, over a thousand years ago the German people felt the inaccuracy in the use of *sein* here for action and replaced it almost entirely by *werden*: "Das Haus *wird* jedes Jahr angestrichen" = "The house *gets* painted every year." For over a thousand years our ancestors did not feel it as incongruous to use *be* for both state and action, but today we are beginning to feel this as inaccurate, so that our best writers not infrequently employ *get* to express action. Thus we see that thought is not abidingly associated with a particular form.

The present employment of *shall* and *will* to form the future tense illustrates the loose relation between thought and form. Originally

*shall* and *will* had modal force. They did not primarily indicate future time, but their peculiar modal force often suggested it. The mind seized upon them as convenient means of expressing future time. It seems to be probable that the mind has never created outright a form to express its thought. It usually employs to express a new thought an existing form that in the new environment will suggest the new thought. Alongside of the new meaning the old meaning often lingers on. *Shall* and *will* often still have modal force, but notwithstanding we do not hesitate to use them also as future tense forms. Alongside of the new future, "The ship *will sail* tomorrow," we still employ the old, "The ship *sails* tomorrow." Thus we see that thought is not vitally associated with a particular form.

A clear insight into this relation between thought and the forms that express it is fundamental to the understanding of the subjunctive, the subject which I desire to discuss here.

The subjunctive is an idea, not a particular form. It has never been associated with a particular form, but has always been expressed by a variety of means. In the older classical languages there is everywhere evident a strong desire to distinguish between fact and conception. The indicative was employed to represent something as a reality. Other forms were used to represent something as a mere conception of the mind. An act, for instance, was often conceived as a desire, demand, requirement, eventuality, probability, possibility, or as a mere thought. There were a large number of shades of meaning in the older subjunctive forms, but there was a unity in these meanings. The action or state was represented not as a fact but as a mere conception of the mind.

Our modern grammarians often speak of the Latin "subjunctive of actuality," but to me this subjunctive meaning seems inconsistent with the nature of the subjunctive. The subjunctive was often used of facts, but the act or state was represented not as an actuality but as a conception. This old use of the subjunctive is still quite common in modern English, so that we can understand the nature of the old Latin so-called subjunctive of actuality by means of our English subjunctive. In English we often employ the subjunctive of facts since the abstract conception, the principle involved, is more prominent in the mind than the concrete fact: "That many men *should enjoy*

it does not make it better" (M. Arnold, *Essay on Keats*). "It is extraordinary, Dorian, that you *should have seen* this in the portrait," (Wilde, *Dorian Gray*). Of course we can employ the indicative here, but it expresses a different thought, stating merely the bare fact: "That many *enjoy* it does not make it better." "It is extraordinary, Dorian, that you *saw* this in the portrait." We employ the subjunctive here when we desire to call attention to the abstract principle back of the facts. The subjunctive in these English examples corresponds closely to the Latin subjunctive of actuality: "*Soli hoc contingit sapienti ut nihil faciat invitus*" (Cicero *Parad.* v. 1. 34) = 'It is characteristic of a wise man that he *should do* nothing unwillingly.' Our grammarians are surely at fault when they say that this Latin subjunctive "represents the act or state as a fact." In all such sentences the subjunctive, true to its nature, represents the act or state as a conception.

There are other cases of this Latin subjunctive that are not so easy to explain since they are translated by forms that are not usually considered subjunctive forms. In Latin it was usual for the verb in an adverbial clause of result to be in the subjunctive since the abstract general conception of result was more prominent in the Latin mind than the concrete act or state in some particular case: "*Tanta vis probitatis est ut eam in hoste diligamus*" (Cicero *Laelius* 29). An American grammarian, not feeling the real force of this subjunctive, translates: "So great is the power of goodness that we love it even in an enemy." But Cicero desires here in *diligamus* to represent the act not as an actual fact but as a result. The abstract conception of a result was more prominent in his mind than the concrete fact. We may render the Latin meaning by employing *come to*: "So great is the power of goodness that we *come to* love it even in an enemy." The Latin subjunctive *diligamus* is a volitive subjunctive. Usually this subjunctive indicates that another person desires or demands the performance of the act. In oldest Latin the subjunctive had often come to indicate not only the constraint of another person's will but often also the constraint of circumstances or natural forces. This use of the subjunctive is found in oldest Latin. It was at first employed only in clauses of result. It was employed here to indicate that the result was a natural one brought about by the constraint of circumstances or natural

forces. The phenomena in question were often well-known facts, but the subjunctive began to be used in oldest Latin instead of the indicative since the desire had arisen to call attention here not to concrete facts but to the abstract idea of a result—something resulting from the constraint of circumstances or natural forces.

We find this subjunctive of result also in Old English: "Swa mon ðonne sceal fulfremedlice Godes fiend hatigean ðætte mon lufigea ðæt ðæt hie beoð and hatigea ðæt hie doð" (King Alfred, *Gregory's Pastoral Care*, II, 353, l. 7) = 'We ought to hate God's enemies so perfectly that we *come to* love what they are and hate what they do.' In the oldest period of our mother-tongue the simple subjunctive was used here. Today we employ *come to* to indicate the constraint of circumstances or natural forces. I know of no grammarian who calls *come to* a subjunctive form, but there isn't the slightest doubt that it is such. It has lost its concrete force and has become a subjunctive form indicating constraint. This is an old subjunctive meaning found in our oldest historic documents. At first it indicated the constraint of a human will, but later it came to be used to indicate the constraint of circumstances or natural forces. The subjunctive is an idea, not a particular form. In older English a simple form was employed to express this idea. Later, the subjunctive sign *come to* was used here since it was felt as expressing the idea more clearly. As we have seen above, thought is not vitally associated with a particular form. In all ages it has been common to exchange one form for another which is clearer or has a stronger appeal. Originally *come* had only concrete force indicating an arrival at a definite place. Today in connection with an infinitive it often has an abstract force indicating a development that has taken place under the constraint of circumstances. It has here developed into a subjunctive sign, just as *shall* and *will* often lose their modal force and become signs for the future tense.

On account of the lack of subjunctive endings it is often necessary in English to employ here a number of words where in Latin a simple ending is sufficient: "Multi ita sunt imbecilli senes ut nullum officii munus exsequi possint" (Cicero *Cat. M.* 35) = 'Many old men become so feeble that they *come to a point where they cannot* perform any duty to society.' Here Latin *possint* corresponds to English *come to a point where they can*. What English loses in brevity it gains in clearness

and concreteness of expression. The words "come to a point where they can" bring to the mind the picture of the constraint of circumstances. The expression, however, is more concrete than in the preceding examples where *come* occurs in this sense. The different words in the expression still contain the concrete picture of coming to a definite point. In the preceding examples the word *come* merges with the following infinitive into a unit in which it performs the abstract subjunctive function of indicating constraint of circumstances. The infinitive construction represents a later stage of development. It contains a large measure of abstractness, but it retains somewhat of the old concrete picture, which gives color to the expression. The English construction is much less abstract than the Latin, for it cannot express another shade of subjunctive meaning, while the Latin subjunctive ending has many shades of meaning. English inclines to discard the old abstract colorless subjunctive for more concrete colorful forms.

The use of *come to* as a subjunctive sign seems to me very interesting. It illustrates our English method of creating subjunctive forms. The mind seizes upon any available convenient means of expressing its thought. Here the idea of *coming* to something suggests the idea of a result, something resulting from the constraint of circumstances or natural forces. The English subjunctive is much more expressive than the Latin. It brings a clear picture to the mind. We do not know what any of the old Latin subjunctive endings originally meant. They doubtless once had as concrete a meaning as our English *come to*, but even in the oldest Latin documents they appear as colorless suffixes to represent the action as a mere conception.

The subjunctive that indicates constraint of circumstances or natural forces as mentioned above was already well established in oldest Latin in clauses of result. Later, this subjunctive spread to temporal clauses: "Accepit agrum temporibus iis cum iacerent pretia praediorum" (Cicero *Pro Roscio Comoedo* xii. 33) = 'He got the land at a time when prices *had come to be quite low*.' "Huius folia priusquam decidant, sanguineo colore mutantur" (Pliny *Naturalis Historia* xiv. 7) = 'Its leaves turn red before they come to the point where they fall.' "Postea quam sumptuosa fieri funera coepissent Solonis lege sublata sunt" (Cicero *De Lege Agraria* ii. 25. 64) = 'After funerals *had come to the point where they were beginning* to be expensive they were abol-

ished by Solon's law.' In early Latin the indicative was uniformly used here since the act was felt as a fact or an actual factor with which one must reckon. Later, the subjunctive replaced here the indicative since the action came to be felt as a mere conception, result, something resulting under the constraint of circumstances or natural forces. In English we can express this idea of result not only by *come to* but also by *shall*: "It will be a better and a happier world when greater numbers of men *come to*, or *shall*, see the need of serving others." In older English the simple subjunctive was used here, as in Latin: ". . . The most forward bud/Is eaten by the canker ere it *blow*" (Shakespeare, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, I, i, 45). This old usage lingers on in poetry and choice prose: "Not tho all men call,/Kneeling with void hands,/Shall they see light fall/Till it *come* for all Tribes of men and lands" (Swinburne, *Songs before Sunrise*). "I am now going down to Garden City and New York till the President *send* for me; or, if he do not send for me, I'm going to his house and sit on his front steps till he *come* out" (Walter H. Page, *Letter to Irwin Laughlin*, August, 1916). In present usage the indicative is the most common form of expression here, just as in the early Latin, since there prevails a desire to represent the action not merely as a conception but as an actual factor with which we are reckoning or as an actual fact: "Send him up to my room when he *comes*"; "Its leaves turn red before they *fall*."

Grammarians often speak of the subjunctive of cause in classical Latin: "Cum solitudo insidiarum et metus plena *sit*, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare" (Cicero *Fin.* ii. 66) = 'Since solitude *comes to be* full of treachery and fear, reason itself prompts us to contract friendships.' Instead of my translation *comes to be* an American grammarian translates *sit* by *is*. To me this seems wrong. He assumes a subjunctive of cause. The idea of cause lies in the connection, not in the subjunctive. The subjunctive here is the usual subjunctive of constraint of natural forces. The English subjunctive *comes to* brings out this idea very nicely.

In the preceding examples we have seen how our English subjunctive sign *come to* corresponds to the old simple Latin subjunctive in clauses of result, time, and cause. There are in English a number of other expressive subjunctive signs which correspond to the older color-



less Latin. These signs are in different stages of development. *Can* and *will* can still as any English verb be used to point to the past: "I tried to do it yesterday, but *couldn't*." "I urged him yesterday to do it, but he *wouldn't*." Here *could* and *would* seem to be past indicatives pointing to the past, but it is in fact the context that suggests the past. They more commonly point to the present or the future, like a past subjunctive: "With a wedge one *could split* this line," corresponding to Latin "*Cuneo hoc agmen disicias*" (Livy xxii. 50. 9). "If now that golden branch *would only show* itself to us!" corresponding to Latin "*Si nunc se nobis ille aureus ramus ostendat*" (*Aeneid* vi. 187). As can be seen by these examples the English subjunctive forms *could* and *would* are used in connection with an infinitive, while the corresponding Latin subjunctive forms are simple. In both Latin examples the simple present subjunctive is used, while in English two entirely different subjunctive forms are employed—*could* and *would*—to bring out the two shades of meaning here. The first form is a potential, the second an optative subjunctive. In the first example the idea of possibility expressed is the possibility that lies in the ability of a person. If it is desired to express the idea of possibility that lies in circumstances we employ *may*: "Someone *may say* to me" corresponding to Latin "*Aliquis dicat mihi*" (Horace *Sat.* i. 3. 19). In Latin the simple present subjunctive is used here as in the preceding examples. Thus we see that modern English has forms for finer shading than is possible in Latin.

*Can*, *could*, *will*, *would* are often used as subjunctive forms, but there are other old verbs that have developed much farther in this direction. *Shall*, *should*, *may*, *might*, *ought*, *must* have almost ceased to be felt as independent verbs. They have become subjunctive signs to color our thought and feeling. They have almost driven the old simple subjunctive out of existence. Many grammarians have deplored the gradual disappearance of the old simple subjunctive. They speak as though the disappearance of the old form meant the decline of English expression. They have overlooked the fine constructive work that has been going on for many centuries. If it were not that the old simple subjunctive, like old forms in general, is still a favorite in higher diction and is thus intimately associated with elevation of thought and feeling, its inferiority would become apparent to all.

Viewed in the light of science the old simple subjunctive alongside of the new colorful forms looks poor and shabby.

In my study of our modern colorful subjunctive forms my attention has been repeatedly called to the glaring deficiency of form in the case of *ought* and *must*. Alongside of the present subjunctive forms *may*, *shall*, *can*, *will* are the past tense forms *might*, *should*, *could*, *would*. There is here a clear differentiation of meaning between the present and the past tense. Both the present and the past tense point to the future, so that they do not differ in indicating the time relations, but the past tense differs markedly from the present tense in that it expresses a greater degree of improbability: "It *may* rain"; "It *might* rain." The past tense of the subjunctive often softens the language, conveying the impression of a modest or cautious statement: "You *shall* do it," with the force of an imperative, but "You *should* do it" with the force of a modest admonition. "It *may* be true" expresses probability, but "It *might* be true" is a much more cautious statement. *Ought* and *must* are past tense subjunctive forms that have no corresponding present tense forms. In the case of *ought* this deficiency is felt by the common people, who have created new forms to express themselves more accurately—a present tense form and a corresponding past tense with the usual differentiation of subjunctive meaning. *Ought* is the past subjunctive of *owe*. It is much used in the literary language in modest statements: "You *ought* to do that" = "You *should owe* the doing of that." The common people feel that there ought to be here a present subjunctive form alongside of the past tense to make the statement a little more positive in accordance with the usual English practice of shading subjunctive expression. They have created a clear present and a clear past tense form for this purpose: "You *don't ought* to do that" and with more modesty and caution "You *didn't* [or *hadn't* or *shouldn't*] *ought* to do that." The means employed here are very interesting. The common people feel the subjunctive force of *ought*, but at the same time feel the lack of distinctive tense forms. Hence they place the present tense *do* before the old subjunctive *ought* to form a present subjunctive and place the past tense *did*, *had*, or *should* before the old subjunctive to form a past subjunctive. I know of no subjunctive formation just like this one. In the literary language simple subjunctive signs are used here. The simple present and the



simple past tense form of some verb are employed in connection with the infinitive of the verb to be conjugated: "It *may* rain," "It *might* rain"; "He *shall* go," "He *should* go"; "Will you do it for me?" "Would you do it for me?" This is very fine shading, much finer than can be expressed by the old simple subjunctive. English is normally a very simple language. It often does not require distinctive forms to express thought and feeling, but it has developed finely shaded forms for the accurate expression of thought and feeling wherever this becomes necessary. Popular speech in the construction under consideration has gone farther than the literary language in coining finely shaded forms of expression. There is in the case of *ought* no available simple present tense form alongside of the simple past subjunctive form *ought*, so that there has arisen in the common people the impulse to create the two compound forms *do ought* and *did* (or *had* or *should*) *ought*. Though the means employed here are different from the usual ones, the procedure is the same as has always been employed. The mind seizes upon an available convenient means to express its thought. Thus we see here as elsewhere that thought is not vitally associated with particular forms. An inexpressive old form is replaced by an expressive new one. As this could not be done in the usual way new means were employed.

Similar to the subjunctive sign *comes to* is the old subjunctive sign *is to*. The preposition *to* here, as in *comes to*, indicates end, which in connection with *is* has developed the modal ideas of necessity, possibility, of fitness: "The letter *is to* [i.e., *must*] be handed to him in person." "An account of the event *is to* [i.e., *can*] be found in the evening papers." "Such women *are to* [i.e., *ought to*] be praised." *Is to* often also represents the action as merely planned: "He *is to* leave tomorrow." Although the subjunctive sign *is to* is as old as the English language it has not been recognized by English grammarians as such. Similarly, I regard *possibly is* as a subjunctive in "*Possibly that is true.*" It has about the same meaning as *might* in "That *might* be true."

Although there is a unity in the many functions of the subjunctive—the subjunctive always denotes a mere conception—for practical purposes we may arrange the many different shades of meaning under two general heads: the optative subjunctive indicating a desire

or some stronger expression of the will and the potential subjunctive expressing a possibility, probability, or a mere thought. Optative subjunctive: "God *bless* you!" "*Be* this purse an earnest of my thanks" (Lytton, *Rienzi*, Vol. I, chap. iii). The old simple subjunctive is now more commonly replaced here by the form with *may*: "*May* you see many happy returns of the occasion!" We employ the past subjunctive to indicate a greater improbability of realization: "Too late! Oh, *might* I see her just once more!" We often speak of the volitive subjunctive when the expression of will becomes stronger: "Everybody *stand* up!" The old simple volitive is now more commonly replaced by forms with auxiliary verbs: "*Let* him *come* in." "You *shall smart* for it." I have no intention to go into details here. I only desire to treat the subjunctive functions in broad outlines.

The same forms are used for the potential subjunctive: "We doubt whether it *be* possible to mention a state which on the whole has been a gainer by a breach of faith" (Macaulay); "*It may* rain"; "*It might* rain." Again we see here that the same form may have different meanings.

In our Greek grammars we find what we have been here treating as one mood, the subjunctive mood, divided into two distinct moods—the subjunctive and the optative. This old classification seems to me unscientific. The names and the treatment in our Greek grammars have been handed down from preceding generations. A well-known grammarian has treated both Latin and Greek grammar. In the treatise on Latin he calls the mood subjunctive, but in the treatise on Greek he divides the mood into two with the traditional names "subjunctive" and "optative." In the course of the development of the Greek language itself the optative forms have disappeared, leaving the subjunctive supreme. In classical Greek the two so-called moods, the subjunctive and the optative, were only different forms of one mood. Sometimes the different forms expressed different shades of subjunctive meaning, sometimes they were only different forms for the same meaning, just as in the modern English subjunctive there are often different forms for different shades of meaning, while in other cases different forms have the same meaning.

In this paper I have tried to show that the subjunctive is an idea, not a form. English grammarians usually consider our old simple Eng-

lish subjunctive as related to the Greek optative. They have confined their study too much to this old form and have overlooked the other subjunctive forms that have developed alongside of it. We find this old so-called optative form also in Latin, but alongside of it are other forms of quite different origin. Latin grammarians wisely called all these different forms subjunctives although they were of different origin. They recognized that the subjunctive is an idea, not a form. All grammars treating Greek grammar have been working from the beginning upon a false basis. They have assumed that the subjunctive and the optative are distinct moods, not seeing the unity of meaning in the different forms. The different forms were only means of expressing different shades of subjunctive meaning or different means of expressing the same subjunctive meaning. In future investigation in this field of study the main objective should be to discover all the different means of expressing the subjunctive. Doubtless new subjunctive forms will be discovered which are not now regarded as subjunctives.

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# THE ONOMATOPOEA OF THE GERMAN VERBAL SUFFIX *-tschen*

**A**MONG consonant combinations to which an onomatopoeic force is attributed, the German *-tsch-* is prominent. The exact direction of this force however, that is, just what sound it is supposed to imitate, or of what motion or action it is symbolic, is not easy to determine.

Most generally accepted is the theory that it represents a splashing sound, as of something falling into water, *platschen*, or walking in water, *watschen*, *watscheln*, or playing in mud or water or other liquid, *matschen*, *mautschen*, *knatschen*, *knitschen*, etc. However, there are many cases where this sound is supposed to symbolize a blow and the resulting noise; examples are *klatsch*, *klitsch*, *ratsch*, *pantsch*, *patsch*, *ritsch*, etc. Again we find it in connection with words denoting a quick motion: *hutsch*, *fetsch dich!* *watsch*, *witsch*, *wutsch*, and others. Then there are many examples where the combination *-tsch-* is associated with words that indicate a slow motion, awkwardness, slovenliness, and kindred meanings: *ablatschen*=den Schuh niedertreten; *antatschen*, von einem der Stahlwaaren befühlt, und sich zuletzt daran verbrennt; *watschen* in the sense of 'waddle'; *Watsch*=dummer, ungeschickter Mensch.

These are some of the semantic groups that could be formed about the *-tsch-* combination. Aside from them, however, there are a number of words that do not admit of grouping. But notwithstanding this seemingly irreconcilable variety of meanings, writers have ascribed to *-tsch-* in almost every occurrence an onomatopoeic force. So Georg Gerland:

Unser Ergebnis also ist, das dies *-tsch-* wo es wirklich deutschen Ursprungs ist, sich inlautend und auslautend aus *tz* entwickelt hat, dies *tz* selber häufig durch Assimilation aus *kz* entstanden. . . . Im Anlaut ist *tsch* wesentlich in Südostdeutschland (natürlich Tirol, Kärnten, Steirmark miteingeschlossen) zu Hause, und soweit es deutsch ist, aus anlautendem *z*, *sch*, als Verstärkung dieses Lautes gebildet. An-, in-, und auslautend ist es fast immer absichtlich lautmalend, oder wenigstens lautsymbolischer Geltung, da denn schon hierdurch jeder Gedanke an rein phonetische Palatalentwicklung schwindet.

Beachtenswert ist, dass alle diese Formen verhältnismäßig jung sind. In der Schriftsprache der mittelalterlichen Blütezeit finden sie sich noch nicht. . . . Mundartlich mögen die Bildungen weiter zurückgehen, indes wohl kaum, und nur vereinzelt, bis ins Althochdeutsche. . . . Auch das anlautende *tsch* scheint nicht älter. Unterstützt diese spätere Entstehung der Lautgruppe nun wieder die Annahme, dass fremder Einfluss sich teilweise in ihr zeigt, so beweist sie auch an einem neuen Beispiel, wie die Sprache auch später, auch jetzt noch onomatopoetisch schöpferisch und tätig ist. . . .<sup>1</sup>

In the same vein we find this viewpoint ably defended and an even wider field assigned to onomatopoea by Winteler,<sup>2</sup> who connects the *-tsch-* with an earlier *-tz-* or *-z-*:

Wenn sie [*-tsch-* Bildungen] in schriftlicher Aufzeichnung erst spät erscheinen, so liegt das wohl an dem etws plebejischen Wesen derselben, um dessen Willen sie in der edleren Sprache gemieden wurden, während die kleinmalerische und auf das tägliche Ausdrucksbedürfnis gerichtete Mundart sie um so liebevoller kultivierte, womit sie der nachhinkenden wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis einen erheblichen Dienst geleistet hat. Denn es scheint ein Irrtum zu sein, dass das Onomatopoeticon durchaus etwas Epigonenhaftes und Nebensächliches im Sprachleben sei. Ganz im Gegenteil dürfte man darin das älteste Element aller Sprachbildung zu erkennen haben, das im Anfang derselben die ganze Sprache darstellte, und die spätere Sprache scheint sich ausschliesslich aus diesem Stoffe entwickelt zu haben, indem mit der steigenden geistigen Entwicklung des Menschen das Onomatopoeticon übertragen wurde zunächst auf die über das Ohr hinausliegende Sinneseindrücke und von da weiter auf abstracte Begriffe oder Vorstellungen. So erscheint uns das Onomatopoeticon als die Wurzel der Sprache. Sowie aber die Wurzel nicht bloss den Stamm mit seinen Ästen und Zweigen nährt, sondern gelegentlich aus dem Erdboden neue Triebe, wilde Schosse emporsendet, so wirkt die Onomatopoesie auch im reifern Sprachleben noch fort. . . .

He proceeds to ascribe to onomatopoea the most important place in the origin of speech, and considers no etymology final until it has led back to the basic onomatopoea.

It is not our purpose to delve so deeply into the past, but rather to look at the first appearance of this combination in written German, and to trace the meanings associated with it.

The development of *-tsch-* from *-tz-* has been noted above, noting first the development of *-sch-* from *-s-* (*knirschen* from MHG *\*knirsēn*,

<sup>1</sup> "Das deutsche *-tsch-*," *KZ*, XXI, 72 ff.

<sup>2</sup> "Über die Verbindung der Ableitungssilbe Got. *-atj-* Ahd. *-azz-* mit Guttural ausgehenden Stämmen, resp. Wurzeln," *PBB*, XIV, 455 ff.

*vertuschen* from MHG *vertussen*, etc.). Wilmanns<sup>1</sup> adds a number of *-tschen* verbs which have various other associations.

The derivation of the sound from Italian, French, and Slavic words has been noted by many writers. The prevalence of *tsch* in Tyrolese and Swiss is an indication of the influence of Romance tongues. But these border influences do not explain the hundreds of cases that arise all over Middle Germany. The following list of variants gives a picture of the change that begins in Middle High German. For the association *tz:tsch*, *st:tsch*, *sch:tsch*, *s:sch*, Fr. *g:tsch*, Ital. *c:tsch*, compare:

*blesten:blentschen*  
*rinse:rinsche*  
*butze:butsche*  
*hotze:hotsche*  
*loschieren:lutschieren*; Fr. *loger*  
*hartschierer*:Ital. *arciero*

These examples could easily be multiplied. The development during the later period is amply illustrated in the examples from 18 on, and will be merely a continuation of what is here observed, namely, a close association between *s:sch*, *sch:tsch*, *tz:tsch*, *st:tsch*.

The number of words in the Middle High German that contain *tsch* is, compared with the modern German, relatively small. They are here arranged in semantic groups. The first group comprises those verbs that denote a blow, a fall, a stroke, or the noise caused by such action:

1. *patschen* = beim Falle schallend aufschlagen, vom niederstürzenden Blute. Cited from the fifteenth century. This form is generally supposed, along with *tatschen*, *platschen*, *klatschen*, to form an onomatopoeic base, and is compared with the Eng. *pat*, *clap*, OE *plattan* 'to strike,' etc.
2. *tetschen* = mit klatschendem Aufschlagen mit Händen und Füßen im Wasser sich bewegen; BMZ *tatsche* = ich taste; *teschen* s.v.a. *tetschen*. Following forms are compared: *teschlen* = grappeln, palpitare; *taselen*, *tiselen* = *tätscheln*, *tändeln*, *schäkern*; *tasten*, etc.
3. *blesten* = klatschend auffallen, var. *blentschen*, *platschen*; vgl. *blatzen*, *platzen* = sich hastig und lärmend stürzen auf, geräuschvoll auffallen.

In the next few examples there is added to the idea of the blow, stroke, or fall, or the attendant noise, the further meaning of 'crushing,' 'grinding,' 'kneading.'

<sup>1</sup> *Deutsche Grammatik*, II. Abt., 110 ff.

4. *erqueschen* = zerschlagen. This is compared with *quetzen*, *quetschen* and with
5. *verquetschen* = zerquetschen,
6. *zerquetzen*, *zerquetschen*. MG *zuquetzen*: *sēre tzuquatschet so was der von slegen wunder iz was daz der herre ie genas*. Kreuzfahrt des L.L. v. Tür. *Ir schilde tzuquetscht; verwunt, tzuquatschet*, etc., all of the last three being from
7. *quetzen*, *quetschen*, *queschen*, *questen* = schlagen, prägen, cudere; stossen, quetschen, zerdrücken, verwunden. This verb with its variants is one of the most popular *-tschen* verbs in Middle High German. The *tz* forms are earlier than the *tsch*, as may be seen by referring to the citations. Lexer derives it from the Lat. *qualere*, *quassare* and compares *quatlern*, *quettern* of the same meaning, also OHG *quaz*, Münze. In this connection cf. the form *quaschiure*, Parz., 577, 22, and *quaschiur*, *ibid.*, 579, 20, along with the form *quatzsüren* from j. Tit. 2723.
8. *knitschen* = quetschen, zerquetschen, seit dem 15. Jh.; *knüsten*, *knisten* = stossen, schlagen, quetschen, OHG *chnistan* = knüßen, schlagen, stossen; MHG *knutzen*, *knützen* = drückend quetschen, zerquetschen, zermalmen.
9. *zerknitschen*, *zerknetschen* = zerdrücken, zerquetschen; *zerknüsten*, *zerknisten* = zerdrücken, zerquetschen.

Two verbs denote merely a noise, ordinarily unpleasant, whether of persons or animals:

10. *retschen* = schnarren, schwatzen. Weigand derives this verb from *ratzen* = kratzen, rasseln. MHG has also the forms, *rassen* = toben, rasseln, and its iterative *rasseln*, das *retschen* = das Quaken der Frösche.
11. *trensen*, *trentschen* = ächzen, crisari.

A quick movement is denoted by two others:

12. *entwitschen* = entwischen. Only one citation: "Do stuont der wis her burgermeister von Ulen, nam ein hering her uz, hielt in zem fuwer, aber leider *entwitscht* er ime uz der hant, die wile er schlüpfrig was gesin" [Germania, XIII, 76 (from a MS of the fifteenth century)].
13. *fetschen*, sich von dannen *fetschen* = sich fortmachen; OHG *fizzeōn* = ambire.

Three denote finally a slipping, dragging motion, whether slow or fast:

14. *hutschen* = schieben, rutschen; intr. *rutschen*: *hussen* = sich schnell bewegen, rennen; *hutzen* = sich schwingend, schaukelnd bewegen.
15. *ketschen* = schleppen, schleifen. DWb. compares *kegen* = ziehen, schleppen: \**kegzen* > \**ketzen* > *ketschen*, by means of the *-zen* suffix.
16. *rutschen* = gleiten, rutschen: Baseler Chr. *rütsen*; Zimmersche Chr. *rutzen*. The usual comparison is with *ruck-zen*.
17. *fletschen* = die Zähne weisen does not fit into any of the categories above: *vletze*, *vletz* = geebener Boden, *fletzen* ebnen.



It would be interesting to take all the examples of *-tschen* verbs in modern German and the dialects and compare them with those of Middle High German in order to note the exact development that has taken place. But for our purposes we need only take representative words of the written language in order to note this development. The words are taken from Grimm's *Dictionary*, unless otherwise noted. Numbers in parentheses are intended to make comparisons with words listed above, particularly with the Middle High German list, in which the *-tschen* suffix appears associated with a similar meaning.

18. *abglitschen* freq. von *abgleiten*; *ausglitschen* freq. von *ausgleiten*; *einglitschen* was *eingleiten*; *glitschen* (Muret-Sanders) from *gleiten* [14-16].
19. *abkarbatschen* = *abprügeln*; so *aus-*, *durchkarbatschen*; *karbatschen* < Fr. *cravache* [1-3]?
20. *abklatschen*, *abklitschen*<sup>1</sup> = Formen schnell, nicht auf der Presse abdrucken; *klatschen* [1-3, 12, 13].
21. *ablatschen* = *pedes trahere*, den Schuh, Pantoffel niedertreten; ein gewisses *Ablatschen* = hoffärtiges Niedertreten der Ferse; *anlatschen* = *talipedare*, ein gutes bezeichnendes Wort; die Schuhe *anlatschen*, anschleifen, nachlässig an die Füße streifen; sie kommt *angelatscht*, angeschlerft, mit halbangezogenen Pantoffeln gegangen; *latschen* (*lätschen*) = schleppend, schlüpfend, träge gehen, mit zu weiten Schuhen einhergehen; *dissolutum esse in moribus* (*auslatschen*); *pedes trahere*; vom Gang der Bären, der Enten, Gänse; breit reden; schlaff und weinerlich reden; *auslatschen* = *egredi talipedando*; die Schuhe austreten; verächtlich von ausschweifenden Ehemännern. Compare also the related words *latsch* = breit; *Latsch* (Aschaffenburg) = der die Beine im Gehen, die Zunge im Sprechen nicht recht aufhebt; kärnt. träge, unbeholfene Person; kann auch auf Kotiges und Flüssiges bezogen werden; *Latsche* = breiter, plumper Fusz; plumpe niedergetretene Fuszkleidung; liederliches Weibesbild. *Letsfuszer* = Schuh-abtreter; *Lötsch*, *Lotze* MHG = ungeschickter, unbeholfener Mensch; *lätsch*, *lätschig* = mit schlüpfendem Gange; kotig, wässrig: OHG *lotar* = 'locker' [2, 14-16].

This group is noteworthy as showing the derogatory connotation, the downhill tendency of words in *-tsch*, and the tendency of such words to take up the meaning of 'watery', 'muddy,' as noted above in *tetschen* (2).

22. *abnutscheln*, *abnutschen*, *ausnutscheln*, *ausnutschen* = *exsugere*, *nutscheln* = *volken* ( ).

<sup>1</sup> For a semantic variation between the *i-* and *a-* forms, and among other vowel variants hereafter, see L. Bloomfield, "A Semasiological Variation in Germanic Secondary Ablaut," *Mod. Phil.*, October, 1909; *ibid.*, January, 1910.

23. *abquetschen*, gewaltsam abdrücken; *ausquetschen*=exprimere, etc. *quetschen*=(1) Münzen schlagen, prägen; (2) (bis zum Weichwerden oder Trennung der Teile) stossen, drücken, pressen; (3) übertragen auf das Innere: mhd. und md. *quetzen*, *quetschen*, alts. *quezzōn*, mnd *quetsen*, *quessen*, *quetten*, nrhein. *gueschen* und *questen* [4-9].
24. *quetschen*=(1) den Laut *quetsch* hervorbringen, *quaken*; (2) watscheln, wackeln, sich ungeschickt benehmen [10-11]; and
25. *quatschen*=(1) den Laut *quatsch* hervorbringen (durch Fallen, Schlagen, Waten, Treten oder Hantieren im *Quatsche*); mit der Peitsche klatschen; den Saft aus etwas pressen; kotig sein; (2) vom Quaken der Frösche, vgl. *quatern* vom Quaken der Frösche; (3) schwatzen, bes. unverständlich oder albern; (4) trans., mit dem Schalle *quatsch* ausschütten, verschütten [2, 10-11].
26. *quatscheln*=(1) im Kot herumwaten udgl.; rheinisch, schwätzen [2, 10-11]; *quatsch*, ein ähnliches Schallwort wie *knatsch*, *matsch*, *patsch*; Interj.: "*quatsch!* da lag er in der Pfütze"; (2) quatschender Laut; breiartige quatschende quappelige Masse, Strassenkot u. dgl.; unverständliches Gerede, Geschwätz; persönlich, ein breitmäuliger Schwätzer; (3) Adj. albern, närrisch, verdreht [2, 10-11].
27. *anhutschen*=proserpere, heranrutschen; *hutschen*=(1) rutschen, auf dem Boden gleiten, kriechen; auf dem Hinteren fortrutschen, kriechen (dim. *hutscheln*); (2) schaukeln, schwanken; auf dem Eise gleiten (dazu *hotzen*, *hotzeln*); (3) reizen, locken, hängt wohl eng mit dem Lockruf *hutsch* zusammen [14].
28. *anklatschen*=allidere; das sanfte Anklatschen der Wellen am steinigen Ufer; der Regen klatscht an die Steine; *aufklatschen*=cum strepitu cadere: der Regen *klatscht auf*; *ausklatschen*=ausschwatzen, ausplaudern; sie *klatscht* alles *aus*; den Schauspieler *ausklatschen*=auszischen, auspfeifen; *beklatschen*=applaudere: den Schauspieler *beklatschen*; er *beklatscht* alles=er klascht über alles: *klatschen* (umlautend, *klätschen*, ablautend *klitschen*) schallen, schallend schlagen; von *klatschenden* Schlägen; vom Zsschlagen der flachen Hände; von der Peitsche; von heftigem Küssen; von Kleidern, die sich breit mit einem Schalle bewegen; von Kleidern die dicht anliegen, als wären sie nass; von Wasser und Nässe, auch Schmutz; die Wasserlein im Brunnen *klatschen*; ein Schlag ins Wasser *klatscht*; durchnässte Kleider *klatschen* am Leibe, daher *klatschnass*; die Fische *klatschen* im Wasser mit heftigen Bewegungen; *klatschend* fallen lassen; auch ohne den Begriff des breiten Schalles, ganz gleich *klappen*; *klatschend* schlagen; Fliegen *klatschen*; bildlich von einem, der von einem "Schlag" betroffen wird; schwatzen, plaudern, wie klaffen, klappen, klappern [1, 2, 3, 10, 11].

The variants, *klätschen*, *kletschen*, *klitschen* parallel the uses above but do not bring in any new element. All are from *klätzen*, "ein

seltenes altes Wort," which is displaced by the *tsch* form. *Klatzen* does not have the meanings associated with 'water,' 'mud,' 'gossip,' etc., developed nearly so far as *klatschen*. The same difference is noted between *klitschen*, *klitschern*, and *klitzen* (1, 2, 3).

29. *anpatschen*=accedere per humida; *aufpatschen*=pede humido sonitum facere; *auspatschen*=egredi ex aqua; *patschen*=den Laut *patsch* von sich geben oder hervorbringen (1) durch Schlagen (Handschlag) knallen, fallen, treten (ins Nasse); (2) durch Schmatzen: beim Essen wie die Schweine *patschen*; (3) durch Schwatzen: *klatschen*, plaudern. Trans. *klatschend* schlagen; schlagend zsdrücken [1, 2, 3].
30. *anplatschen*=cum strepitu accedere? *anplätschern*=leviter astrepere. *platschen* spätmhd. im 15. Jh. *platsen*, *blatschen*, var. zu *blesten*=den Schall *platsch*, *platz* hervorbringen durch Schlagen, Fallen, schwer Auftreten, u.s.w.; in aqua palpare, im Wasser *pletschen*; das *platschende* Ruder; kärnt. schallen, schlagen, stark regnen, *plätschern*; *klatschen*, schwätzen. *pletschen*, *pletschen* (1) was *platschen*, mit schwerer Last fallen; es regnet, dasz es *plätscht*; (2) breit dasitzen (cf. sich *hinflatschen*); (3) trans. mit *platschendem* Schalle breit schlagen, überhaupt breit drücken, schlagen. *plätschern*, früher auch ohne Umlaut, *platscheren* iterativ zu *platschen*, den Schall *platsch* wiederholt hören lassen oder hervorbringen: intrans. knallen, knattern, das *Platschern* und *Glatschern* der Musketen; von einer sich bewegenden, fallenden oder ausschlagenden Flüssigkeit, eines Bächleins, u.s.w.; Plapperstein spielen; trans. durch einen *Platsch*, durch Schall hervorbringen; *plätschernd* giesen [1, 2, 3]. Here also *plutschen* österr.=mit schwerer Zunge reden, stottern.
31. *anputschen*=anstoszen, gehört zu *anposzen*, *anboszen*; *ausbutschen*=extundere; *putschen*, *butschen*=einen Putsch (Stosz, Puff) geben, stoszen [1-3].
32. *anrutschen*=reptando accedere; *ausrutschen*=prolabi, ausgleiten; *rutschen*=sich gleitend bewegen; von lebenden Wesen, kriechen, gleiten: auf den Knien *rutschen*; mundartlich im Sinne von schaukeln; übertragen: das Geld *rutschen* lassen, ausgeben, u.s.w. [16].
33. *antatschen*=angreifen, antasten; *tatschen*=antasten; *tätscheln* dimin. *titschen* Ablautform zu *tatschen*: (1) schlagen, *klatschen*, anschlagen (Rechenpfennige im Spiel an die Wand werfen); (2) tauchen, tunkten, eintunken: ich *titsche* mit den Fingern hinein und koste es; *austitschen* was austippen [1, 2, 3].
34. *ausätschen*=illudere, *ätsch* machen gegen jemand [10-11].
35. *autschen*=*autsch* ausrufen. An older form of *autsch* is *ausch*. *ätsch* is probably also from \**ätsch* [10-11].
36. *aufquitschen*=fritinnire, aufzwitchern; *quitschen* und *quitschen* aus *quikzen*, einen feinen widerwärtig schneidendem Ton von sich geben oder

hören lassen: die Türangel, die Maus *quietscht*. *quietschern* = garrirre [10-11].

37. *ausfletschen* = irridere; man sagt auch "das Wasser *ausfletschen*" für ausplätschen, ausplätschern; *fletschen* = die Zähne blecken, weisen; *fletschen* und faulenzen = *viam* obsidere; sich *hinfletschen* = *reclinare*; auch ein *fletschen* für breit schlagen oder drücken. *fletschern* = plätschern; *flatschen* = *tergo* insidere, hocken? "Die anderen zwei Völker Indie *flatschen* auf der Erde um"; sich *fletzen* = (1) sich hinlegen; (2) volitare, flattern; (3) stark regnen; *flitscheln*, dasselbe; schwirren, von dem Laut, den eine geschwungene Gerte, ein geschossener Pfeil in der Luft rege macht; auch für das Plätschern, Flistern des Wassers [2, 10-13, 17].

All of these words do not belong together. The meanings *viam* obsidere, *sich hinlegen*, *reclinare* are not to be reconciled with *volitare*, *flattern*. The meanings 'das Wasser *ausfletschen*, *flatschen*, stark regnen,' etc., seem to be a direct influence of the *-tschen*, of course with the analogy of *platschen*, etc.

38. *aufwatscheln* = *anatis* in modo surgere; *auswatscheln* = *anatis* in modo incedere; *watscheln* = wackelnd, schwerfällig, mit kurzen Schritten gehen; im Wasser herumpatschen, waten; . . . das Wort hat sich allmählich ausgebreitet und wird jetzt allgemein verstanden. Zunächst bezeichnet es den Gang von Gans und Ente, und man könnte deshalb denken die Bedeutung 'wackelnd gehen' von 'sich im Wasser bewegen' abzuleiten, vgl. engl. *waddle* = wackelnd gehen zu *wade* = waten. Dagegen spricht aber, dass *watscheln* auch sonst in der Bedeutung *wackeln* vorkommt. Es muss daher, wenn auch die andere Bildung sich eingemischt haben kann, im mhd. *wackzen* die Grundlage gesehen werden. . . . Die Bedeutung 'im Wasser herumtappen, waten' . . . ist wohl keine Weiterbildung von *waten*, sondern wie *watschen* von der Interj. *watsch!* ausgegangen [1, 2, 3].
39. *Watschen* ähnlich wie *patschen* und *quatschen* vom Treten oder Schlagen des Wassers und den Ton nasser Gegenstände; *watschen*, *wätschen* = schlagen, ohrfeigen, eig. schlagen dass es patscht; von der Interj. *watsch!* gebildet; in Aachen, bei den Haaren raufen, zerzausen; *watschen* schwätzen, klatschen, Nbf. zu *waschen* 8 = plaudern. *watschern* = unverständlich reden (Silesia, Saxony, Lausitz); *watschkern* = plappern (Silesia); *watscheln* = schwätzen [1, 2, 3, 10, 11].

These words are listed separately, but there is no reason why they might not all be derived from the base *Watz* = *Stosz*. The connection between 'strike' and 'talk' (*pat*, *patter*) needs no comment.

40. *auszwitchern* = *fritinnire*; *aufzwitchern* = alte *fritinnire*; *zwitchern* mhd. *zwitchern* [10, 11].

41. *ausgrätscheln* = divaricare pedes, ausspreizen; *ausgrätschen*, dasselbe; *auskrätschen* = *ausgrätschen*, *grätschen* (Muret-Sanders) 'to straddle,' 'to do the splits': *gratteln*, weitbeinig gehen. The Carinthian *grätschen* = einen erwischen, ertappen, is reminiscent of Nos. 12, 13, otherwise there is no connection between this group and the Middle High German words.
42. *aus hatschen*, *aus hutschen* = subito egredi; in Bayern *hatsch aus!* auch *katschaus!* *katzaus!* *hutschen* = reizen, locken; *anhutschen* = instigare [12, 13]; *huschen* = flüchtig über etwas hin gleiten.
43. *ausknätschen* = ausbleuen, ausdrücken; andere schreiben *Knätschen*; *erknätschen*, *erknätschen* = *zerknätschen*; *knätschen* = quetschen; einen Laut, den das Wort nachahmt, hören lassen, wenn man z.B. etwas Weiches in der Hand zerdrückt; mit diesem Laut zerdrücken; zerknittern; *knätschen* (häufiger und älter bezeugt); wie aber der Vokal in dem merkwürdigen Stamme so vielgestaltig ist, in *a*, *ä*, *e*, *i*, *o*, *ö*, *u*, *ü*, *au*, auch *ä*, *ē*, *ī*, *ū*, von denen dieselbe Mundart gewöhnlich mehrere hat, so fast nicht weniger der Wurzelauslaut, denn *knischen*, *knütschen*, *knisten*, *knüsten*, *knätschen*, *knätschen*, *knüssen*, *knauzen* sind von einer Bedeutung [4-9].
44. *knätschen*, *knätschen* = drückend quetschen; schlagen, zerschlagen; kneten, von weichen Dingen; mhd. *knüsten* [4-9].
45. *knätschen*, ein schwieriges md. und obd. Wort; von gewissen Tönen, die durch das *tsch* bezeichnet werden sollen, wie unter *Knätsch* (breiartig kotiger Boden, Strassenschmutz, henneb., thür., niederrh., sächs., wohl anderwärts. Es heisst auch *Mätsch*, *Pätsch*, *Trätsch*, *Mätsch*, alle mit dem *tsch*, das man da als lautmalend empfindet); (a) essen dass es *knätscht*, wenn man z.B. eine saftige Birne beiszt; (b) daher gleich *knätschend* kauen, mit Geräusch essen; (c) etwa pressen, zertreten, das jenen Ton gibt, z.B. saftiges Obst; (d) in eine *knätschige* Masse treten, darin herumtreten oder kneten [4-9].
46. *knätschen* = weinen, in Bonn; schl. *knätschen*, *knätschen*; in Sachsen vom Weinen kleiner Kinder; auch *knätschen*, *knaetschen*, *knätschen*; nass. *knätschen* = breit reden. Es wird doch mit vorigem *knätschen* eins sein [4-9, 10, 11].
47. *knätschen* gleich *knätschen* schon im 15. Jh. = *zerknätschen*; *Knätschbeere*, die beim Brechen knackt [4-9].
48. *knorzen*, *knorzen* = (1) kneten, knätschen, quetschen; Trauben im Troge *knorzen*, Sauerkraut *knorzen*, Teig anmachen; vom Kneten der Wäsche; (2) schweiz. *knorzen*, *knörtschen*, *knorschen* vom klatschenden Reiben, Kneten bei der Wäsche, vom Patschen in Nässe und Kot: *knorren* = knirschen, *knorsen* = zerknirschen, u.s.w. [4-9].
49. *banschen*, *bantschen* = füllen, anfüllen, in sich füllen, gierig, mit vollen Backen essen: gehört zu *Bansch*, *Bantsch* = venter, Fr. *panse*, Ital. *pancia* ( ).
50. *panschen*, *pantschen* = (1) schlagen, bes. Kinder mit der flachen Hand; (2) worin herumwühlen, Flüssigkeiten mischen, bes. Getränke womit mischen

- und dadurch fälschen; (3) durcheinander essen; schmatzend essen, schmausen: *Pamps*, *Pams*=dicke, pappige Masse; *Pams*=Dickbauch [1-3, 10, 11].
51. *bluntschen*=plumpen, platschen, ins Wasser fallen: *bluntsch*=plump; cf. Eng. *blunt* [1, 2, 3].
52. *britschen*=ferire, mit der Hand, dem Brett, u.s.w. *britschen*; die Türen schmeiszen, ein und aus britschen; aus dem Dienst jagen; mit der Hand ins Wasser schlagen, platschen; Weine *britschen*=mischen; klatschen, platschen; cf. *britschnass* [1, 2, 3].
53. *pritschen*=mit der *Pritsche* schlagen, überhaupt Schläge geben (abgeleitet von *pritsch*=hin, fort, verloren); sich davon machen; trans. einen hintergehen [1, 2, 3].
54. *däntscheln* (1) wie *dätscheln*, *däscheln*,=streicheln, schmeichelnd klopfen; (2) Leckerbissen kochen, köcheln: *däntsch*=Backwerk. The first meaning points to a form of *tätscheln* with *n*-infix [1, 2, 3].
55. *dätscheln*, *tätscheln*, wie *däntscheln*. Die Süddentschen gebrauchen *datschen*, *dätschen* (1) für etwas Weiches, bes. Teig drücken, draufschlagen, dass es schallt, platschen, liebkosend und vertraulich streicheln: die Mutter *dätschelt* das Kind im Bade; (2) antasten, angreifen, und dabei tändeln und schöntun. *datschen*=mit Teig umgehen; *dätschen*=fallen. *zsdätschen*, mit einem Schlag zsfallen: *Datsch*, *Dätsch*, *Dotsch*=ein harter Schlag mit der flachen Hand; Teig; Mehlspeise, u.s.w. [1, 2, 3, 4-9].
56. *durchflitschen*=durchfliegen (like an arrow). *flitscheln*=flattern, mit den Flügeln schlagen; *flitschen*=(1) dasselbe; (2) schwirren, von dem Laut, den eine geschwungene Gerte, ein geschossener Pfeil in der Luft rege macht; auch für Plätschern, Flistern des Wassers; *flitschern*=sursurrare, flistern [12, 13].
57. *durchmautschen*=durchmengen; *manschen*, *mäntschen* masalierte Form zu . . . *matschen*=manibus aliquid indecore tractare; im Wasser, im Teige, im Drecke *manschen*; *manchen* ist ein Pöbelwort, womit man das grauenerweckende Umgehen mit Speisen und Brühen, da man with Händen darein greift und menget, zu verstehen gibt [4-9].
58. *durchwitschen*=durchschlüpfen; *durchwischen* [12-13].
59. *flintschen* oder *flitschen*; "*flintscherigen* oder *Flinkenerz* wird genennet, was vom sichtigen Erz man auf dem Gestein liegen sieht"; "*flitsch* oder *flammet Gold*" [12-13].
60. *flunschen*, *fluntschen*=os *distorquere*: *Flans*=Maul, *Fluns*, *Flunsch*, *Fluntsch*=verzogenes Maul.
61. *flutschen*, *flutschern*=(1) vom Federvieh, kränkeln, das Gefieder aufblasen; (2) mit vielen Thränen weinen [2, 12-13].
62. *forträtschen*=fortregnen; *tratschen*, *trätschen*=jabber, chatter (Muret-Sanders); *Drasch*, *Dräsch*=Lärm, Geschwätz [10-12].
63. *frätscheln*, *frätscheln* was frägeln, forscheln, wiederholt fragen, schwätzen [10-11].

64. *futschen* (Glarus) = gleiten, hin und her rutschen; (Thür.) ausgleiten; pommerisch, heimlich in die Tasche steckend entwenden: from *fuschen*, *fusen* in similar meanings [12-13, 14-16].
65. *gautschen*, *gäutschen* = (1) schaukeln, schwanken; (2) wiegen; (3) *getschen* = schwanken; der Schwebwasen im Gesümpf *getschet*, wenn man darauf tritt; (4) von Wasser, Wein und ähnl. übertragen, durch Schwanken ausfließen, u.s.w. Die ursprüngliche Form wird *gauzen*, älter *güzen* gewesen sein. Cf. also *gausen*, *geusen* = Flüssiges mischen.
66. *gautschen*, *gäutschen* = bellen, schreien: *gauzen*, *gäuzen* = bellen, schreien.
67. *hatschen*, *hätschen* = (1) vom schleifenden, schleppenden Gang, wie er namentlich durch altes nicht fest an den Füßen sitzendes Schuhwerk hervorgerufen wird; (2) von der gleitenden, streichelnden Bewegung der Hände geht das tirolische *hatschen* aus = streichelnd lieblosen; bair. *hetschen* = schwanken, schaukeln [14-16]. Similarly, *hätscheln*, etc.
68. *hetschen* (Nbf. zu *heschen*) schluchzen [10-11].
69. *katschen*, sächs. heizt der schmatzende Klang bei lautem Essen *Kätschen* oder *Katschen*; auch garstig oder langsam kauen; schles. = verwirren, von Fäden: schles. *kesche* = eine Speise; nahe liegt ein sl. Wort *kaša* = Brei [4-9].
70. *ketschen* = schleppen, mit Mühe ziehen, tragen, schleppen: *kegen* = ziehen, schleppen, Eng. *cadger* = 'huckster' [14-16]. *kötschen*, a variant.
71. *kratschen*, *krautschen* = die Erde um die Pflanzen auflockern, von Unkraut reinigen: *kratzen* ( ).
72. *kratschen* = knirschen, knistern: *krascheln* with same meanings [4-9].
73. *krätschen* = groll schreien; kärnt. *grätschen* = schreien, lärmern, krachen; schwäb. *vergrätschen* = ausplaudern: *krassen* vom Geschrei des Raben [10-11].
74. *kreitschen* = sieden; schreien machen: *kreischen* [10-11].
75. *lutschen* = saugen wie Kinder, ein landschaftlich verbreitetes Tonwort; auch verächtlich für trinken: *ludlen*, *lullen* = saugen, Lor. *lotzen* = saugend lecken, *lutschen* ( ).
76. *lurtschen* = lahmen mit den Füßen; behaglich, langsam trinken, saugen; schnarren: *lurtsch* = link, verkehrt, ungeschickt [14-16].
77. *matschen*, Nbf. zu *manschen* (57) von Nieder- und Mitteldeutschland bis nach dem Süden hin laufend: md. = in solchen Flüssigkeiten (Kot, Brei) herumwühlen; unreinlicherweise in etw. Flüssigem, Weichem herumwühlen [1, 2, 3, 4-9].
78. *petschen*, *petzen* = zwicken, kneipen [12, 13]; *petschen* = trinken (vgl. kneipen); hörbar kauen [10-11]; *pitschen* = zwicken.
79. *pfatschen*, *pfatzen* was *patschen*; knittern, leise knallen [1, 2, 3].
80. *pfützen*, *pfitschen* = pfetzen, zwicken, kneipen, stecken, ritzen [12-13].
81. *pfatschen* was *flatschen*, *platzen* [1, 2, 3].
82. *pfletschen* = sich breit und plump hinsetzen. Cf. No. 37 [17].
83. *pflotschen* = splash; cf. No. 37, *flatschen* 3 [1, 2, 3].



84. *pfnätschen, pfnäschen* = pfneischen, einen Hund durch den Geruch des *Gepfneisches* ködern ( ).
85. *pfutschen, pfütschen* = behend sein, schlüpfen; etwas in aller Hast verrichten [12, 13].
86. *pfutschen* = stümperhaft machen ( ).
87. *prätschen* = schlagen mit einer Prätsche [1, 2, 3].
88. *pratschen* = praschen, prahlen [10-11].
89. *ratschen, rätschen* = rasseln, klappern; von dem Laut der Enten; schnattern; mhd. *retschen*; den Laut *r* schnarrend oder fehlerhaft aussprechen; verächtlich und allgemein obd., schwatzen, plaudern; Karten spielen (böhm. *hrati* = spielen): mhd. *retschen* 10 above, *q.v.* [10-11].
90. *wantscheln* = tauschen, Tauschhandel treiben, vielleicht dissimiliert aus \**waltscheln* (tirol. *waltsch, wälscher* = krämer) ( ).
91. *wantschen, wansten*, den Wanst vollstopfen, unanständig, viel, gierig essen; stalter has *wamschen, wanschen, wantschen*; cf. *Wamme, Wamst* = Bauch ( ).
92. *zätscheln* = zärtlich behandeln, liebkosen (ein Kind), auch verwöhnen; verziehen, zaghaft werden; älter mit *tz* im Sinne von foppen, necken, vexieren; dimin. von *zätschen* mit üblichem Bedeutungswandel von einer körperlichen Bewegung, *zätscheln, zappeln*: *zetzen* [1, 2, 3].
93. *zätschen*, älter *zätzen*, mhd. *zetzen* über *zeckzen* (*zecken* = einen leichten Stosz oder Schlag geben, necken, reizen), foppen, vexieren; schles. *zatschen* = streicheln, liebkosen, *hätscheln*; mit junger onomat. Dehnung, *zaat-schen* = kläglich tun, empfindlich sein, weinerlich klagen [2, 3, 10, 11]; junge lautmalende Bildung *zätschen* aus *zättern* = krähen.
94. *zätschern* = (1) kränklich sein; (2) oberlaus. *zatschern* wabbeln, wohl zu schles. *zetter* = wabbliges Fleisch; (3) schles. *zätschern* = zwitschern ( ).
95. *zötschern* = zwitschern ( ).

The words listed under the paragraphs 18-95 are all (with exceptions noted) from Grimm's *Dictionary* and comprise practically all of the *-tschen* verbs there listed. They present therefore a fair picture of the extent to which the *-tschen* formations, in themselves essentially dialect words, have made their way into the written language.<sup>1</sup> We take it for granted that the yet unpublished parts of that *Dictionary* would not throw the collection out of balance in any one semantic direction.

This list of words tells its own story. We find by close analysis that beginning with three words in Middle High German (1-3) which indicate a fall, stroke, or blow with accompanying noise, and with six

<sup>1</sup> Compounds have sometimes been admitted by reason of the fulness with which they are treated. This is particularly true of the earlier volumes.



(4-9) that denote a grinding, squeezing, crushing by means of blow or pressure, we now have thirty-four words that mean 'to strike,' 'to beat,' and sixteen that mean 'to crush.'

We begin with two words that express utterance, the croaking of frogs and the prattle of human beings. The prattling has nineteen representatives at present, all in the same derogatory sense of idle or superfluous talk, while the noise of the frogs has grown into forty-two noises of all sorts. We must note here, however, that this group is backed up by all those that mean 'to strike,' causing a noise.

From one verb meaning 'to paddle in the water or mud' we now have no less than thirty-four.

The quick movement grows from two to eleven; the gliding, slipping, sliding grows from three to twenty. Besides these more or less clearly defined groups we find the *-tschen* suffix on a large variety of verbs, indicated above by the empty parenthesis ( ), that have no trait in common except the form of the suffix.

Our conclusion is that the consonant group *tsch* has during the six hundred years or more of its existence appeared most frequently in connection with (1) verbs that denote a blow, a fall, a stroke, (2) and particularly when the blow or fall is accompanied with a noise. The large number of these cases should not mislead us. They do not as a rule show any particular attraction of this meaning for the suffix *-tschen*, but are the normal development out of a large group of verbs in *-zen*, more than 50 per cent of which denote a noise, or an utterance, whether of persons or of things. But of all noises that the *tsch* represents, it has selected only one as its especial favorite (3), namely, the noise of splashing water, of slushing or slirting of mud, pattering in dough and the like. Evidently therefore, so soon as, by the change from *s* to *sch* the first word meaning 'to fall' took on the *-tsch-* form, and the first time it was applied to the falling or splashing of a liquid (it was probably the falling of blood<sup>1</sup> from the wounds of some embattled knight), this verb with this sound was felt to be a word fitly spoken. Or its origin may have been humbler. A child pattering in a forbidden mud puddle, slapping the water with a stick, may have made the first change *klatzen* = *klatschen*. Most probably the knight on the field of honor, the child at its play, the mother at her dough-tray,

<sup>1</sup> See example under *patschen* in Lexer's *Middle High German Dictionary*.

the peasant trudging through the rain to his daily task—all discovered this happy combination at once in various parts of the country, and each person hearing it noted its aptness and added to its spread. This is the sense in which we understand Gerland's reference to intentional onomatopoea. This is one of the *neuen Triebe, wilden Schosse* of Winteler. But the folk was, in legal terminology, accessory after, not before the fact. However, the fact that *tsch* has in the popular mind such a sound-painting effect seems clear, not merely by reason of the number of examples, nor by reason of the repeated assertion of writers on the subject, but also by such cases as *bluntschen, ausfletschen* (56, 37), etc., above, where the meaning seems unquestionably to have followed the suffix.

Meanwhile, the regular change of *s* to *sch* in a variety of other words found more or less ready acceptance, as noted above. The application of the *-tschen* suffix to verbs denoting idle talk seems phenomenal until we reflect upon the close semantic relation between words meaning 'to strike,' 'to pat,' and 'to talk,' 'to patter.'

It is not necessary to refer every case of a *-tschen* verb to a *-tzen* form. Many of these groups have forms in *s, ss, sch, st* (cf. No. 43). Let us suppose in a given dialect the words *knützen, knüschen, knütschen*, all meaning 'to mash a soft potato.' The word *manschen* or *queschen* or *questen*, for example, in the same dialect, and with the same or a similar meaning, might readily take on the *tsch* suffix. This must surely have been the process in a number of cases which have given no end of difficulty to the lexicographer.

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## PROPRIETY IN THE LIGHT OF LINGUISTICS<sup>1</sup>

**S**TRANGE as it may seem, the notion of good behavior is often gained from verbs serving primarily to express a motion. It is quite evident that there exists a relationship between such terms as Ger. *schicken-schicklich*, Eng. *to come-comely*, Fr. *passer-passable*, etc.

A closer investigation shows that quite a number of verbs of motion when used figuratively can acquire the meaning of propriety, fitness, or suitability, and that terms denoting propriety, fitness, or suitability are frequently connected with verbs of motion.<sup>2</sup> This fact holds good not only for German, English, and French, but for Indo-Germanic languages altogether.

A few examples selected from the Germanic, Romance, and ancient languages may serve to illustrate this particular metaphoric use of terms expressing motion. The arrangement we have chosen is by parts of speech. Within these the material is arranged by languages.

### A. VERBS

#### I. GERMANIC LANGUAGES

Ger. *sich benehmen* (*nehmen* to take) to conduct, deport, behave one's self, as: *sich nicht zu benehmen wissen* to be unmannerly (or awkward), not to be accustomed to society.

Ger. *sich betragen* (*tragen* to carry) to behave, conduct, demean one's self, as: *sie betragen sich schlecht* they don't behave well, they misbehave.

Ger. *sich aufführen* (*führen* to lead, carry, convey, bring) to behave, conduct one's self, to deport, comport one's self, as: *er führt sich sehr gut auf* he behaves very well.

<sup>1</sup> Abbreviations used: a., adjective; imp., impersonal; lit., literally; n., noun; n. (in quotations), neuter; OI, Old Indic; p.a., participial adjective; p.p., past participle; p.pr., participle present; s., *sich*; sb. (in quotations), substantive; v.a., verb active; v.dep., verb deponent; v.i., verb intransitive; *Wb.*, *Wörterbuch*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. e.g., nouns like Eng. *bearing* (fig. behavior), *carriage* (fig. behavior), *conduct*, *deportment*, and adjectives like *bearable*, *becoming*, *catching* (fig.), *imposing* (fig.), *pliable* (fig.); Ger. *Benehmen*, *Betragen*, *Führung* (fig. conduct), *Gefallen* (liking, pleasure, kindness), *Wandel* (fig. behavior, conduct); *angemessen*, *anziehend*, *bekömmlich*, *erträglich*, *verbindlich*, etc. It is quite evident that these words denoting behavior and similar meanings are derived from verbs of motion.

Ger. *sich schicken* (*schicken* to send) to be fit, appropriate, to become, suit; to accommodate one's self [to], conform [to], comply [with], as: *das schickt sich nicht für ihn* it does not become him; *sich in jemandes Laune . . .*<sup>1</sup> to accommodate one's self to someone.

Ger. *zukommen* (to come to, approach, arrive, <*kommen* to come) imp. to behoove, become; to suit, befit, to be suitable, as: *es kommt mir zu* it belongs to me, it is fit for me, it falls within my province.

Ger. *zutreffen* (*treffen* to meet) to agree, as: *auf ein Haar . . .* to be right to a hair, to prove right.

Eng. *to become* (*to come*) to suit, be suitable, to befit, to accord with in character; to be worthy or proper to, as: "Nothing in his life/*Became* him like the leaving it" (Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, I, 4); "I don't think so much learning *becomes* a young woman" (Sheridan, *The Rivals*, I, 2).

Eng. *to conduct one's self* (to conduct, to lead together, lead) to behave, as: "He *conducted himself* nobly"; "Pray, how is it we should *conduct ourselves*?" (Browning, *The Ring and the Book*, II, 102).

Eng. *to hit* (lit. to strike) to suit, be conformable; to strike, touch properly, as: "This does not *hit* the sense"; "You have *hit* him there since this argument never fails with him." V.i.: to succeed as by a stroke of skill or luck; to agree, suit, fit, to act in harmony, be of one mind, as: "Pray you let us *hit* together" (Shakespeare, *Lear*, I, 1). Cf. to *hit* the nail on the head, to *hit* most effectually, to do or say a thing in the right way; to *hit it off* to agree, be in accord (colloq.).

Eng. *to jump* (lit. to leap, skip, spring), fam. to agree, tally, coincide, as: "In some sort it *jumps* with my humour" (Shakespeare).

## II. ROMANCE LANGUAGES

Fr. *accompagner* (lit. to escort, accompany, follow) to match, suit; to be in keeping with, to set off, as: *cette garniture accompagne bien la robe*; "Son ton, son accent, son propos *accompagnaient* parfaitement sa physionomie" (J. J. Rousseau); "Ses cheveux blonds *accompagnaient* admirablement sa tête virginale" (B. de St. Pierre).

Fr. *se comporter* (*porter* to carry, bring, convey) to behave, behave one's self, as: *se . . . mal ou bien, se . . . d'une certaine manière*.

<sup>1</sup> Ellipses in this connection indicate a word which is repeated and which can easily be understood from the context; the sign < denotes from, i.e., derived from; the sign >, whence, i.e., from which is derived.

Fr. *se conduire* (*conduire* to conduct, lead, guide) to behave, conduct one's self, as: *il se conduit bien*; "*Conduisez-vous avec vos ennemis comme s'ils devaient être un jour vos amis*" (Mme de Staël).

Fr. *convenir* (*venir* to come) to agree, admit, allow, suit, fit, match; to become, to be right, proper; to be convenient, as: *nous en sommes convenus* we have agreed upon this matter; *cette maison ne m'ayant pas convenu*, je ne l'ai pas arrêtée as this house did not suit me I have not rented it; *il ne vous aurait pas convenu* it would not have been proper for you. Imp.: *il convient* it is suitable, advisable, as: *il conviendrait* de tenter le sort des armes it would be advisable to try the chances at war.

Ital. *comportarsi* (*comportare* < *portare* to carry, bring) to behave one's self, as: *comportatevi bene*, e sarete ben voluto da tutti = Fr. *conduisez-vous bien* et tout le monde vous chérira.

Ital. *condursi* (*condurre* to conduct) to behave, as: *condursi bene*.

Ital. *convenire* (lit. to unite together, to assemble) to suit, agree; imp. to be fitting, expedient, as: *convien* correggere sè stesso prima di correggere gli altri = Fr. *il faut d'abord se corriger soi-même avant de corriger les autres*; *convenirsi* to fit one's self to, to accommodate one's self to, as: *non si conviene* ciò.

Ital. *passarsi* (*passare* to pass, go by, to come or go over) to behave, conduct one's self.

Ital. *venirsi* (*venire* to come) to behoove, suit, befit, become.

Span. *comportarse* (*comportar* to carry, bring together) to comport, behave or conduct one's self. Cf. Ital. *comportare* in *comportatevi bene* = Fr. *conduisez-vous bien*.

Span. *conducirse* (*conducir* to conduct, lead, guide) to behave, conduct one's self.

Span. *convenir* (*venir* to come) to agree, fit, suit: ... *en* to settle, agree upon.

Span. *venir* (lit. to come) to fit, suit, as: *esa chaqueta no me viene*.

### III. ANCIENT LANGUAGES

Gr. *εἶκα* (*εἶκω* to be like) to be or look like, to be fit. Imp. *εἶκε* (Homer) it is fitting, right, seemly; Att. to seem likely, seem, as: *ὡς εἶκε* as it seems, as is fitting.

Prellwitz<sup>1</sup> compares the word with Lith. *į-wỹkti* 'eintreffen, 'zutreffen, wahr werden' (Fick, *BB*, 4, 184), *pa-wėikslas* 'Beispiel,' *pa-weikslūs* 'musterhaft,' Lett. *wikstūs* 'schicke mich an' ("s'apprêter à," "to prepare for") which terms, according to him, resemble *ζοικα* in meaning more closely than the etymology proposed by Fick in his *Indogermanisches Wörterbuch*; i.e., OI *viç* to enter, go into, to settle on or in. We do not hesitate to accept Fick's view and consider *ζοικα* a verb of motion which was no longer used in its literal sense, but whose etymology shows that it was originally a verb of motion. It is based on the well-known Skr. root *viç* 'enter.' Cf. Fick, *Wb.*, I<sup>4</sup>, 125: "*veiç*-eintreffen, eingehen. Skr. *viç viçāti vivēça viviçūs viviçré* eintreffen, eingehen. Mit Skr. *vivēça viviçūs viviçré* stimmt lautlich *φέφοικα:φεφικῦια φέφικται*.—*véiços* n. Haus, Wohnung. Skr. *vēças* n.=Got. *veihs* n. Flecken."

Gr. *ικνέομαι* (lit. to come, come to, arrive at, reach); imp. it becomes, it befits, it beseems, as: *τοὺς μάλιστα ικνέεται* (Herodotus ii. 36) whom it most concerns.

Gr. *προσῆκω* (lit. to have come to, to be near, to be at hand; *ἦκω*, properly: I have come, am here (Lat. *adsum*); then simply: to come; fig. to relate or belong to); imp. (1) *προσῆκει πρὸς τινα* it concerns one; with dat. *προσῆκει μοι* it is my business; (2) it belongs to, beseems, befits.

Lat. *agere* (lit. to set in motion, drive, chase, throw out) to act, perform, perform as an actor, hence: to act the part of, to behave like, as: "*id agunt ut viri boni esse videantur*" (they behave so as to give the appearance of good men (Cicero); ". . . amicum" to behave like a friend (Tacitus).

Lat. *congruere* (lit. to run, come or meet together) to be suited or fitted, to correspond, agree, as: ". . . et cohaerere cum causa" to be in keeping with the case (Cicero).

Lat. *convenire* (lit. to come together) to coincide, to agree with, harmonize, to be fit, becoming, suitable, proper, applicable, as: "*nec vero hoc in te unum convenit*" this is certainly not applicable to you in particular (Cicero).

<sup>1</sup> W. Prellwitz, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der griechischen Sprache* (2. Aufl.; Göttingen, 1905); É. Boisacq, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* (Heidelberg and Paris, 1916), s.v. *εικόν*, quotes "lith. *parėikslas* 'example,' *pa-veikslūs* 'exemplaire,' aj. lett. *wikstūs* s'apprêter à; Bezenberger, *BB*, 27, 141." He does not mention the OI *viç*.

## B. ADJECTIVES (AND ADVERBS)

## I. GERMANIC LANGUAGES

Ger. *bekömmlich* (*bekommen, kommen* to come) suitable, fit, as: *es möchte mir nicht bekömmlich sein* it might not agree with me.

Ger. *geschickt* (adj. and adv.; *schicken* to send) skilful, able, appropriate, as: *zu etwas geschickt machen* to enable, fit for something, as: *das kam . . . heraus* that was to the purpose, that was the proper thing to do [or say].

Ger. *schicklich* (*schicken* to send) becoming, proper, appropriate, fit, convenient, suitable, decent, decorous, seemly, as: *jemandem einen schicklichen Platz anweisen* to assign a suitable place to somebody.

Ger. *treffend* (*treffen* to hit, strike, to meet) striking, appropriate, suitable, pertinent, as: *eine treffende Antwort* a suitable [or pertinent] answer; . . . *sein* to be to the point.

Ger. *trefflich* (*treffen*, etc.) very suitable, excellent, exquisite, first rate, as: *eine treffliche Gelegenheit* a rare [i.e., very suitable] opportunity.

Ger. *zutreffend* (p.a. of *zutreffen* < *treffen*, etc.) suitable, just, pertinent, as: *seine Bemerkungen waren durchaus . . .* his remarks were entirely suitable [to the point].

Ger. *zuworkommend* (p.a. of *zuworkommen* to come before someone) obliging, courteous, polite, well bred, refined in manner, as: *sie hat ein sehr zuvorkommendes Wesen*.

Eng. *becoming* (p.a. of *to become* < *to come*) suitable, comely, befitting, appropriate, fit, meet, congruous, as: "This manner is becoming to her" (adv. *becomingly*).

Eng. *comely* (*to come*) decent, suitable, proper, becoming, etc., as: "Is it *comely* that a woman pray unto God uncovered" (I. Cor. 11:13)? "Bashful sincerity, and *comely* love" (Shakespeare, *Much Ado about Nothing*, IV, 1).

Eng. *conformable* (*to conform* < *to form* to give form to, shape, mold) corresponding in form, character, etc.; suitable, fit, as: "*Conformable* to all the rules of correct writing" (Addison); "A subtle, refined policy was *conformable* to the genius of the Italians" (Prescott, *Ferd. and Isa.*, II, 1).

Eng. *convenient* (*to convene* to come together, meet) fit, suitable, proper, appropriate, becoming, as: "My friend arrived at a very *convenient* time"; "Feed me with food *convenient* for me" (Prov. 30:8).



## II. ROMANCE LANGUAGES

Fr. *conforme* (*conformer* < *former* to form, mold, cut out) conformable, congenial, suitable, as: *conforme à la vérité* conformable to the truth, in accordance with the truth; *pour copie ...* a true copy, conformable to the original.

Fr. *congru* (cf. Eng. *to congrue* < Lat. *congruere* to come together) congruous, suitable, consistent, as: *portion congrue* suitable allowance; adv. *congrûment* suitably, congruously.

Fr. *convenable* (*convenir* < *venir* to come) convenient, proper, fit, suitable, becoming, befitting, seemly, decorous; adv. *convenablement* conveniently, suitably, becomingly.

Ital. *conveniente* (*convenire* to come together; to agree, fit, suit < *venire* to come) suitable, proper; *convenevole* suitable, proper, fit, meet; adv. *convenientemente* and *convenevolmente*, *idem*.

Ital. *congruo* (cf. Lat. *congruere* to come together; to agree, suit, fit) congruous, suitable, befitting.

Span. *conveniente* (*convenir* to suit, be fitting, fit, agree < Lat. *convenire* to come together, assemble; to fit, suit < *com-* together and *venire* to come) suitable, fitting.

## III. ANCIENT LANGUAGES

Gr. *ἐοικώς* (p.a.; Homer) < *ἔοικα* meet, fitting, right, as: *ἐοικότι κεῖται ὀλέθρῳ* he lies in fitting ruin; *εἰκυῖα ἄκοιτις* a suitable wife, a help meet for him. *εἵκελος* (like, after the fashion of) < *εἰκός* (neut. ptc. of *ἔοικα*, Ion. *οἰκός* [Herodotus i. 155]) likely, reasonable, fair, equitable; *παρά τὸ εἰκός* unreasonable, *ἐπι-εἵκελος* similar, *ἐπι-εἰκής* fit, suitable, *ἀεικής* unfit, unsuitable; adv. *εἰκότως* in all likelihood, probably, fairly, reasonably, *αἰκής*, *ἐς* unseemly, adv. *ἀϊκῶς* in unseemly fashion.

Gr. *ἱκνούμενος* adv. (p.pr. of *ἱκνέομαι*) fittingly, aright; *τὸ ἱκνεύμενον* (p.n.) that which is fitting, proper.

Gr. *προσήκων*, *-ουσα*, *-ον* (p.a. < *προσῆκω*) belonging to, befitting, befitting, as: *τὸ προσήκον* or *τὰ προσήκοντα* that which belongs to one, all that is proper to someone, what is fit or seemly, one's duties; *προσήκον* (p.n.) used absol., it being fit or becoming (Lat. *quum conveniat* or *conveniret*). *προσηκόντως* (adv. p.pr.) suitably, fitly, becomingly.



Lat. *accommodatus*, *accommodus* (*accommodo* lit. to make one thing of the same size and shape as another) fitted or adapted to a thing, suitable, conformable, as: "quae mihi intelligis esse *accommodatus*" 'conformable to my interest' (Cicero).

Lat. *congruus*, *congruens* (*congruo* lit. to run, come or meet together) agreeing, fit, appropriate, suitable, congruous, as: "ora vacent epulis, alimentaue *congrua* carpant" (Ovid); "*congruens* actio menti" (Cicero).

Lat. *conveniens* (*convenio* to come together, assemble) agreeing, fitting, appropriate, suitable, as: *quid enim philosopho minus . . .* what could be less becoming to a philosopher?

## C. NOUNS

## I. GERMANIC LANGUAGES

Ger. *Anpassung* (*anpassen* to fit, suit < *passen* < Fr. *passer* aller d'un lieu à un autre, traverser) fitting, adaptation, accommodation, adjustment; *Anpasslichkeit*, *Anpassungsvermögen* adaptiveness, as: sein *Anpassungsvermögen* ist erstaunlich.

Ger. *Aufführung* (*aufführen* to raise, erect, construct) behavior, conduct, deportment, manners, as: gute . . . good conduct; rohe . . . ill breeding.

Ger. *Geschick* (*schicken* to send) fitness, aptness, proportion, as: ins . . . bringen to adjust, set right.

Ger. *Schicklichkeit* (*schicken*) becomingness, fitness, propriety; decency, decorum, as: schon die . . . hätte geboten, dass . . . common propriety demanded that. . . . Cf. *Schicklichkeitsgefühl* sense of propriety, tact, chic.

Ger. *Zuworkommenheit* (*zuworkommen* < *kommen* to come) obligingness, complaisance; good breeding, courtesy, as: seine . . . verschafft ihm viele Freunde.

Eng. *becomingness* (*becoming* < *to come*) suitability, congruity, propriety, decency, gracefulness arising from fitness, as: "*Becomingness of virtue*" (Delany, *Christmas Sermon*).

Eng. *chic* (n. and adj.),<sup>1</sup> in English and French obviously owes its origin to German words like *Schick*, *schicklich*, *Schicklichkeit*, which are evidently connected with *schicken* to send. Cf. "*Chic and Charm-*

<sup>1</sup> As regards the origin and meaning of *chic*, cf. p. 425, n. 1.

ing Spring Frocks" (*Baltimore American*, February 26, 1928); "The Ultimate in Winter Chic Badger Fur on Black" (Advt., *Baltimore Evening Sun*, September 10, 1928).

Eng. *comeliness* (*comely* < *to come*) the quality of being comely, becomingness, suitability, fitness, as: "For *comeliness* is a disposing fair/Of things and actions in fit time and place" (Sir J. Davies, *Dancing*).

Eng. *competence*, *competency* (*to compete*, Span. *competir*, Ital. *competere* < Lat. *competere* < *com* together and *petere* seek) fitness, suitability, adequateness, as: "There is no doubt of his . . . for the task."

Eng. *conduct* (< Lat. *conductus*, p.p. of *conducere* to bring together, collect, lead to) personal behavior or practice, deportment, as: "laudable . . .," "evil. . . ."

Eng. *convenience*, *conveniency* (Lat. *convenientia* < *convenire* (t)s, p.pr., suitable, convenient < *convenire* to come together) fitness, congruity, suitability, adaptation, propriety, as: "To debate and question the *convenience* of Divine Ordinations is neither wisdom nor sobriety" (Milton, *Eikonoklastes*, chap. xvii).

## II. ROMANCE LANGUAGES

Fr. *chic* (n. and adj.); cf. p. 425, n. 1.

Fr. *compétence* (*compéter* < Lat. *competere* to go or come together) competence, competency, cognizance, sufficiency, as: *cela n'est pas de ma ...* that is out of my sphere.

Fr. *comportement* (*comporter* < *com* + *porter* to carry) behavior, demeanor, comportment, as: *son ... choque tout le monde*.

Fr. *conduite* (*conduire* to conduct, lead) conduct, manner, as: *homme sans ...*, *manquer de ...*; "Ceux de qui la ... offre le plus à rire sont toujours sur autrui les premiers à médire" (Molière).

Fr. *convenance* (*convenir* = *con* + *venir* to come) convenience, fitness, propriety, expediency, seemliness, congruity, suitability, decency, as: *il a tout à sa ...* he has everything at his convenience; *convenances*, pl., good manners, propriety, etiquette, decorum, as: *... de fortune* suitability of fortune; *mariage de ...* suitable, prudent marriage; *raisons de ...* reasons of expedience; *blesses les convenances* to offend against propriety.

Ital. *condotta* (*conducere, condurre* to guide, lead, accompany) conduct, behavior, culture, as: *uomo di ... a well-bred man*.

Ital. *congruenza, congruita* (cf. *congruo, congruente* suitable, appropriate < Lat. *congruere* to run to come or meet together), suitable-ness, fitness, propriety, becomingness.

Ital. *convenienza, convenienza* (*convenire* to come together) propriety, fitness, agreement; *convenevolezza* decency, respectability, becomingness, convenience; *convenevole* (m.; adj. and n.) decency, decorum, as: *fare i convenevoli* to display good manners.

Span. *comportamiento* (*comportar* = Ital. *comportare* < ML *comportare* to behave < Lat. *comportare, comportare* to bring together) comportment, behavior, demeanor, deportment.

Span. *conducta* (*conducir* to conduct, take, guide, drive) behavior, conduct.

Span. *conveniencia* (< Lat. *convenientia* < *convenien(t)s* suitable, convenient < *convenire* to come together) convenience, fitness, suitability, propriety.

### III. ANCIENT LANGUAGES

Gr. *εἰκών, ἡ* (*εἰκω* > *εἰκα* < OI *viç* to enter, go into, settle on or in; cf. the explanations given by Prellwitz and Fick (p. 306), image, likeness, a semblance, a simile, as: *θηρὸς ἐχθίστου δάκους εἰκὼ φέροντα πολέμιος ἐπ' ἀσπίδος* bearing on his hostile shield the image of a most dangerous wild beast (Aesch. *Sept.* 559).

Gr. *τρόπος, ὁ* (< *τρέπω*; Lat. *torqueo-* to turn) a way, manner, fashion, mode; of persons—a way of life-habit, custom; a man's habits, character, temper, conduct, as: *ἐν τρόποις Ἰξίονος* after the fashion of Ixion; *βάρβαρον τρόπον* in barbarous fashion; *πρὸς τοῦ κύρου τρόπον* suitably to his temper or taste; *τρόπον τινὰ ἔχειν, τρόπῳ τινὶ χρῆσθαι* to behave, conduct, demean one's self. Cf. *εὐ-τραπελία, ἡ*, wit, liveliness, politeness (Lat. *urbanitas*); coarse jesting, ribaldry < *εὐ-τράπελος, ον*, easily turning; fig. versatile, ingenious, clever, witty, lively; tricky, dishonest.

Gr. *τύπος, ὁ* (*τύπτω* to beat, strike) a type, a figure, as: *τύπος ῥήτορος* (Plato *Republic*).

Lat. *competentia* (*competo* to go or come together) agreement, fitness, competence, as: *secundum naturalem membrorum omnium inter se competentiam* (Gellius).

Lat. *compositio* (*compono* to put, place, lay or bring together) a proper arrangement of words (in rhetoric), as: . . . *apta* (Cicero); a settlement of differences, reconciliation, as: *de compositione agere, loqui* (Caesar).

Lat. *congruentia* (*congruo* to run, come or meet together) agreement, harmony, fitness, symmetry, as: . . . *morum* (Suetonius).

Lat. *convenientia* (<*conveniens* <*convenio* to come together, assemble) agreement, accord, harmony, conformity, fitness, as: . . . *partium* complete symmetry (Cicero).

A few words regarding words of motion no longer used in their literal sense in modern languages may not be out of place. To this class belong, on the one hand, verbs like Eng. *to attract, fit, suit*;<sup>1</sup> Ger. *bequemen, leiden, passen*,<sup>2</sup> whose etymology as well as their equivalents

<sup>1</sup> To attract < Lat. *attractus*, p.p. of *attrahere* < *ad* to + *trahere* to draw, drag or haul; to *fit*, ME *fitten* to array troops, to arrange; Icel. and Norw. *fitja* to knit together; Swed. dial. *fitja* to bind together; cf. Ger. *fitzen* to bind into skeins from *fitze* a skein; cf. also M. Dan. *fidde* to knit and Dan. *fid* a skein (Skeat); to *suit* (=to harmonize); cf. Fr. *suite*, VL\* *sequita* following, series from *\*sequere* to follow; Lat. *sequor, secutus*, v.dep., to follow, to come or go after, toward or to.

<sup>2</sup> Ger. *bequemen* goes back to a verb of motion although used only in transferred meaning. It is formed from adj. *bequem* convenient, comfortable, MHG *bequame*, OHG *biquāmi* suitable, fit; related to OE *gecwēme*, ME *tecwēme*, *cwēme* 'agreeable, suitable; the base *\*qēmi* is a v.a. from Goth. *qiman*, OHG *chuman* to come, for which the figurative sense of 'to be fitting, to suit' already existed in Goth. *gaquimip* it is fitting; cf. OE *becuman*, Eng. *become* as well as Ger. *kommen* and Lat. *convenire* to fit in with, to be becoming, to suit. *Bequemen* is used reflexively only, as: *sich nach etwas . . . to conform [or submit] to*, s.t., *sich zu etwas . . . to condescend [or to yield]*, to s.t., adj. *bequem* lazy, indolent; convenient, commodious, fit, as: *er ist sehr bequem* he does not like to be put to any inconvenience; *wann es Ihnen bequem ist* at your convenience [or leisure], when it suits you. N. *Bequemlichkeit*; cf. *Bequemlichkeitsliebe*. *Leiden* originally meant 'to go.' It is an equivalent of MHG *liden*; OHG *lidan* to go, proceed; OE *līpan*, Goth. *leiþan* to go. In OHG and MHG it is used both in the above-mentioned original and in the figurative sense of 'to endure, suffer, put up with.' It is generally assumed that *līpan* from the meaning of 'traveling in a foreign land and across the sea' acquired the sense of 'being uncomfortable, bearing in patience, suffering.' Cf.

"dat sagētun mī sfolldante  
westar ubar wentilsþo . . ." (*Hildebrandslied*, l. 42).

In modern German, *leiden* became restricted to the figurative sense of to suffer, endure, and similar meanings; to allow, admit; to like, tolerate, as: *Anfechtungen . . . to undergo temptations*; *bei jm. wohl gelitten sein* to be in favor with some one, to be in someone's good books; adj. *leidlich* tolerable, passable; *unleidlich* insufferable, intolerable. Cf. *leiten*, from the equivalent MHG and OHG *leiten*, corresponding to OS *lēdan*, OE *lædan*, Eng. *to lead*. It is considered an ancient factitive of *leiden*, meaning lit. to cause to go, and probably derived from Goth. *\*laidjan*, factitive of Goth. *līpan* to go. *Passen* came into the German language during NHG time, from Fr. *passer* to go from one place to another; not to play, *pass* [at cards]. This latter meaning was retained in German; but the word assumed likewise the meaning of to fit, suit, match, in a literal and figurative sense, as: *der Schlüssel passt zum Schloss* 'the key fits the lock'; *er passt in jede Gesellschaft* 'he is fitted for any society'; *wie das passt!* how nicely that suits!; falls es Ihnen *passt* if it is convenient to you; adj. *passlich* fit, suitable, convenient; *passend*; n. *Passlich-*

in other languages point to the fact that they were originally verbs of motion;<sup>1</sup> on the other hand, a class of verbs such as Ger. *widerfahren*,

*keit*. Cf. *unpassend, unpässig, Unpässlichkeit*. *Anpassen* 'to fit, suit (lit. and fig.); fig. to accommodate, adapt: dem geringsten Fassungsvermögen *angepasst* suited to the meanest capacity; reflex to conform [to], as: man muss sich den Sitten eines Landes *anpassen* one must conform to the customs of a country; *Anpassung* fitting, accommodation; *Anpasslichkeit* adaptiveness.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. also such terms as Eng. *demeanor, amenable*; Ger. *billig*; Eng. + Fr. *chic*; and others. Although their present appearance hardly shows it, yet their etymology makes it clear that they were originally connected with verbs of motion. Eng. *demeanor* < *demean* (n. + adj.) Fr. *démener* to conduct < *mener* to lead, VL *mināre* (for Lat. *minari*) to conduct, lead about, also: to drive out, chase away; Eng. adj. *amenable* (fig.) easy to lead < Fr. *amener* to lead to, bring to < Fr. *à* to + *mener* to conduct, lead, drive < Lat. *ad* to, VL *mindre* (for *mindri*).

Ger. adj. *billig* (< *billigen*) equitable, just, fair, reasonable; MHG *billich*, OHG *billich* 'gemäss, geziemend.' Cf. Meringer (IF, XVIII, 284): "*billig* setzt ein \**bill* voraus der Bedeutung 'behauen, eben, glatt, passend gemacht' (vgl. ahd. *billōn* 'polire'). mhd. *billich* 'passend, recht.' Wegen der Bedeutungsentwicklung, vgl. engl. *fair* und got. *fagra* IF. 16,176; 17,159."

As regards origin and meaning of Eng.-Fr. *chic*, we find various explanations in standard dictionaries. The Oxford *New English Dictionary* offers the following interpretation: "*Chic*, sb. & a. *slang* (Fr. *chic*, of uncertain origin; it has been variously referred to G. *schick* tact, skill, and viewed as an abbreviation of *chicane*: see Littré). A. sb. Artistic skill and dexterity; 'style', such as gives an air of superior excellence to a person or thing. 1856 Lever *Martin's of Cro' M.* 321. The French have invented a slang word . . . and by the expression '*Chic*' have designated a certain property by which objects assert their undoubted superiority over all their counterfeits. [Examples follow from 1882 and 1887.] 1888: *Pall Mall G.* 6. Sept. 4/2. Her voice is sweet and her delivery artistic, but she is wanting in what the French call *chic*—an untranslatable word, denoting an indispensable quality. B. a. (not so used in F.) 'Stylish,' in the best of fashion and the best of taste." Three examples follow from Eng., from 1879, 1888, and 1887. Webster's *Dictionary* has: "*Chic* n. (F.) Great artistic cleverness or skill, esp. in painting, that which gives an air of great excellence to a person or thing; good form; style. *Colloq.* 'Sometimes charm is mere *chic*, cachet, style, order & movement in carriage.' W. C. Brownell. *Chic* a. (F.) Original and in good taste or form; characterized by *chic*. *Colloq.*" The *Century Dictionary* interprets: "E. *chic*, a. & n., as a Fr. word, usually explained fr. G. *geschick*, aptness, skill, address, *geschickt*, apt, clever, *schicken* adapt (o.s.), bring about, caus. of *ge-schehen*, happen; otherwise referred to OF. *chic* small; cp. E. *chicane* < Fr. *chicane* trickery, caviling, < *chicaner*, probably OF. *chic* small, little (de *chic* à *chic*, from little to little); as a noun, a little piece, finesse, subtlety, etc." Funk and Wagnall's *Standard Desk Dictionary* renders Eng. *chic* adj. by "natty, clever, striking, stylish" and Eng. *chic* n. by "1. Originality, taste, as in dress. 2. Facility and cleverness in execution. 3. Airiness or smartness of manner (Fr. < Ger. *geschick*, skill)." E. Littré, in his *Dictionnaire de la langue française*, offers the following interpretation: "*chic*: 1) Autrefois, mot du style familier signifiant abus des procédures, finesse, subtilités captieuses: cet homme entend le *chic*, est versé dans les détours de la *chicane*. 'La discorde, qui sait le *chic*, En fait faire un décret public.' La *Henriade* travestie, ch. V, p. 68, dans Fr. Michel, *Argot*. 2) Aujourd'hui, terme d'atelier: on dit d'un peintre qu'il a ou qu'il entend le *chic*, quand il produit rapidement et avec facilité des tableaux à effet. 'J'use de mots de l'art, je mets en marge hic; J'espère avec le temps que j'entendrais le *chic*.' *Satyres* de Du Lorens, *Sat.* XII, p. 97, dans Fr. Michel, *Argot*. Fig. Il a le *chic*, se dit, dans un langage très-familier, d'un homme adroit, qui sait s'y bien prendre. En un autre sens, il a du *chic*, se dit d'un élégant, ou d'une chose élégante et bien tournée: ce chapeau a du *chic*. Etym. Il est possible que ce mot dans le second sens, vienne de l'allemand *Schick*, aptitude, façon, tournure. Quant au premier sens, qui est ancien puisqu'il se trouve dans Trévoux, le doute est grand, à moins qu'on n'y voie une abréviation comique de *chicane*." *Petit Larousse Illustré* states: "*chic* n.m. (de *chicane*). Pop. Terme d'atelier pour exprimer une certaine habileté de main dans les arts;

*befolgen*, *ergehen*, *übereintreffen* (-kommen), which likewise are limited to a metamorphic sense expressing propriety and kindred meanings. Cf. also, e.g., Eng. *to become*, *forego*, *undergo*; Fr. *attraire*, *circonvenir*, *contrevenir*. It is evident that this latter class represents verbal compounds belonging to simple verbs which in their literary sense frequently occur in everyday language; hence it is not necessary to refer to etymology or to equivalents in other languages in order to prove that they must originally have been verbs of motion. Cf. Eng. *to come* and *become*, *go* and *forego*; Ger. *folgen* and *befolgen*, *gehen* and *ergehen*; Fr. *traire* and *attraire*, *venir* and *circonvenir*, etc.

It is noteworthy that quite a number of verbs of motion attain the meaning of propriety, etc., chiefly when used reflexively. Lat. *gero*, e.g., acquires in conjunction with the reflexive pronoun the signification of 'to bear one's self' in the sense of 'to deport,' 'to behave,' 'to conduct one's self.' Cf. cases like Eng. *to betake*, *conduct one's self*; Ger. *s. benehmen*, *s. tragen*, *s. betragen*; Fr. *se comporter*, *se conduire* (*conduisez-vous bien*), *se mêler*; Ital. *comportarsi* (*comportatevi bene*), *conducersi*, etc.

In conclusion, the writer wishes to emphasize the fact that there has been no intention on her part to give an exhaustive account of words of motion denoting propriety, etc., in any language. She trusts, however, that a sufficient number of examples has been given in order to illustrate the principle that the idea of good behavior is frequently gained from that of motion pure and simple.

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*tournure hardie, avantageuse: avoir du chic.*" The word is not mentioned in the *Dictionnaire de l'Académie*, nor do we find it in Meyer-Lübke's *Etymolog. Wörterbuch*. Körting (*Lat.-Roman. Wörterbuch*<sup>1</sup>, No. 2132) states: "Span. *chico* (s. unter *ciccam*); davon vielleicht frz. *chic*." It seems obvious that the modern *chic* (cf. *Litttré*) in English and French owes its origin to German words like *Schick*, *schicklich*, *Schicklichkeit*, which are evidently connected with *schicken*.

## THE INJUNCTIVE IN GOTHIC

THE Indo-European injunctive, by some considered the oldest form of the verb in this family of languages, was a series having secondary endings but no augment and used without distinction of tense or mood. Such a verbal concept could develop a number of modal ideas and explain the apparent assumption by the indicative of functions generally regarded as belonging elsewhere. This facilitated the partial disappearance of the subjunctive in classical Sanskrit, Balto-Slavic, and Germanic and of the optative in Italic. Through the *Auslautgesetze* the differences in Germanic between primary and secondary endings were lost, causing a coincidence of indicative and injunctive forms and leading to a mingling of function. The Indo-European injunctive took on the functions of an indicative (mainly past, but also enclitic present), of a volitive, and of a future. An attempt is made here to trace the survival of the injunctive in Gothic with special reference to the volitive and future functions. Stability in the use of Gothic modes was not well marked and considerable variation is found, a variation due in part, of course, to the embarrassment of translating the wealth of forms of the Greek verb. In the footnotes the Greek original of the Gothic is given. Without it the understanding of the latter, even if not impossible, is at any rate difficult. The accompanying Greek serves moreover the useful purpose of comparison and contrast. The Gothic text is that of Streitberg's *Die gotische Bibel* (Heidelberg, 1919).

### I

In each of the following examples except the last the Gothic uses indicative and optative (subjunctive) forms in parallel constructions, while the corresponding Greek verbs agree with themselves in mode. Even if the indicative was not injunctive originally, it has acquired a modal force through analogy or otherwise. In the last example the situation is reversed, the Gothic *wairþiþ* representing first a Greek aorist subjunctive and second a future indicative.



Matt. 6:31 Ni maurnaiþ nu qibandans: hva *matjam* aiþþau hva *drigkam* aiþþau hve *wasjaima*?<sup>1</sup>

Luke 17:8 Ak niu qibiþ du imma: manwei hva du naht jah bigaurdands andbahtei mis, unte matja jah drigka, jah biþe *gamatjis* jah *gadrigkais* þu?<sup>2</sup>

John 6:53 Nibai *matjiþ* leik þis sunaus mans jah *driggaþiþ* is bloþ, ni habaiþ libain in izwis silbam.<sup>3</sup>

I Cor. 11:27 Eiþan hvazuh saei *matjiþ* þana hlaif aiþþau *drigkai* þana stikl frauþins unwairþaba frauþins skula wairþiþ leikis jah bloþis frauþins (cf. I Cor. 11:29 where Gothic uses *matjiþ* jah *drigkiþ*).<sup>4</sup>

Matt. 10:38 Jah saei ni *nimiþ* galgan seinana jah *laistjai* afar mis, nist meina wairþs.<sup>5</sup>

Matt. 5:19 Iþ saei ni *gatairiþ* aina anabusne þizo minnistono jah *laisjai* swa mans, minista haitada in þiudangardjai himine; iþ saei *tauþiþ* jah *laisjai* swa, sah mikils haitada in þiudangardjai himine.<sup>6</sup>

John 7:17 Jabai hvas wili wiljan is taujan, ufkunnaþ bi þo laisein framuh guda *siþai*, þau iku fram mis silbin *rodja*.<sup>7</sup>

John 12:5 Duhve þata balsan ni frabauht *was* in 't' skatte jah fradailiþ *wesi* þarbam?<sup>8</sup>

Col. 3:4 þan Xristus swikunþs *wairþiþ*, libains izwara, þanuh jah jus bairhtai *wairþiþ* miþ imma in wulþau.<sup>9</sup>

## II

a) In the examples of this group are seen various shades of the volitive idea. The first example shows the mere stem used as imperative second singular. The others are usually explained as indicatives employed as imperatives (but see Wilmanns, III, 6).

Matt. 5:29 Iþ jabai augo þein þata taihswo marzjai þuk, *usstagg* ita jah *wairp* af þus.<sup>10</sup>

Matt. 9:38 *Bidjiþ* nu frauþan asanais.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>1</sup> μὴ οὖν μεριμνήσῃτε λέγοντες· τί φάγομεν ἢ τί πίωμεν ἢ περιβαλώμεθα;

<sup>2</sup> ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐρεῖ αὐτοῦ· ἐτοίμασον τίθειν ἐν ἡμῶν, καὶ περιζωσάμενος διακόνει μοι, ὥς φάγω καὶ πίω, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα φάγεσθαι καὶ πίεσαι σύ;

<sup>3</sup> ἐὰν μὴ φάγητε τὴν σάρκα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ πίνετε αὐτοῦ τὸ αἷμα, οὐκ ἔχετε ζωὴν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς.

<sup>4</sup> ὥστε ὅς ἂν ἐσθίῃ τὸν ἄρτον τούτων ἢ πίνῃ ποτῆριον τοῦ κυρίου ἀνάξιος, τοῦ κυρίου ἐσθίεις ἐσται τοῦ σώματος καὶ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ κυρίου.

<sup>5</sup> καὶ ὅς οὐ λαμβάνει τὸν σταυρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ ὀπίσω μου, οὐκ ἔστιν μου ἕξιος.

<sup>6</sup> ὅς ἐὰν οὖν λίσσῃ μίαν τῶν ἐντολῶν τούτων τῶν ἐλαχίστων καὶ διδάξῃ οὕτως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐλαχίστος κληθήσεται ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τῶν οὐρανῶν· ὅς δ' ἂν ποιῇ καὶ διδάξῃ, οὗτος μέγας κληθήσεται ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τῶν οὐρανῶν.

<sup>7</sup> ἐὰν τις θέλῃ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ ποιεῖν, γνώσεται περὶ τῆς διδαχῆς πότερον ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐγὼ ἀπ' ἑμαυτοῦ λαλῶ.

<sup>8</sup> διὰ τοῦτο τοῦτο τὸ μῦρον οὐκ ἐπράθη τριακοσίων θηναρίων καὶ ἐδόθη πτωχοῖς;

<sup>9</sup> ὅταν ὁ χρίστος φανερωθῇ, ἡ ζωὴ ὑμῶν, τότε καὶ ὑμεῖς σὺν αὐτῷ φανερωθήσεσθε ἐν δόξῃ.

<sup>10</sup> εἰ θεὸς ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς σου ὁ δεξιὸς σκανδαλίζει σε, ἔξελε αὐτόν καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ.

<sup>11</sup> δεήθητε οὖν τοῦ κυρίου τοῦ θερισμοῦ.

Matt. 9:30 *Saihvats ei manna ni witi*.<sup>1</sup>

Matt. 27:49 *Ip þai anþarai qeþun: let, ei saihvam*.<sup>2</sup>

John 11:7 *Qaþ du siponjam: gaggam in Judaian aftra*.<sup>3</sup>

I Cor. 15:32 *Matjam jah drigkam, unte du maurgina gaswiltam*.<sup>4</sup>

b) The citations below containing the Gothic optative are parallel with those just preceding and serve to show their modal nature.

John 7:37 *Jabai hvana þaursjai, gaggai du mis jah driggkai*.<sup>5</sup>

Matt. 6:3 *Ni witi hleidumei þeina*.<sup>6</sup>

Matt. 8:13 *Swaswe galaubides wairþai þus*.<sup>7</sup>

Mark 7:10 *Saei ubil qipai attin seinamma aiþþau aiþein seinai, dauþau afdauþjaidau*.<sup>8</sup>

John 12:26 *Jabai mis hvas andbahtjai, mik laistjai*.<sup>9</sup>

I Tim. 6:2 *Appan þaiei galaubjandans haband frauþans ni frakunneina, unte broþrþus sind, ak mais skalkinona, unte galaubjandans sind jah liubai*.<sup>10</sup>

Numerous other citations of this sort can be given.

c) In Luke 10:2-10 one finds optatives and imperatives in parallel constructions. But the negative command prefers the optative.

### III

a) In Rom. 7:7 (*Hva nu qipam?*)<sup>11</sup> the indicative is used to translate the Greek deliberative future.

b) In the following the optative is similarly used:

Mark 12:9 *Hva nu taujai frauþa þis weinagardis?*<sup>12</sup>

Mark 15:36 *Qimaiu Helias athafjan ina?*<sup>13</sup>

c) The optative of the next corresponds to the Greek present.

I Cor. 10:30 *Jabai ik anstai andnima, duhve anaqibaidau in pize ik awi-liudo?*<sup>14</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ðræte mþeitis gignwsketw.*

<sup>2</sup> *oi ðe λοιποι ελεγον· αφετε ιδωμεν.*

<sup>3</sup> *λεγει τοις μαθηταις· δγωμεν εις την 'Ιουδαίαν πάλιν.*

<sup>4</sup> *φάγωμεν και πίνωμεν, αβριον γάρ αποσπνήσκομεν.*

<sup>5</sup> *έάν τις διψή, έρχέσθω προς με και πινέτω.*

<sup>7</sup> *ως έπιστευσας γεννηθήτω σοι.*

<sup>6</sup> *μη γνώτω ή άουστερά.*

<sup>8</sup> *ò καταλογών πατέρα ή μητέρα, θανάτω τελευτάτω.*

<sup>9</sup> *έάν έμοι τις διακονή, έμοι ακολουθείτω.*

<sup>10</sup> *oi ðe πιστοίς έχοντες δεσπότας μη καταφρονείτωσαν, ότι αδελφοί εισιν, αλλά μάλλον δουλούνέτωσαν, ότι πιστοί εισιν και άγαπητοί.*

<sup>11</sup> *τί ούν έροθμεν;*

<sup>12</sup> *τί ούν ποιήσει ο κύριος του έμπελώντος.*

<sup>13</sup> *ei έρχεται 'Ηλίας καθελείν αυτόν (έρχομαι is used as future in New Testament Greek).*

<sup>14</sup> *ei έγω χάριτι μετέχω, τί βλασφημοίμαι ύπερ ου έγω εύχαριστώ;*

d) Here the optative corresponds to the Greek subjunctive.

John 12:27 Jah hva *qibau*?<sup>1</sup>

Other cases are found in John 5:47; 6:28; 18:11 and Luke 18:7.

#### IV

Several examples of the use of the Gothic indicative with distinctly modal force are found. The Gothic verbs translate Greek subjunctives. The anticipatory idea is present in

Matt. 10:23 Amen auk *qiba* izwis, ei ni ustiuhp baurgs Israelis unte *qimiþ* sa sunus mans.<sup>2</sup>

II Cor. 10:6 Jah manwuba habandans du fraweitan all ufarhauseino, þan *usfulljada* izwara ufhauseins.<sup>3</sup>

Luke 9:27 Sind sumai þize her standande, þaiei ni kausjand daupau, unte *gasaihand* þiudinassu gudis.<sup>4</sup>

The next shows the volitive with parataxis.

Luke 6:42 Broþar let ik *uswairpa* gramsta þamma in augin þeinamma.<sup>5</sup>

Too numerous to cite are Greek conditional sentences, the subjunctive of whose protases is regularly rendered by the Gothic indicative. Of this a single example is given.

Rom. 13:4 Ip jabai ubil *tauþis*, ogs.<sup>6</sup>

#### V

Because of the modal attributes of the Gothic injunctive-indicative it assumed fully the functions of the future. This is a very familiar phenomenon. There was practically no need felt for a periphrasis to convey the future idea such as exists in the new Germanic languages. Yet one finds a few cases of the compound future, which will be cited later. The Sanskrit and Greek futures in -s- and the Latin future perfect and simple future in -am are of subjunctive origin. The future really has modal force, since it expresses that which is or was non-existent at the time of the utterance.

Matt. 7:23 Jah þan *andhaila* im þatei ni hvanhun kunþa izwis.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> και τι ειπω;

<sup>2</sup> ἀμὲν γὰρ λέγω ὑμῖν, οὐ μὴ τελίσγητε τὰς πόλεις τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ, ὥς ἂν ἔλθῃ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

<sup>3</sup> και ἐν ἑτοίμῳ ἔχοντες ἐκδικῆσαι πάντας παρακοήν, ὅταν πληρωθῇ ἡμῶν ἡ ὑπακοή.

<sup>4</sup> εἰσὶν τινες τῶν ὧδε ἑστῶτων οἱ οὐ μὴ γένησινται θανάτου ὡς ἂν ἴδωσι τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ.

<sup>5</sup> ἀδελφε, ἔφευ ἐβόλω τὸ κέρφος τὸ ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ σου.

<sup>6</sup> εἰάν δὲ τὸ κακὸν ποιῇ, φοβοῦ.

<sup>7</sup> και τότε ἀπολογησω αὐτοῖς ὅτι οὐδέποτε ἔγνωσαν ἡμᾶς.

Matt. 10:32 Sahvazuh nu saei *andhaitiþ* mis in andwairþja manne, *andhaita* jah ik imma in andwairþja attins meinis saei in himinam ist.<sup>1</sup>

Luke 1:76 Jah þu, barnilo, praufetus hauhistins *haitaza*; *fauragaggis* auk faura andwairþja frauþins.<sup>2</sup>

Luke 5:35 Apþan *qimand* dagos, jah þan afnimada af im sa brupfads.<sup>3</sup>

John 14:30 þanaseiþs filu ni *maþlja* miþ izwis.<sup>4</sup>

John 8:12 Saei laisteiþ mik ni *gaggiþ* in riqiza, ak *habaiþ* liuhap li-bainais.<sup>5</sup>

## VI

a) The reference above in Division V to the natural modal force of the future tense is illustrated by the frequency of the use of the Gothic optative to translate the Greek future indicative.

Mark 8:12 Amen qiþa izwis: jabai *gibaidau* kunja þamma taikne.<sup>6</sup>

Mark 10:8 Jah *sijaina* þo twa du leika samin swaswe þanaseiþs ni sind twa, ak leuk ain.<sup>7</sup>

Luke 1:20 Jah (sai) *sijais* þahands jah ni magands rojan.<sup>8</sup>

Luke 8:17 Ni auk ist analaugn, þatei swikunþ ni *wairþai*, nih fulgin, þatei ni *gakunnaidau* jah in swekunþamma qimai.<sup>9</sup>

Luke 9:41 Andhafjands þan Iesus qap: o kuni ungalaubjands jah inwindo, und hva *siau* at izwis jah *þulau* izwis?<sup>10</sup>

II Tim. 2:2 Jah poei hausides at mis þairh managa weitwodja (waurda gudis) þo anafilh triggwai (m) mannam, þatei wairþai *sijaina* jah anþarans laisjan.<sup>11</sup>

I Tim. 6:8 Apþan habandans usfodein jah gaskadwein þaimuh ganohidai *sijaima*.<sup>12</sup>

II Cor. 12:6 Apþan jabai wiljau hvopan, ni *sijau* unwita, unte sunja qiþa, iþ freidja, ibai hvas in mis hva *muni* ufar þatei gasaihviþ aiþþau gahauseiþ hva us mis.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>1</sup> πᾶς οὗν ὅστις ὁμολογήσει ἐν ἑμοὶ ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὁμολογήσω καὶ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ πατρὸς μου τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς.

<sup>2</sup> καὶ σύ, παιδίον, προφήτης ὀφίστου κληθήσῃ· προπορεύσῃ γὰρ πρὸ προσώπου κυρίου.

<sup>3</sup> ἔλθουσιναι δὲ ἡμέραι, καὶ θῶν ἀπάρθη ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὁ γύμψιος.

<sup>4</sup> οὐκ ἐστὶν πολλὰ λαλήσω μετ' ὑμῶν.

<sup>5</sup> ὁ ἀκολουθῶν ἑμοὶ οὐ μὴ περιπατήσῃ ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἔξει τὸ φῶς τῆς ζωῆς.

<sup>6</sup> ἀμήν λέγω ὑμῖν εἰ δοθήσεται τῇ γενεᾷ ταύτῃ σημεῖον.

<sup>7</sup> καὶ ἔσονται οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκα μίαν ὥστε οὐκ ἐστὶν εἰς δύο ἀλλὰ σὰρξ μία.

<sup>8</sup> καὶ ἡοὺ ἔσθι σικωπῶν καὶ μὴ δυσάμενος λαλήσῃς.

<sup>9</sup> οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν κρυπτὸν ὃ οὐ φανερόν γενήσεται οὐδὲ ἀπόκρυφον ὃ οὐ γνωσθήσεται καὶ εἰς φανερόν ἔλθῃ.

<sup>10</sup> ἀποκριθεὶς δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν· ὦ γενεὰ ἀπίστος καὶ διεστραμμένη, ὥς ποτε ἔσομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ ἀνίσταμαι ἐμῶν.

<sup>11</sup> καὶ ἡ ἔκωνας παρ' ἑμοῦ διὰ πολλῶν μαρτύρων, πάντα παράθου πίστει ἀνθρώποις οἵτινες ἱκανοὶ ἔσονται καὶ ἐτέρους διδάξαι.

<sup>12</sup> ἔχοντες δὲ διατροφήν καὶ σκεπάσματα τούτοις ἀρεσθυσόμεθα.

<sup>13</sup> ἐὰν δὲ θελήσω καυχῆσασθαι, οὐκ ἔσομαι ἄφρων, ἀλλ' ἔσθω γὰρ ἐρῶ· φέλλομαι δὲ, μὴ τις εἰς ἐμὲ λογίσσῃται ὑπὲρ ὃ βλέπει με ἢ ἀκούει τι ἐξ ἑμοῦ.

Gal. 5:12 Wainei jah *usmaitaindau* þai drobjandans izwis.<sup>1</sup>

Phil. 4:9 Jah guþ gawairþeis *sijai* mip izwis.<sup>2</sup>

b) The Gothic optative is sometimes used to translate a Greek indicative, not future, in a clause of characteristic, a condition, an indirect statement, etc.

Luke 1:61 Ni ainshun ist in kunja þeinamma saei *haitaidau* þamma namin.<sup>3</sup>

Luke 4:3 Jabai sunaus *sijais* gudis, qiþ þamma staina.<sup>4</sup>

Luke 17:6 Jabai habaidedeiþ galaubein swe kaurno sinapis, aiþþau jus *qiþeiþ* du bairabagma þamma.<sup>5</sup>

Rom. 9:7 Niþ-þatei *sijaina* fraiw Abrahamis allai barna, ak: in *Isaka* haitada þus fraiw.<sup>6</sup>

I Cor. 1:16 þata anþar ni wait ei annohun *daupidedjau*.<sup>7</sup>

## VII

Two cases are presented here of the expression of the future idea by the complementary infinitive accompanied by the present of a verb used as auxiliary. This is very exceptional in Gothic.

II Cor. 11:12 Ip þatei tauja jah *taujan* haba.<sup>8</sup>

Phil. 1:18 Jah in þamma fagino, akei jah *faginon duginna*.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ἀποκόφονται οἱ ἀναστατούντες ἡμᾶς.

<sup>2</sup> καὶ ὁ θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης ἔσται μεθ' ἡμῶν.

<sup>3</sup> οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ἐν τῇ συγγενείᾳ σου δε καλεῖται τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ.

<sup>4</sup> εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ, εἰπὲ τῷ λίθῳ τούτῳ.

<sup>5</sup> εἰ εἶχετε πίστιν ὡς κόκκον σινάπεως, ἀλέγετε ἐν τῇ συκαμίνῳ ταύτῃ.

<sup>6</sup> οὐδ' ἐστὶ εἰς τὴν σπέρμα Ἀβραάμ, πάντες τέκνα, ἀλλ' ἐν Ἰσαὰκ κληθήσεται σοι σπέρμα.

<sup>7</sup> λοιπὸν οὐκ εἶδα εἰ τινα ἄλλον ἐβάπτισα.

<sup>8</sup> ὁ δὲ ποῦν καὶ ποιῶ.

<sup>9</sup> καὶ ἐν τούτῳ χαίρω, ἀλλὰ καὶ χαρήσομαι.

## THE SEMANTIC DEVELOPMENT OF OE *CRAFT*

THE Germanic stem *kraft-* shows a very simple and uniform semantic development in all the dialects with the exception of the Old English. The meanings of OS, OHG *craft*, ON *kraptr*, OFris *kreft*, MDu *cracht*, LG *kracht* are simply 'strength,' 'power,' and with few important developments this meaning holds for the corresponding modern dialects. OE *craft*, on the other hand, develops the following meanings: (1) 'strength,' 'power,' 'might'; (2) 'a great number,' 'host'; (3) 'power of mind,' 'wisdom,' 'knowledge,' 'intelligence'; 'skill,' 'ingenuity,' 'craft,' 'cunning,' 'deceit'; (3a) 'power of evil,' 'device,' 'craft'; (4) 'general ability,' 'faculty,' 'endowment,' 'talent'; 'virtue,' 'excellence'; (5) 'skill,' 'art,' 'trade,' 'work,' 'profession'; (6) 'a machine,' 'instrument,' 'engine.'

Anglo-Saxon poetical literature used *craft* as a synonym especially for *mægen* and *mihte*, as, for instance, *Beowulf* 418 *mægenes craft*, or 379 *mægen craft*.<sup>1</sup> The same usage is found in the so-called Caedmonian *Genesis B* 269 and *Christ and Satan* 200. Once we find *abal* as a synonym (*Gen. B* 497). The compound *mægenecraft* (cf. OHG *magenchraft*, OS *megincraft*) represents a common device to intensify the meaning (cf. *Beo.* 379 above). Other phrases such as *craft and miht* (*Daniel* 327, *Andreas* 939); *þurh his cræftes mihte* (*Andr.* 585); *þurh anes craft* (*Beo.* 699; *sylfes cræfte*, 2360); *þurh his craft and meaht* (*Cyn. Chr.* 218, *Andr.* 327, *Gen. B* 272); *þurh his wuldres craft* *Chr. and Sat.* 392, 585, as well as numerous other uses, among them *Beo.* 982, *Gen. B* 414, *Exod.* 29, *Chr. and Sat.* 725, *Guthlac A* 198, attest to the use in the sense of 'physical strength or power.'

A semantic development found generally in the Christian literature of most of the older Germanic dialects is that in group 2, viz., 'a large number,' 'host.' In modern biblical language we still use the term 'powers of heaven or hell' with the same connotation. NHG *Kraft* and NE *force* have also taken on the meaning 'a large number.' OHG *chraft* in the sense 'Heeresmacht' is also well known. In the Old Saxon, *craft* was used in the sense 'hosts of heaven' or 'hosts of

<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, owing to lack of space, the writer has had to delete almost all citations from the article.

hell' (*Heliand* 416 *thio engilo craft* or 3036 *fiundo craftes*). Note also the compound *himilcraftes-hrori* (4337). In the Old Norse it is applied exclusively to the hosts of heaven (cf. *Gammel norsk Homiliebog* 177 and *Mariu saga* 621, 11). With this meaning so general in the other dialects it would seem strange that it should not also be found in the Old English. Anglo-Saxon dictionaries do not seem to record it, however. The writer believes this meaning was prevalent in early Old English Christian literature but that it soon died out. The author of the Caedmonian poems seems clearly to indicate this sense in three passages. Satan plunged into hell and plotting the fall of man says (*Gen. B* 400): *Ne gelyfe ic me nu þæs leohtes furðor, þæs þe him þenceð lange niotan, þæs eades mid his engla crafte*. In *Dan.* 393 the youths in the fiery oven sing a paean of praise to Jehovah:

and þec Israela, æhta scyppend,  
herigad in hade, herran þinne.  
and þec haligra heortan crafetas,  
soðfæstra gehwæs sawle and gastas lofiad, etc.

The last sentence would then mean: 'And let the hosts of saintly souls, let all the spirits and souls of the righteous praise thee.' *Dan.* 362,

De gebletsige, bylywit fæder,  
woruldcrafta wlite and weorca gehwile,

is also best understood in this sense. The passage would then mean, not 'let the beauty of the world or world-powers,' as usually translated (whatever that may mean), but 'let the [radiant] countenance of the world's hosts [i.e., God's creatures] bless thee and thy works, O Gracious Father.' Here the hosts of the world, human beings, are contrasted with the hosts of heaven, for the next line reads: *heofonas and englas, and hluttur water*, etc. The *Codex Exon.* (Azariah 74) has *woruldsceafta wuldor* for *woruldcrafta wlite*, which might well be an emendation by a later scribe who, not understanding the meaning of *crafte* in this connection, substituted words which to him made a more intelligent reading of the passage.<sup>1</sup>

It is very likely that we have in this development of meaning a case of semantic borrowing in all of these dialects.<sup>2</sup> The expression

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Brandl, *Pauls Grundriss*, II, Part I, 947.

<sup>2</sup> For a discussion of semantic borrowing see the author's articles: "Analogy as a Factor in Semantic Change," *Language* II, 35-45, and "Semantic Borrowing in Old English," *Klaeber Anniversary Volume, Studies in English Philology*.



in the Greek for 'hosts of heaven' so frequently found in both Old and New Testaments is *δυνάμεις τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*, which Jerome consistently translates *virtutes caelorum*. Now *δυνάμεις* and *virtus* mean primarily 'power,' 'strength,' and were used regularly by Anglo-Saxon scribes to translate *craft*, or vice versa; *craft* was used to translate them into the Old English. What was more natural, then, than to use *craft* whether the Latin or Greek word meant 'power' or 'hosts'? The frequency with which this expression occurs in the Bible warrants a perfect familiarity either with the Latin or the Greek word on the part of the Anglo-Saxon Christian writer. Note the following occurrences of this use: Matt. 24:29: *αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν οὐρανῶν*: *virtutes caelorum*; 30: *μετὰ δυνάμεως δόξης*: *cum virtute multa majestate*; Luke 21:26: *αἱ γὰρ δυνάμεις τῶν οὐρανῶν σαλευθήσονται*: *nam virtutes caelorum movebuntur*, and further references: Mark 13:25; Isa. 34:4; Jer. 8:2; Dan. 8:10, etc.

The semantic expansion of our word to the meanings contained in group 3 above caused it to be used to express human capability of whatever kind. The beginning of this expansion represents simply the change from the literal to the figurative, the transference from the idea 'physical strength' to 'mental strength.' The earliest occurrences of this development are found in connection with such words as *mod*, *snytro*, etc., where they were first used in the literal sense 'power of mind,' hence 'wisdom,' 'intelligence,' 'knowledge,' 'skill.' This use of the word seems to have been a favorite one in the Caedmonian poems, especially in extolling the merits of Daniel, as may be seen from its use in the following passages: Dan. 484, 534, 593. Other uses we find in *Guth. A* 184; *Guth. B* 1128; *Andr.* 631; *Cyn. Chr.* 441; *Gifts of Men* 12 and 32. From the direct association of *snytro* or *mod* it is an easy transition to the use of the simple form in the sense 'wisdom,' 'knowledge.' Thus in Dan. 81 Nebuchadnezzar sought out from the tribe of Israel certain young men who were wisest in books of law because he

wolde þæt þa cnihtas cræft leornedon  
þæt him snytro on sefan seggan mihte.

Cf. also Dan. 736 and *Elene* 595. From 'intelligence,' 'knowledge' to 'skill' is but a step since skill is but a manifestation or application of intelligence or knowledge. Early illustrations of this use are few. The

first we have in *Beo.* 2769. This use becomes most frequent, however, after Caedmon and down through Alfred's time. In the Caedmonian poems it is not used, the author preferring *list*, *gleaw*, *gleawferhd*, or *gleawmod* to express the idea. From Cynewulf on we find it well established; for instance, *Andr.* 471, 483, 498; *Fortunes of Men* 70.

The adjective *craftig* naturally took on the same changes of meaning as the noun, developing the senses 'wise,' 'intelligent,' 'skilful.' The earliest record of this use is in the compound *lagucraftig* (*Beo.* 209). Other uses we find in *Gen.* 1080, *Chr. and Sat.* 349, *Gifts of Men* 62 and 80. This use of the word was prolific in developing new compounds. Besides *hygecraft* (cf. *Dan.* 96; *Cyn., Chr.* 241) used synonymously with the two compounds discussed above, we have *runcraft* (*Dan.* 732), *boccraft*,<sup>1</sup> *larcraft*, *leornungcraft*, *æcraft*, and the corresponding adjectives.

In the Caedmonian biblical paraphrases another deviation from the sense 'power' is found. The author frequently associates the word with *deofol*, *feond*, or similar words in phrases such as *purh feondes craft* or *purh deofles craft*. Since the devil's power was always directed to evil ends the word *craft* took on the development 'device,' 'wile,' 'craft.' Thus *purh deofles craft* became synonymous with *purh deofles searo*, and always in the bad sense, as in *Gen. B* 447, 451, 488, 819, and *Dan.* 30, 224; *St. Juliana* 480. *Whale* 24 has this use in the adjective in connection with *facne*: For the author of the *Beowulf* the association giving the evil connotation was 'secrecy' (2168, 2290) or the 'thief' (2219). In this meaning the word was often associated with *searo*, and this resulted in the compound *searo-craft*, adj. *searocraftig*, in the sense 'deceit' as in the *Guth. A* (674). This last compound, however, is not always (though often) used in the evil sense. Probably under the influence of the development of group 3 it may mean 'skill' in the usual sense, as in Cynewulf's *Christ* 9 and *Gifts of Men* 58. This use of the word in a bad sense results, therefore, in the same meaning as if developed through the usual association 'intelligence,' 'cunning,' 'craft,' 'deceit' of the group discussed above. The meaning 'craft' in this the prevailing sense today came from one association

<sup>1</sup> The OS has this word *boccraft* in the sense 'learning,' 'intelligence' (*Hel.* 614), although no other meaning of OS *craft* remotely approaches this semantic development. The obvious explanation is that, if not the form, at least the meaning was taken over from the OE.

or the other, it being impossible to tell which. It is most likely that the association with such words as *deofol*, *feond peof*, *facne*, *searo*, etc., was the earlier because it is closer to the fundamental meaning.

Since our word has taken on not only the meanings 'physical strength,' 'ability' but also 'mental strength,' 'ability,' it is not surprising that the next development should be a generalization of the meaning to 'general ability,' 'endowment,' 'talent,' 'faculty,' etc. This use probably began in the plural in much the same way as our use of the plural of 'power' today (cf. *Gifts of Men* 21, 29; *Fortunes of Men* 43). In the old Northumbrian gospels the parable of the talents (Matt. 25:15-28) has *craft* for Lat. *talentum*.

In another passage of *Gifts of Men* (106), and *his giefe bryttad summun on cystum, summun on craftum*, the author apparently is distinguishing between moral qualities, on the one hand, and physical and mental capabilities, on the other. At this time, then, the word had not yet developed the meaning 'virtue,' 'moral excellence.' It is not until the time of Alfred that we find this development, especially in the translations from the Latin. Here it regularly translates the Lat. *virtus*. We have already seen that it was used at an earlier period to translate the same Latin word but in an entirely different sense. This again is a case of semantic borrowing. In Christian ethical and homiletic literature *virtus* was abundantly used to express both 'divine and spiritual power or strength' as well as 'moral worth,' 'virtue,' 'excellence.' In the Old English translation of Gregory the Great's *Cura pastoralis*, *virtus* in this sense is used between twenty and thirty times, each time translated by *craft*. Compare a few of these passages: (I) *craftē: virtutibus*; (XLIX) *mid ðæm gæstlican craftē: virtute ex alto*; *mid ðæm godlican craftē: cum virtute divina*, etc. In the Old English version of Boethius' *de consolazione philosophiae*, *craft* is frequently used (xxxii. 1; xxxvi. 5, etc.) both in the sense 'ability,' 'faculty,' and 'virtue.'

We come now to the development in group 5, the starting-point of which is the meaning 'knowledge,' 'skill,' etc. In this meaning *craft* became associated with the Lat. *ars* because they both expressed much the same idea. The fundamental meaning of *ars* like Gr. *τέχνη*, by which *ars* may also have been influenced semantically, was 'skill [expressed] through physical or mental activity.' This fundamental

idea developed, on the one hand, 'handicraft,' 'trade,' 'occupation,' and, on the other, 'knowledge,' 'science' (the knowledge, skill, or workmanship employed in working upon an object; the object thus worked upon, i.e., a work of art; art, profession; any branch of science, etc.). The association of *craft* with *ars* in the sense 'skill,' 'knowledge' led to the semantic expansion of the Old English word so that this in time took on the same meanings which the Latin word had developed. There were other Old English words meaning 'skill,' 'knowledge' such as *gleawnes*, *list*, etc., and on occasions they may also have been used to translate the Latin word (cf. *leodwyrhta list*, the equivalent of *poetarum ars* [*Boeth. Introd.* 5 Metr.]), but none of them seemed to express the fundamental idea as well as *craft*, so the latter was used almost exclusively in this connection. Naturally such ideas as 'art,' 'profession,' 'trade,' etc., with their varied connotations could not come into general use before the things they stood for actually existed. They would be found first in Old English translations from the Latin. But the amount of this literature extant is practically negligible for the earlier period. Among clerics and educated churchmen *craft* must have had this use at an early period. For example, while the interlinear version of the *Rule of St. Benedict* dates from the tenth century, it must have been an important document for the novices of the monasteries from the seventh century on, and the Anglo-Saxon version or interlinear in the early period not so very unlike that which has come down to us. Our word occurs a number of times in this as a translation of *ars* in the sense under discussion. Compare the following: *ecce hec sint instrumenta artis spiritalis: efne þas sind tol craftis gæstlices* (IV); *in arte aliqua: on ænigum craftre* (XLVI); *Artifices: Crafcican; ipsas artes: sylfan craftas . . . pro scientia artis: for ingehide his craftes* (LVII); *artes diversa: mistlice craftes* (LXVI). Again *ars* was applied in the Middle Ages to express the divisions of learning or knowledge: the *trivium*, i.e., grammar, logic, rhetoric, and the *quadrivium*, i.e., arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy, called also the *liberales artes*. Naturally there were no native Old English expressions for such technical terms, so we have *craft* taking on the meaning of *ars* used in compound either with loan-words or native expressions to give the meaning: e.g., *grammaticscraft* or *stafcraft* for *ars grammatica*; *flitercraft* or *flitcraft* for *ars disceptandi* or *dialectica*;

*leopcræft*, *scopcræft*, *wopcræft*, *sangcræft* for *ars poetica* or *ars canendi*; *dreamcræft*, *gleocræft* for *ars musica*; *metercræft* for *ars metrica*; *tælcraeft*, *rimcræft* for *arithmetica*; *tungolcræft* for *astronomia*, etc.

From the special compounds, no doubt coined and first learned in the Latin classes of the monasteries, the expansion to other expressions in which *ars* was used with some modifier resulted in the formation of other compounds such as *wordcræft* for *ars oratoria*; *drycræft*, *dwolcræft*, *wiccecræft*, *scincraeft* for *ars magica*; *galdorcræft* for *ars incantandi*, *incantatio*; *deofolcræft* for *ars daemoniaca*; *læcecræft* for *ars medicinae*, etc. Some of these were probably compounds which existed before the analogy with the Latin expressions. Thus a word like *wigcræft* meant originally 'power,' 'strength in battle,' and would have been rendered *vis bellica*. Then under the influence of the meanings in group 3 it came to mean also 'skill in fighting.' In this sense it was associated with *ars* and took on the meanings of *ars bellica*, signifying not only 'military strength,' 'skill,' but 'military art,' 'the art of war.'

We run across this type of compound as early as Cynewulf. In the latter's *Elene* we find the expression *wordcræft* (592, 1238) and *wordes cræftes* (419), probably formed by analogy with *ars oratoria* or *ars rhetorum*. In *Whale* (2) and *Phoenix* (548) *wodcræft*, in *Andreas* (765) *drycræftum*, (134) *rimcræfte*, (166) *galdorcræftum*, (34) *dwolcræft*, are all possible analogical formations. In *St. Juliana* (14) *firencraeft* may have been influenced by an expression like *scelesta ars* similar to *mala ars* which may also account for *aclæcræft* (*Andr.* 1364).

For these earlier uses we have no actual evidence of association with the Latin synonym. Let us now turn to the translation literature of Alfred. Here we have no difficulty in finding the correspondences which we have surmised for the previous century. Note the following Old English and Latin correspondences:

Bede, *Eccl. Hist.* (IV, 2), *metercræft: metricae artis*; (IV, 24) *leodcræft: canendi artem*; (IV, 27) *deofolcræftes: daemoniacae artis*; (V, 14) *smidcræfte: fabrili arte*; Greg., *Dial.* (I, 4), *drycræftum: magicis operibus*; (I, 4) *drycræftum: magicis artibus*; (IV, 55) *læcecræfte: medicinali arte . . . læcecræfte: medicinae artem*; (I, 9) *glicraeft: ludendi arte*; (I, 10) *drycræftum: magicis artibus*; Orosius (I, 2) *drycræftes: magicæ artis*; (I, 4) *drycraftas: magicis artes*.

After our word had been used in compounds to express certain of

the foregoing specialized uses of the Latin word it would not be long until the simple form, *craft*, took on the meanings of *ars* in general, i.e., 'applied skill of any kind,' 'a branch of learning,' 'a profession,' 'trade,' etc. Again there is abundant evidence of the close association of these words in the Old English translations of Alfred and others. Of the general use of the simple form in this sense before this time there is little evidence. One passage in the *Elene*, however, deserves attention. After the finding of the cross a fitting shrine must be built for it and

da seo ewen bebead craf̃tum getyde  
sundor asecean, þa selestan,  
þa þe wrætlicost wyrcean cudon  
stangefogum, on þam stedewange  
girwan godes tempel.

While the expression *craf̃tum getyde* might be rendered here simply 'dowered with skill' (cf. Kennedy), in view of the fact that Cynewulf, as we have seen, already uses the compounds with *craft* in the sense of Lat. *ars* and also knows *craftiga*, 'artifex,' as we shall see below, it is entirely probable that we have here an early instance of the use of the simple form in the sense 'craft,' 'trade.' This use of the word is well illustrated in an interlinear colloquy of the Archbishop Aelfric (*Wright-Walker*, pp. 92 ff.) where a form of *craft* is used thirty times, each time translating a form of *ars*.<sup>1</sup>

Let us now compare some of the uses of the word in the translations of Alfred's time: Bede, *Eccl. Hist.* (IV, 22), *swylcra craf̃ta: talium artium*; Gregory, *Dial.* (III, 1), *craft . . . : artem . . .*; (III, 7) *craf̃te: arce*. In this passage (unless it is the error of a scribe) the translator, Bishop Waerferth, evidently read *arte* for *arce*, otherwise he could not have written *craf̃te* to express the meaning of the Latin.<sup>2</sup> (IV, 56) *craf̃tes: artis* (τῆς τέχνης); (IV, 56) *craf̃tes: artis*; (I, 10) *craf̃te: arte*. From the *Cura pastoralis* (I) we compare the following:

<sup>1</sup> A comparison of the most important of the translations of Alfred's time shows that with the exception of the *Cura pastoralis*, in which it often translates *virtus* as mentioned above, *craft* is regularly rendered by *ars*. Only two instances of its being used for *via* were found: once in the *Cura pastoralis* 22 and once in the *Orosius*, I, 13. Once in Bede, *Eccl. Hist.*, IV, 13, it translates Lat. *peritia* in a sense practically synonymous with *ars*.

<sup>2</sup> The Verona MS M of Gregory's works, it is true, reads here *arte* instead of *arce*, but it is so full of orthographic faults and peculiarities that unless the bishop actually used this as his source, we must regard it as a misreading. Cf. *Fonti per la storia d'Italia* (pub. by Istituto Storico Italiano; Roma, 1924), LVII, 148 and xcii ff.



*Forðon þe nan cræft nis to læronne ðæm þe hine ær geornlice ne leornode forhwon beoð æfre swa e driste ða ungel æredan ðæt hi underfon þa heorde ðæs læreowdomes, ðonne se cræft þæs læreowdomes bið cræft ealra cræfta? : Nulla ars doceri praesumitur, nisi intenta prius meditatione discatur. Ab imperitis ergo, pastorale magisterium qua temeritate suscipitur, quando ars est artium regimen animarum.* In the next passage (XXXIV) the translation is not very exact, *cræftes* meaning something like 'tricks' whereas *artium* means rather 'skill,' but in the mind of the translator the one word suggested the other: (XXXVII) *mid sumum cræfte gemengð: ex arte componitur; (LXI) cræft: arte.*<sup>1</sup>

The Latin influence goes still farther, however. From *ars* in the sense 'an object upon which skill or knowledge has been put, i.e., a work of art; and *facere*, the compound *artifex* is formed with the meaning 'skilled worker,' 'architect,' 'builder.' After the OE *cræft* has taken on the meaning of *ars* the meaning of *artifex* was expressed by a form of *cræft*, the substantive adjective *cræftiga*, *cræftega*, again by semantic analogy. The appearance of this form coincides with that of the compounds discussed above, the earliest references being Cynewulf *Christ* (12) and *Andreas* 1633. In the translation literature the word regularly rendered Latin *artifex* although occasionally it also translated *opifex*. In the passage from the *Rule of St. Benedict* (LVII) we saw one instance of this. Compare also the following from Gregory's *Dialogues*: (III, 37) *cræftigan: artifices; cræftigum: artificibus . . . . cræftigum: artifices . . . . cræftigan: artifices; (IV, 16) cræftigan: opificis . . . . cræftiga: artifex; (IV, 28) cræftigan: artifices.* And from the *Cura pastoralis* (VIII): *cræftege: artifex.* Once (*Eccl. Hist.*, V, 21) *cræftige wyrhtan* translates *architectos*, but usually the analogical formation *heahcræftiga* is used for this, *heah-* naturally translating *archi-*. In the same chapter we find *heahcræftigan stangeworces: architectos.* From this use of the noun and adjective is derived the verb *cræftan* translating *architectari* (cf. Aelfric, *Gram.* 36 *ic cræfte: architector*) in place of the older *timbrian*. Adverbial uses of *ars* were likewise expressed by the adverb *cræftlice*, as in the *Cura pastoralis*: (LX) *cræft-*

<sup>1</sup> The writer obviously does not consider these correspondences of the Latin and Old English as proof of semantic borrowing. They are proof of the close association of these words over a long period of time. That there was semantic borrowing is the natural deduction from this association because such association is scarcely ever without influence on the meaning. It is almost impossible actually to prove semantic borrowing for the older period.



*lice: tante arte; (XXXVII) cræstelice: tanta arte.* In the glosses (Wright-Wülker, 565, 40) we find *cræftlic* glossed *artificialis*, once also *craftman: artificialis* and once *cræft-wyrc: artificium*.

The development of the meanings in group 6 is due again, in part at least, to semantic borrowing. In Medieval Latin *ars* was used in the sense 'machine' (*machina*, Du Cange). The development of meaning is easily followed, the steps being: 'a work of art, skill, or ingenuity,' 'a contrivance,' 'a machine.' A similar development is seen in NE *engine* from OFr *ingin* 'a tool,' derived from Lat. *ingenium*, a synonym of *ars*. In like manner *artificium* developed this meaning. The contrivances or machines designated by these words were for the most part instruments of war as may be seen from the further derivative of *ars* which we have in NE *artillery* from OFr *artillerie*, etc. This use of *ars* may account for the fact that the compound *wigcræft* discussed above also takes on the meaning 'a warlike engine' as well as 'a warlike art,' as, for instance, in *Orosius*, I, 2: *mid scotum, ge mid stana torfungum, ge mid ellum heora wigcræftum: vis magna telorum*. Our word is glossed a number of times in this development, for example, in Napier's *An. Oz.*: (1668) *machinas: cræftas*; (120) *machinam, ingenium: craft*; once also (3443) *machine: searecræftas*. Aelfric used the word frequently in this sense (cf. *Lives of the Saints*, V, 253-90 [E.E.T.S.] [35, 314]).

The meanings in group 6 may also be accounted for in another way, namely, through the influence of *searocræft*, which probably developed this meaning independently of the Latin word. The first element *searu* meant primarily 'armor' or 'war trappings' and from this could come such meanings as 'instrument of war,' 'machine.' It translates such words as *ballista*, *catapulte vel machina belli* (cf. Wright-Wülker, Gloss.). *Cræft*, as we have seen, having been associated with *searo* in another sense might have taken over the meaning 'machine' from the compound by ellipses. This, however, is much less likely than the semantic influence of *ars* and its compounds in this sense, especially in view of the close association of these words in other meanings.

It would be interesting to follow the semantic development of our word through the later OE period, and to show how some of the meanings prevalent in the older period were dropped in later times. It is of

especial interest, in view of the foregoing discussion, to note how the derivative of *ars*—viz., *art*—coming into the English through the Norman French and having naturally the same meanings as *craft* gradually usurped the position of the latter in certain uses. Our records of this begin with the thirteenth century in designations for the studies of the *trivium* and the *quadrivium*. These meanings were gradually extended so that by the seventeenth century the two words were almost exact synonyms. This association with 'art,' if not with its Latin source, brought about the complete elimination of the original meaning of *craft*, namely, 'power,' 'strength,' a meaning which was, of course, foreign to the Latin word. A detailed discussion of this last association besides leading us out of the Old English period would also lead us too far afield. It has been our purpose in this discussion to follow as closely as our sources would permit the semantic development of the Old English form alone. We have seen that this has led us not only into the usual paths of semantic investigation but into the rather neglected by-paths of analogical influence. Undoubtedly the great expansion of meaning which our word experienced was due to this analogical influence.

There are two important periods in the semantic history of our word, the first when the original meaning took on the development 'mental strength,' 'power,' and the other when it became associated with the Latin words discussed above. The writer is not ready to claim that the first of these developments also is due to semantic borrowing because our lack of records of its uses in the earlier centuries makes it impossible ever to prove anything. It is, however, significant that all the important words in Latin meaning 'physical strength,' 'power,' viz., *vis*, *virtus*, *robor*, *potentia*, show the development to 'mental power.' Of the Germanic words with this fundamental meaning none, as far as we can discover, shows this development in the older period. Such a development might easily have come about in early Christian terminology which is so replete with expressions for 'spiritual power,' 'divine power,' 'power of the Holy Ghost,' etc. (cf. *divinus* and *virtus* above). It is, therefore, not improbable that this development, too, may have been analogical. However this surmise may be regarded, analogical influence for the later periods can certainly not be denied.

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## KEMBLE'S SALOMON AND SATURN

TO BIBLIOGRAPHERS of Old English literature, J. M. Kemble's *The Dialogue of Salomon and Saturnus*, published by the Aelfric Society (London, 1848), is well known. That an earlier version exists is generally ignored; and nowhere, to my knowledge, is the marked difference between it and the edition of the Aelfric Society noted. The article on Kemble in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, XXX, 369 ff., notes briefly: "‘Salomon and Saturn,’ 8vo, 1845 (?); this edition was begun by Kemble as early as 1833; he called it all in except twenty copies, one of which is in the British Museum, when he undertook to produce for the Aelfric Society." The *British Museum Catalogue* describes the volume as "Without titlepage. Privately printed," and conjectures "London? 1845?" as place and date of printing.

It seems, then, not out of place to analyze briefly the early version, now inaccessible to most students. The study is made on the basis of copies of both versions now in the possession of Professor Archer Taylor, of Chicago University, who has kindly made them available to the writer.

"The edition" of 1845 (?), as it is called by the DNB, cannot fairly be classed as an edition at all. It is rather bound page proof of a proposed edition, a few copies of which have been preserved when the original plans of publication were abandoned.<sup>1</sup> The volume is small 8vo,  $6\frac{3}{4} \times 4$  inches, of 292 pages, the first page bearing the signature *B*, each succeeding gathering bearing proper signature to and including *U*. All gatherings are complete except the last (*U*), consisting of three leaves (the last page blank). There is no title-page, printer's imprint, date, Table of Contents, or Preface.

The edition of 1848 is large 8vo,  $8\frac{3}{8} \times 5\frac{1}{8}$  inches, of 326 pages. Page 1 bears the signature *Salom. B*. This is preceded by five leaves: (1) blank; (2) title-page, the verso bearing printer's imprint; (3-4) Preface; (5) Table of Contents. The body of the volume, fourteen

<sup>1</sup> For the sake of convenience, the early version will be referred to, in this study, as *Proofs*; the version issued by the Aelfric Society will be termed *Edition*.

gatherings, *B-P* (the last of 12 pp. only), is followed by an Appendix of seven gatherings, signatures *Q-U*, *X*, *Y* (the last with three blank leaves). The type of the *Edition* is larger than that of the *Proofs*, except in the printing of numerous illustrative extracts from documents parallel or related to the *Salomon*.

Not only do the volumes differ in externals; they diverge fully as much in content. Much that was included in *Proofs* has been omitted from the *Edition*, and not a little has been relegated to the Appendix; much, too, has been added in the *Edition* that does not appear in the *Proofs*. Thus the Old English text of *Salomon and Saturn* (both prose and poetry), for which the rest of the volume serves as introduction and commentary, appears only in the edition of 1848.<sup>1</sup>

The exact date of *Proofs* cannot be determined; presumably the volume was being set up at the time when the Aelfric Society assumed publication.<sup>2</sup> The only evidence available to the writer is that given in the Preface to the *Edition*, signed March, 1848.<sup>3</sup> This gives something of the history of the volume though in a fashion at times vague and indefinite. We learn that the task was commenced in 1833, at Cambridge, an outgrowth of studies in the history of the Reformation in Germany, that it developed into a plan for an edition of *Epistolae obscurorum virorum*,<sup>4</sup> that the discovery of the *Salomon and Marcolf* led to a modification of the volume into an analysis of this tale and its contacts stressing the development of prose fiction rather than the history of reformation. So far everything is clear. Kemble continues:

It will be readily imagined that fifteen years have not passed without bringing great changes in the mode in which I myself view such collections. Much that in 1833 had been heaped up by way of illustration, and whose introduction could only have been justified by such an object, has now been cancelled in deference to the demands of delicacy. Much too that would then have appeared for the first time, has since been made accessible through other

<sup>1</sup> The *British Museum Catalogue* rightly refers to *Proofs* as "an historical introduction."

<sup>2</sup> The Aelfric Society was organized in 1842 (London); cf. *British Museum Catalogue*, s.v. "Academies."

<sup>3</sup> If the *Brit. Mus. Cat.* or *DNB* had other evidence, it is at least not published.

<sup>4</sup> Published in a series of editions from 1516, the first collection possibly by Crotus Rubianus, the second largely by Ulrich von Hutten; cf. *Meyers Konversations-Lexikon* (6th ed.), V, 875, and *Edition*, p. 222.

collections. Accordingly many things have been omitted entirely; while short extracts have in other cases been relied upon to put the reader in possession of the general argument.

This characterization suits remarkably well some of the changes revealed by a comparison of *Proofs* and *Edition*. And yet the *Proofs* cannot represent the plan of 1833.

Kemble continues: "On the formation of the Aelfric Society it was remembered that such a book was in being. The remarkable poem of *Salomon and Saturn* was selected for publication, and the materials previously collected formed a not uninteresting introduction to it." Does the reference "such a book" refer to *Salomon and Saturn* or to Kemble's book now in the hands of the printers? The latter seems to me more probable. And does the phrase "on the formation of the Aelfric Society" suggest "immediately"? It may, then, be necessary to date the *Proofs* somewhat earlier than 1845.<sup>1</sup>

A comparison of the *Proofs* and the *Edition* reveals the following differences: (1) The *Proofs* contain much illustrative material omitted from the *Edition*. (2) The *Edition* adds the Old English text, some notes, and translations both of the Old English and some of the German texts. (3) The *Edition* shows a careful revision of many passages as to content, diction, and typography.

A tabulation under the foregoing heads will make clear the extent and nature of the changes.

#### I. INCLUDED IN "PROOFS" ONLY

Pp. 52-64 (even pages only) the Latin version of *Salomon and Marcolf* according to Gartner's edition of 1585,<sup>2</sup> with variants from a British Museum

<sup>1</sup> This conjecture becomes almost a certainty when we remember that the *Edition* of 1848 was published in instalments, the first of which appeared in 1845; cf. B. Thorpe, *Analecta Anglo-Saxonica* (London, 1868), Preface, p. viii, and Louis F. Klipstein, *Analecta Anglo-Saxonica* (New York, 1849), I, 393. That the twenty copies preserved of *Proofs* may have been bound up in 1845 is a possibility; that they were printed or set up in that year would seem to me incredible. Furthermore, as we know that Kemble in 1843 completed Volume I of his edition of the poetry of the *Vercelli Book* for the Aelfric Society, there seems little reason to date the *Salomon and Saturn* then. Is it not more reasonable to suppose that in 1842, at the formation of the Aelfric Society, the *Proofs* were in press, that the project was then taken over by the Aelfric Society but postponed until the completion of the more important edition of the *Codex Vercellensis*, and that in 1845 the *Edition* of *Salomon and Saturn* began to appear?

<sup>2</sup> Andreas Gartner issued several editions of *Dicta proverbialia*, to some of which was appended the *Marcolphus*; cf. *Edition*, p. 34. Later, in an edition of *Epistolae obscurorum virorum* (Frankfurt, 1643), he also appended the debate, *Brit. Mus. Cat.*, s.v. "Gratius, O."

copy of *Dyalogus Salomonis et Marcolfi*, an edition "evidently anterior to 1500" (cf. *Proofs* pp. 32 and 52). On pp. 53-65 (odd pages only) is the Latin text according to the Göttingen Library copy (described on p. 32). The second version is that printed *Edition*, pp. 51-56.<sup>1</sup>

P. 87, l. 5—p. 96, l. 3, the German prose, *Frag und Antwort des Königs Salomonis und Marcolphi*, from an edition of 1670 in the University Library of Göttingen. The *Edition* (p. 72) prints a small fragment (six questions and answers). The coarseness of the dialogue and its availability elsewhere are the reasons for omission.

P. 96, l. 10—p. 110, an extract from MS Trinity College Camb., O. 2. 45, "from the very beginning of the 13th century," contains proverb lore closely parallel to that of *Salomon and Marcolf*. An elaborate tabulation of parallels follows the text. The whole section is omitted from the *Edition*.

P. 111, l. 17—p. 122, l. 8, the French *Proverbes de Marcoul et de Salemon* (from *Bibl. Royale*, No. 1830), by Pierre Mauclerc. The *Edition* (pp. 73-74) retains only seven stanzas (1-4, 57-59).

P. 128—p. 131, l. 16; p. 131, l. 25—p. 132, l. 24, the second French version, based on MS Trin. Col. Camb. R. 3. 19. The *Proofs*, pp. 125-32, give the complete text, with variants from four other manuscripts and one printed version. The *Edition*, pp. 78 ff., gives "part of the text [i.e., the Camb. MS] as a fully sufficient specimen of this composition."

Pp. 133-44, l. 13, passages from parallel French documents, omitted from *Edition*.

P. 145, tabulation more complete than the similar table, *Edition*, p. 81.

Pp. 148-51, "Various Readings to the French Versions," omitted from *Edition*.

Pp. 182-87, l. 7, a wordy introduction to a section "Other Compositions of the Same Nature." In the *Edition* this is reduced to an Appendix and is much altered.

P. 243, ll. 12 ff., a brief list of parallels between *Demaundes Joyous* and *Salomon and Saturn*. Omitted from *Edition* because duplicated by a fuller analysis, pp. 292 ff. (*Proofs*, pp. 250 ff.).

Pp. 267-71 (ll. 199-336), a continuation of the German version of *Der Phaffe Amis*. The *Edition* (pp. 304 ff.) prints only ll. 39-198.

## ii. IN THE "EDITION" ONLY

Title-page, Preface, Table of Contents.

Pp. 113-220 have no parallel in *Proofs*:

1. *The Traditional Character of Marcolfus*, pp. 113 ff.

<sup>1</sup> In the elimination of the Gartner text from the *Edition*, Kemble is guilty of a serious slip. He retains (*Edition*, p. 50) the statement of *Proofs*, p. 52: "I proceed to give the corresponding portion of the Latin version printed by Gartner in 1585." The Latin text follows (*Edition*, p. 51) with the note: "From the copy in the University Library of Göttingen compared with that of the British Museum."



2. *Salomon and Saturn* (the Old English versions and comments on these), pp. 132 ff.
  3. *Adrian and Ritheus*, pp. 198 ff.
  4. *Adrian and Epictus*, pp. 212 ff.
  5. *The Master of Oxford's Catechism*, pp. 216 ff.
- Pp. 226-48 (right-hand column only), a modern English translation of *The Proverbs of Alfred*, printed parallel to the Middle English text (*Proofs*, pp. 191-210).
- Pp. 259-69 (odd pages only), a modern English translation of the *Anglo-Saxon Apothegms*, from Cot. MS Jul. A II, fols. 141 ff. (*Proofs*, pp. 220-25).
- Pp. 309-14, a paraphrase of *Der Phaffe Amis* (German text, *Proofs*, pp. 263-71).

### iii. REVISION OF THE TEXT OF "EDITION"

The *Edition* shows a great many minor changes (numbered by the hundreds, I should venture). Usually they aim at brevity or clarity of expression; at times, at more specific conclusions; and, more commonly, at mere correctness of spelling, wording, or typography. A few are of interest. Both versions reveal Kemble's dislike of the French—a distrust of their scholarship and an antagonism toward their national traits. The *Edition*, however, tones down the violent statements of the *Proofs*. To illustrate, *Proofs*, page 7: ". . . And rude, coarse even, as many of the compositions of our forefathers are, we may be proud to think that little of that disgusting profligacy which from the earliest times characterizes the mongrel literature of France, is to be found among ourselves." The passage in the *Edition*, page 6, reads: ". . . Little of that disgusting profligacy which from the earliest time characterizes the literature of other races is to be found among ourselves." Similarly the passage *Edition*, page 292, paragraph 2, is greatly modified (*Proofs*, p. 249). *Edition*, page 82 n. has omitted a satiric comment on French etymologists found, *Proofs*, p. 146. In fact, Kemble reveals throughout his warm sympathy for things German and Germanic and a tendency to glorify these elements at the expense of the non-Germanic.

Of typographical changes the most striking is the manner of printing tabulations of comparisons of proverbial lore. In the *Edition*, page 57 ff. (*Proofs*, pp. 68 ff.), is an analysis of the contacts of the German and Latin versions with gnomic literature in general. Similarly, *Edition*, pages 251 ff. (*Proofs*, pp. 214 ff.), analyzes the *Proverbs of*

*Alfred*. In both cases the *Proofs* print the tables transversely on the page, with references to sources in the left-hand margin. The *Edition* prints a normal page, giving references, in small type, immediately below each citation. Incidentally, the parallel material presented in the *Proofs* is considerably fuller than that of the *Edition*.<sup>1</sup> The change in size of type has already been noted. One other improvement is the use in the *Edition* of the character  $\text{ȝ}$  in Middle English quotations (p. 270 and p. 315) where the *Proofs* use Z (p. 226 and p. 272). And, finally, the *Edition* reveals countless changes in spelling, punctuation, capitalization, and the like. These are the result partly of an effort at consistency, partly a mere matter of correctness. The *Proofs* reveal a text, at first accurate, but growing worse toward the end of the volume until the last pages abound in printer's errors. Everything speaks of an edition abandoned in the making and of page proof, not fully revised, bound for the convenience of a few until the real edition should appear.

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<sup>1</sup> Similarly, the *Proofs*, pp. 96 ff., prints transversely the analysis of MS Trinity College Camb., O. 2. 45 omitted from *Edition*; cf. above, Tabulation, sec. 1.

## THE ANALYTIC FUTURE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FICTION

THE correct use of *shall* and *will* in the future tense constitutes one of the most perplexing problems of modern English syntax. Grammatical theorists of the past, relying too much upon the etymological significance of these auxiliaries, have never been able either to agree among themselves or to formulate rules that would fit the facts. They have clearly demonstrated the inadequacy of the deductive method to do justice to the phenomena of a living language.

Persons not familiar with the history of the *shall-will* future may still find it possible to believe in a grammatical golden age when *shall* was regularly used in the first person, and *will* in the other two. But the usage of the best authors nowhere bears out this theory.

It is the belief of the present writer that the fluctuations in the use of *shall* and *will* during the past seven hundred years are due not so much to the subtleties of meaning (so great that only native Englishmen can master them)<sup>1</sup> as to a confusion growing out of the simultaneous use of *shall* and *will* as mood and tense auxiliaries. The two verbs have been compelled to bear an impossible burden. In such cases it usually requires a long period of struggle to evolve some sort of cosmos out of the chaos. This struggle is still going on. For a long time *will* seems to have been the favored form, for it has been steadily gaining, even in the first person of main clauses, as a general future auxiliary. But inasmuch as *will* still retains its old modal use, and has not been converted into a colorless "form word," no great progress has been made toward a satisfactory solution of the difficulty.

Now that grammar has advanced to the status of an inductive science, the rules concerning the future tense should manifestly be brought into harmony with the usage of the standard authors—so far as this has been established. Before an adequate rule can be formulated, however, a great deal of work must still be done. By reviewing the theories of the prescriptive grammarians, Professor Fries<sup>2</sup> has

<sup>1</sup> For a good discussion of this point, see Krapp, *The English Language in America*, II (1925), 264-67.

<sup>2</sup> "The Periphrastic Future with *Shall* and *Will* in Modern English," *PMLA*, XL, 963-86.

blazed the way. He has also set a good example by his painstaking study of eighteen English and eighteen American contemporary dramas.<sup>1</sup>

The present investigation of ten representative American<sup>2</sup> prose writers (Table I) is intended as a supplement to that of Mr. Fries in the field of drama. For purposes of comparison I have in the chart indicated Fries's American drama percentages by means of a bar (—).

TABLE I

| Date      | Author        | Title of Book                   | Abbr. | No. of Pages |
|-----------|---------------|---------------------------------|-------|--------------|
| 1917..... | Garland       | <i>Son of the Middle Border</i> | SB    | 467          |
| 1919..... | Hergeshelmer  | <i>Java Head</i>                | JH    | 255          |
| 1923..... | Zona Gale     | <i>Faint Perfume</i>            | FP    | 218          |
| 1925..... | Erskine       | <i>Helen of Troy</i>            | HT    | 304          |
| 1925..... | Morley        | <i>Thunder on the Left</i>      | TL    | 273          |
| 1925..... | Willia Cather | <i>Professor's House</i>        | PH    | 283          |
| 1926..... | Steele        | <i>Urkey Island</i>             | UI    | 287          |
| 1927..... | Cabell        | <i>Something about Eve</i>      | SE    | 364          |
| 1927..... | Wilder        | <i>Bridge of San Luis Rey</i>   | BS    | 235          |
| 1928..... | Ellnor Wylie  | <i>Orphan Angel</i>             | OA    | 337          |

Besides exhibiting the distribution of the *shall* and *will* forms, the tables which follow also record the usage of four other future tense expressions: the present, the "am-to," the "about-to," and the "going-to" futures. This part of my study permits of an interesting comparison with an investigation by Royster and Steadman<sup>3</sup> of six earlier English novels.

While I have in this paper followed very closely the classifications employed by Fries, I have departed from his method in one important respect, namely, in omitting from my statistics all *shall*s and *will*s whose context required a modal interpretation. I have further excluded all conditions contrary to fact (because they express no real future notion); all cases of *will*, *would* denoting "habitual action"; all uses of *will* in the sense of 'be willing,' 'have a desire to'; all *shall*s and *will*s in quoted passages. Lack of space prevents me from fully illustrating these omitted uses.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 986-1024.

<sup>2</sup> The author has in preparation a similar study of contemporary British novelists.

<sup>3</sup> "The 'Going-To' Future," *Manly Anniversary Studies in Language and Literature* (1923), pp. 394-403.

<sup>4</sup> However, since *shall* is used in the first person about as frequently as *will* to express determination, I give here a number of typical examples: "You may comb my hair, but if you say another word, I shall never play again" (BS, p. 164). "I promise you I shall never trouble you again, if you listen to me this once" (*ibid.*, p. 201). "The bath, however, I shall certainly take" (OA, p. 298). "The only negligence I contributed in the case of

Highly interesting are the following typical examples of the indiscriminate use of *shall* and *will*, illustrating both the modal and the temporal sense:

With a feeling that we would never see them again . . . with a feeling that we should never see them again [*SB*, pp. 293-94]. "I shall stay until September," I replied. "I will not go back at all, if I am needed here" [*ibid.*, 403]. I shall christen this riding-horse Kalki. Yes . . . I will accept the throne of Antan [*SE*, p. 35]. Then I shall rage and roar and quite possibly, ramp. Then I will bluster and speak harshly [*ibid.*, p. 239]. "I won't be like George!" he exclaimed. "But I shan't go unless you'll come with me" [*TL*, p. 267]. Tomorrow we will go to the Cheyenne village; the change will be beneficial, and in three days I shall be perfectly well [*OA*, p. 287]. I shall certainly not marry anyone to-night; you may depend upon it that I will remember [*ibid.*, p. 295].

For reasons adduced by Fries<sup>1</sup> I have consistently counted the contractions *I'll*, *you'll*, *he'll*, etc., as *I will*, *you will*, *he will*, etc., Professor Krapp<sup>2</sup> to the contrary notwithstanding.

The chart and the tables, I believe, require very little explanation. Table I merely lists in chronological order the books studied, together with the number of pages and the abbreviations employed. Table II gives a detailed statistical account of the number of times each form occurs in the several books. The percentages at the bottom of the columns record the relative frequency of *shall* and *will* in the different persons and kinds of sentences under which they stand. Table III summarizes the uses of *shall* and *will* for all persons and kinds of clauses. It reveals a variation of 20 per cent between the extremes of *Java Head* and the *Bridge of San Luis Rey*. Even the book with the highest percentage of *shalls* uses over three times as many *wills*, whereas the average number of *wills* is over seven times as great as that of the *shalls*.

Paris," said Menelaos, "was that I trusted you out of my sight. I shan't do it again" (*HT*, p. 153). "I have not asked Hermione to marry him, and I never shall!" (*ibid.*, p. 95). "This is the last time I shall ever lift a bundle of this accursed stuff!" (*SB*, p. 235). "I owe this Kolesos Koleros no homage. And I very certainly shall not linger to pay any, with a princess waiting for me" (*SE*, p. 37). "No," he thought, "I shan't let her go: we can all be happy together" (*TL*, p. 257). "My determination is irrevocable," said Shiloh with proud simplicity, "I shall never return to that theatre of tyrannies, the continent of Europe" (*OA*, p. 40). "Because if you are, I shall [determination] come along just to see that you aren't shot without a proper trial" (*ibid.*, p. 89). "Of course, I could stand it, and what is more, I shall. It is my irrevocable decision to go by way of Santa Fé" (*ibid.*, p. 233).

<sup>1</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 989.

<sup>2</sup> *Modern English: Its Growth and Present Use*, p. 295.

TABLE II  
*Shall-Will Futures*

[illegible]

The chart is a graphic representation of the statistics of Tables II and III. It clearly reveals the general tendencies. For purposes of comparison I have incorporated Professor Fries's averages obtained

TABLE III  
RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF *Shall* AND *Will* FUTURES,  
ALL PERSONS AND ALL KINDS OF SENTENCES

| Title                                 | <i>Will</i>  | <i>Shall</i> |
|---------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| <i>Java Head</i> .....                | 348 = 97.5 % | 9 = 2.5 %    |
| <i>Thunder on the Left</i> .....      | 386 = 95.5   | 18 = 4.5     |
| <i>Professor's House</i> .....        | 235 = 95.1   | 12 = 4.9     |
| <i>Helen of Troy</i> .....            | 933 = 89     | 116 = 11     |
| <i>Urkey Island</i> .....             | 198 = 88.4   | 26 = 11.6    |
| <i>Son of the Middle Border</i> ..... | 300 = 87.2   | 44 = 12.8    |
| <i>Faint Perfume</i> .....            | 189 = 85.9   | 31 = 14.1    |
| <i>Something about Eve</i> .....      | 276 = 82.9   | 57 = 17.1    |
| <i>Orphan Angel</i> .....             | 609 = 80     | 153 = 20     |
| <i>Bridge of San Luis Rey</i> .....   | 115 = 77     | 34 = 23      |
| Totals.....                           | 3,589 = 87.8 | 500 = 12.2   |

from the study of eighteen contemporary American plays. They are indicated by a bar (—) through or above the column. In general there is a striking agreement between the two results. The notable deviations occur in the first person of each of the different classes of constructions. These differences are due largely, I believe, to the

TABLE IV  
RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF *Shall-Will* AND OTHER FUTURE FORMS


| Title                                     | No. of Pages Studied | <i>Shall-Will</i> Futures | Present; Am-To; About-To; Going-To |
|---|----------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. <i>Old Curiosity Shop</i> *.....       | 100                  | 120 = 94.5 %              | 7 = 5.5 %                          |
| 2. <i>Wuthering Heights</i> .....         | 100                  | 190 = 92.7                | 15 = 7.3                           |
| 3. <i>Pride and Prejudice</i> .....       | 100                  | 139 = 88.5                | 18 = 11.5                          |
| 4. <i>Middlemarch</i> .....               | 100                  | 85 = 83.3                 | 17 = 16.7                          |
| 5. <i>Barry Lyndon</i> .....              | 100                  | 110 = 82.7                | 23 = 17.3                          |
| 6. <i>Pendennis</i> .....                 | 100                  | 50 = 74.6                 | 17 = 25.4                          |
| Total of 6 older novels.....              | .....                | 694 = 87.7                | 97 = 12.3                          |
| 1. <i>Java Head</i> .....                 | 255                  | 357 = 90.6                | 37 = 9.4                           |
| 2. <i>Bridge of San Luis Rey</i> .....    | 235                  | 149 = 89.2                | 18 = 10.8                          |
| 3. <i>Something about Eve</i> .....       | 364                  | 333 = 88.1                | 45 = 11.9                          |
| 4. <i>Orphan Angel</i> .....              | 337                  | 762 = 88                  | 104 = 12                           |
| 5. <i>Helen of Troy</i> .....             | 304                  | 1,049 = 87.6              | 148 = 12.4                         |
| 6. <i>Thunder on the Left</i> .....       | 273                  | 404 = 85.2                | 70 = 14.8                          |
| 7. <i>Faint Perfume</i> .....             | 218                  | 220 = 77.6                | 67 = 22.4                          |
| 8. <i>Professor's House</i> .....         | 283                  | 247 = 76.7                | 75 = 23.3                          |
| 9. <i>Urkey Island</i> .....              | 287                  | 224 = 72.7                | 84 = 27.3                          |
| 10. <i>Son of the Middle Border</i> ..... | 467                  | 344 = 71.2                | 139 = 28.8                         |
| Total of 10 recent novels.....            | .....                | 4,089 = 84                | 787 = 16                           |

\* Statistics for the six older novels were taken from Royster and Steadman, "The 'Going-To' Future," *Manly Anniversary Studies*, p. 397.



fact that the drama approaches more closely to the living spoken language than fiction and autobiographical narrative. Part of the difference may also be caused by the difference in scope, Fries including in his statistics also the modal uses of *shall* and *will*.

CHART



Legend: ■ = will; □ = shall. Bar (—) shows percentage of Professor Fries's study of 18 contemporary American dramas.

Table IV presents the comparative percentages of *shall-will* and other future forms. By way of comparison with nineteenth-century usage, I have reproduced the statistics of six novels reported by Royster and Steadman. Although these investigators studied only a hun-

dred pages of each book, such a portion would be sufficient to serve as a fair sample of each author's usage. Table IV shows an increase of nearly 4 per cent in the use of non-*shall-will* future tenses in about one hundred years. This is indicative of a healthy, normal growth, which is no doubt largely due to a vague dissatisfaction with the ambiguity lurking in the *shall-will* future.

My figures bear out the general tendency "to use *will* as the generalized type form to express futurity," as stated by Professor Krapp.<sup>1</sup> At the present rate of development, the complete victory of *will* over *shall* might be expected in a hundred years. But even then, so long as *will* retains its old modal force, English would not yet have an unequivocal future tense worthy of a great world-language. The resuscitation of *woll*, the extinct variant of *will*, if stripped of all modal function and suggestion and converted into a pure "form word," would give English a suitable future tense auxiliary and offer a simple solution of an extremely vexing problem.

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<sup>1</sup> *The English Language in America*, II, 266.



## RESTWÖRTER

**W**IR begegnen auf Schritt und Tritt Formen, die sich den empirischen Verallgemeinerungen, die wir "Lautgesetze" nennen, zu entziehen scheinen. Wie ich schon mehrfach ausgeführt, finden viele davon ihre Erklärung in der zeitlichen Begrenzung der jeweiligen Richtung der Sprechgewohnheiten ("drift"), welche den Lautgesetzen zugrunde liegen. Allgemeine Aufstellungen darüber sind kaum durchführbar; doch lässt sich bei manchen Gruppen von Lautgesetzen beobachten, dass sie nicht alle Formen, die ihnen zugänglich sind, gleichzeitig erfassen, sondern bei gewissen Laut- oder Formtypen einsetzen, allmählich den Sprachdurchschnitt ergreifen und endlich bei einem Restbestande haltmachen, den sie spät oder gar nicht beeinflussen.

Im grossen und ganzen handelt es sich dabei um zwei Grundarten dieses allmählichen Umsichgreifens von Lautgesetzen oder Lautrichtungen—die eine ist durch Nachbarlaute, die andere durch Verhältnisse des Wort- und Satztones bedingt. Für die erste Art sind zahlreiche Belege allgemein anerkannt, zB. die verschiedenen Schichten der slavischen Palatalisierung, die umlautverhindernden oder -verzögernden Faktoren in verschiedenen germanischen Sprachen, namentlich dem Althochdeutschen, und ganz besonders die Bedingungen der Monophthongierung der germanischen Diphthonge in den einzelnen Mundarten. Bei der Wirkung des Worttones denkt man natürlich vorwiegend an die Behandlung tonloser Silben und an Verners Gesetz; beschleunigende oder verzögernde Wirkung des Satztones ist in vielen althochdeutschen Denkmälern in scheinbaren Unregelmässigkeiten der Lautverschiebung klar erkennbar, wie ich es *JEGPh*, XVI, 18, kurz dargestellt habe.

Immerhin erfasst in solchen Fällen das Lautgesetz im Laufe der Zeit alle Formen, in denen sich die erforderlichen Lautverhältnisse finden; der Restbestand ist nur zeitweilig, die "Ausnahmen" verschwinden. Aber dann und wann (und vielleicht öfter, als es scheint) kommt es vor, dass ein Restbestand sich dem allgemeinen Vorgang überhaupt nicht einfügt; die dem Lautgesetz zugrundeliegende Strö-

mung ist zur Ruhe gekommen, ehe die letzten Formenreste in sie aufgenommen waren. Es mag Gründe verschiedener Art für dieses Beharren geben. So mag es sich um Wörter der Kindersprache, um Lautnachahmungen, um Taboo-Wörter handeln. Besondere Beachtung aber verdient ein Typus von Wörtern, über die sich ein bestimmter Lautwandel infolge ihrer "psychologischen Tonlosigkeit" noch nicht erstreckt hatte, ehe er in der betreffenden Sprache zum Abschluss kam. Damit meine ich teilweise Wörter, die tatsächlich meist schwache Satzbetonung hatten (zB. Präpositionen), teilweise Formwörter häufigen Vorkommens, wie etwa Pronomen und Hilfsverba. Sie sind mehr als der Sprachdurchschnitt feste Gewohnheit geworden und zeigen im Lautwandel langsameren Fortschritt, ebenso wie sie analogischen Veränderungen längeren Widerstand leisten (man denke zB. an das verbum substantivum in den meisten idg. Sprachen).

Nur auf den letztgenannten Typus verwende ich gegenwärtig den Ausdruck "Restwörter." Darunter verstehe ich also Wörter, die wegen ihrer Ton- und Formlosigkeit sich so lange dem Wirken eines Lautgesetzes entzogen haben, dass sie bei dessen Aufhören in der alten Form weiterbestehen. Die folgenden Beispiele stellen Unterarten des Typus dar.

1. Got. *du*, *dis*- und Ähnliches.—Schon JEGPh, XVI, 5, gab ich der Meinung Ausdruck, dass got. *du*, *dis*- und vielleicht auch urnordisch *-ga* für *-ka* Formen mit idg. *d*, *g* seien, die sich infolge ihrer Tonlosigkeit der Lautverschiebung entzogen hätten. Für die gotischen Wörter hatte schon Delbrück, IF, XXI, 356, eine ähnliche Erklärung gegeben; er sagt über die Gleichung got. *du* = westgerm. *tō*: "Nach der jetzigen Auffassung haben sie nichts mit einander zu tun, ich glaube aber (was man ja auch früher immer harmlos angenommen hat), dass sie identisch sind, indem *du* die proklitische Gestalt von *tō* darstellt . . . *d* hat ein untadelhaftes Analogon an dem *d* von gotisch *dis* in *disdailjan*, etc. (Fussnote: "Ich weiss nicht, ob die Vermutung, *du* und *dis* seien proklitische Formen, nicht schon anderswo ausgesprochen worden ist.") Vgl. Rolffs, Gotisch "*dis*-" und "*du*" (Diss. Breslau, 1908), S. 43.

Uhlenbeck bezeichnet *du* als unerklärt und lehnt Bugges Hinweis auf Verners Gesetz im Anlaut (*Btr.*, XII, 420 f.) als "ganz zweifelhaft" ab. Für *dis*- vermutet er Entlehnung aus lat. *dis*-. Feist ist gegen Delbrücks Auffassung skeptisch; für *du* hält er sie für

„sehr zweifelhaft,“ bei *dis-* hält er „den Vergleich für verfehlt.“ Meillet, *Mém. Soc. Ling.*, XV, 92, dagegen stimmt Delbrück zu.

Mir scheint die Logik von Delbrücks Annahme zwingend. Beide Wörter sind normaler Weise unbetont. Analogieen, wie ich sie in meinem eingangs erwähnten Aufsatz anführe, lassen darauf schliessen, dass sich diese tonlosen Wortformen der Artikulationssteigerung, die in der Lautverschiebung liegt, erst nach der Trennung der Goten von der germanischen Spracheinheit einfügten—also zu einer Zeit, wo *im Gotischen* die Lautverschiebung zum Stillstand gekommen war. Für ein gotisches *du* = idg. *\*dō* spricht erstens die Parallele des Westgermanischen *tō* (für die Delbrück a.a.O. das Syntaktische beibringt), zweitens das häufige Vorkommen der entsprechenden Partikel in anderen indogermanischen Sprachen, zB. lat. *dē*, *-de*, *-dō*, *dum*; gr. *δέ*, *δή*, *-δε*; ir. *de-*, *di-* (*du-*, *do-*); sl. *do*, *da*; lit. *da*; vgl. Grassmann, *KZ*, XXIII, 569 und 572 („ohne Verschiebung“).

Welche andere Erklärung für gotisch *du* könnte es geben? Es könnte auf idg. *θ* (*dh*) zurückgehen; dann würde man eine äusserst wahrscheinliche Entsprechung in ai. *adhi* finden. Oder es könnte aus einem idg. *tu* in proklitischer Stellung abgeschwächt sein (dies ist natürlich nicht Delbrücks Annahme; er verlangt ja idg. *\*dō*, *\*dā*). Air. besitzt zufällig genau diese Form: die Präposition *to-*, *tu-* erscheint in vortoniger Stellung als *do-*, *du-* (Thurneysen, *Hb.*, S. 108). Das Zusammentreffen könnte überzeugend wirken, wenn man an den isolierten Fall denkt. Aber eine derartige Schwächung des Verschlusslautes, die gut zu irischen Lenierungsvorgängen passt, würde so entschieden gegen alle germanischen Lautrichtungen gehen, dass ich wenigstens durchaus nicht daran glauben kann, solange man nicht so sichere Parallelen geben kann, wie sie für das Bestehen von Restwörtern sprechen. Der neuenglische Übergang von *þ* zu *ð* oder der entsprechende neunordische Übergang von *þ* zu *d* in Pronominalformen ist durchaus keine Parallele für eine Schwächung von *t* zu *d*, denn er entspricht der germanischen Lautrichtung aufs genaueste, während diese ihr zuwiderläuft; vgl. *JEGPh*, XVI, 22. Zudem müsste man bei Annahme proklitischer Schwächung unnötigerweise die westgermanische und die gotische Form von einander trennen, ein Umstand, der gleichfalls stark ins Gewicht fällt. Ich beharre also darauf, dass *du* ein Restwort ist, und dass seiner proklitischen Stellung zwar nicht die Schwächung aus *t*, wohl aber die Bewahrung des idg. *d* bis in

die Zeit nach der Trennung des Gotischen vom Westgermanischen zuzuschreiben ist.

Gotisch *dis-* wird gern als Entlehnung aus dem Lateinischen betrachtet. Grienberger, *Untersuchungen zur gotischen Wortkunde*, hatte es als urverwandt mit lat. *dis-* bezeichnet; Uhlenbeck, *Btr.*, XXX, 372, erklärt dies als unmöglich, und Loewe, *KZ*, XL, 547, stimmt ihm bei: "Gotisch *dis-* gehört zu den zahlreichen Lehnwörtern, welche das Gotische an der unteren Donau aus dem Latein entnommen hat." Ich halte Grienbergers Ansicht für weit wahrscheinlicher. Ist got. *du* als Restwort gesichert, so ergibt sich daraus eine gotische Form *dis-* gegen westgerm. *\*tiz-* von selbst; mehr als das: sie ist fast mit Notwendigkeit zu fordern, denn die Tonverhältnisse der beiden Partikeln sind gleich. Man kann mit grosser Wahrscheinlichkeit die Regel aufstellen, dass anlautendes *d* in vortonigen Wörtern im Gotischen unverschoben bleibt. Für auslautendes *d* > *t* in dem gleichfalls unbetonten *at-* braucht natürlich keineswegs das Gleiche zu gelten; vielmehr lässt das Gotische Spirantenauslautgesetz eher annehmen, dass Gotisch überhaupt zu stimmlosem Auslaut neigte (wie modernes Deutsch, Russisch usw.), also *d* im Auslaut kaum später, sondern eher früher als im Anlaut zu *t* wurde.

Für got. *und*, das ich an der oben erwähnten Stelle in gleicher Weise auf idg. *\*ŋ-də* zurückführe, gebe ich zu, dass die Sache recht zweifelhaft ist. Die Zusammenstellung *und*: *untē* = *\*ŋ-də*: *\*ŋ-dē* (ähnlich lateinischem *quande*: *quandō*) ist gewiss verlockend. Die Präposition *und* hätte sich dann ebenso wie *du* durch ihre Tonlosigkeit der Verschiebung entzogen, während in der Konjunktion *untē* das *d* verschoben war. In Bezug auf Abstufung finden wir ein ähnliches Verhältnis in gr. *δέ* (Partikel): *δή* (Adverb), slav. *do* < idg. *\*dō* (Präposition): *da* < *\*dō* (Konjunktion). Ahd. *unz*, *unze* würden in diesem Fall zu got. *und*, *unte* stimmen, auf Grund einer westgermanischen Durchführung der Lautverschiebung auch in der tonlosen Form. Aber es lässt sich nicht bestreiten, dass andere germanische Formen, besonders afries., as. *und* 'bis,' vielleicht auch ae. *ōþ* 'bis,' got. *unþa* 'ent-, 'und 'unter,' ahd. *int-* 'ent-, 'untaz 'bis,' dagegen sprechen und eher auf Verwandtschaft mit lat. *ante*, gr. *ἀντί* (in verschiedenen Ablautstufen) hinweisen.

An meiner Erklärung von urnord. *-ga* als Restform für *-ka* (a.a.O.)



halte ich fest, doch ist die Form zu isoliert, als dass man viel Gewicht darauf legen könnte.

Ähnliche tonlose Wörter mit idg. *b* oder *g* kommen im Gotischen nicht vor. Dennoch gewähren *bi-* und *ga-* in gewissem Sinn eine Parallele. Das Nächstliegende wäre natürlich, in Anlehnung an gr. *ἐπί*, sl. *po* (in syntaktisch gleicher Verwendung), lat. *co-* an Schwächung aus idg. *p*, *k* in unbetonten Wörtern zu denken (vgl. Joh. Schmidt, *KZ*, XXVI, 23), aber dafür gibt es, wie oben gesagt, keinerlei Parallelen. Auch die von Bugge a.a.O. angenommene Ausdehnung von Verners Gesetz auf solche Fälle hat in dieser Form wohl nirgends Anerkennung gefunden. Dennoch glaube ich, dass ihr ein richtiger Gedanke zugrunde liegt. Ich glaube mit Bugge, dass idg. *\*pi-*, *\*ko-* über *\*fi-* *\*xa-* zu ger. *\*βi-*, *\*γα-* wurden, nur stelle ich mir den Weg anders vor (wie ich glaube, in Übereinstimmung mit Wood, *MLN*, XXV, 73: "It must be remembered that *ga-* is unstressed and may therefore go back to an original Ger. *\*xa-*"). Ist meine in *MPh*, XV und XVI, ausgesprochene Annahme, dass idg. *bh*, *dh*, *gh* eigentlich stimmlose Spiranten in lenis-Aussprache waren, richtig, so hat man die Entstehung von *\*βi-* und *\*γα-* so aufzufassen: Nach dem ersten Akt der germanischen Lautverschiebung (*p > f*, usw.) besass das Germanische, ebenso wie das Althochdeutsche nach der zweiten Lautverschiebung, zweierlei stimmlose Spiranten, nämlich fortis und lenis. Die fortis waren die aus idg. *p*, *t*, *k* verschobenen, während die lenis als solche aus dem Indogermanischen ererbt waren, also den angenommenen *bh*, *dh*, *gh* entsprechen (ich schreibe die ersteren *f*, *þ*, *x*, die letzteren *φ*, *θ*, *χ*). Fortis-Spiranten sind im Germanischen, wenn man nach der Analogie historischer Verhältnisse schliessen darf, im allgemeinen kurzlebig, aus physiologischen Gründen, die in dem genannten Aufsatz (*MPh*, XV, XVI) besprochen sind. Sie neigen zum Übergang in lenis, und zwar zunächst im Inlaut; im Urgermanischen entwickeln sich unter geeigneten Akzentverhältnissen (Verners Gesetz) aus diesen stimmlosen lenis stimmhafte Spiranten. Aber ohne Zweifel müssen wir sehr frühe Entwicklung von fortis-Spiranten zu lenis auch in unbetonten Partikeln annehmen, denn unter germanischen Aussprachegewohnheiten ist gerade lenis-Aussprache eine feste Begleiterscheinung der Tonlosigkeit, wenn sie auch keineswegs von ihr allein abhängt; daher fielen die Anlaute von *\*fi-* und *\*xa-* mit den sogenannten idg. *bh*,

*gh* ( $\phi$ ,  $\chi$ ) zusammen, d.h. sie wurden stimmhaft: \* $\beta i$ -, \* $\gamma a$ -. Das läuft im letzten Grunde auf dasselbe Erklärungsprinzip wie das für *du*, *dis*- angenommene hinaus.

2. Mfr. *that*, *it*, *what*, usw. (sporadisch auch *up*), für die Paul (*Btr.*, VI, 554) und Kögel (*Litbl.* [1887], S. 110 f.) andere Erklärungen vorschlugen, halte ich für ganz klare Beispiele von Restwörtern. Die hochdeutsche Verschiebung von *t* zu *zz* dehnte sich gleichfalls nur allmählich über den Wortschatz aus, und diese Pronominalformen behielten die unverschobene Form länger bei als der Sprachdurchschnitt; im Mfr., dem nördlichsten der hd. Dialekte, kam die Verschiebung zum Stillstand, ehe diese Formwörter (und Endungen) erreicht waren. Näheres darüber habe ich *JEGPh*, XVI, 1 ff., gegeben.

Sollten wir im *Hildebrandslied* einen zeitweise wirklich gesprochenen Mischdialekt vor uns haben, so würde darin ein grosser Bestand von Restwörtern vorliegen. Ich möchte in der Frage noch keine feste Meinung aussprechen, glaube aber sagen zu dürfen, dass ich das Gedicht, entgegen der herrschenden Meinung, als ursprünglich niederdeutsch betrachte; bei der Umarbeitung ins Hochdeutsche haben vorwiegend Formwörter und Wörter häufigsten Vorkommens die niederdeutsche Form bewahrt, zB. *dat*, *it*, *tō* (*ti*), *at*, *suasat*, *ik*; *üsere*, *ödre*, *wēt*, *chūd*, *seggen*, *heittu*, *furlaet*, *luttilla*, *hēme*. Das würde zu der recht allgemeinen Beobachtung passen, dass beim praktischen (nicht schulmässigen) Erlernen fremder Sprachen gerade die häufigen Formwörter gern in der muttersprachlichen Form beharren—zB. *und*, *oder* im Englisch der Deutsch-Amerikaner. Auch das Festhalten von *ik*, *dat*, *wat* in dem wesentlichen mitteldeutschen heutigen Berliner Dialekt gehört hierher.

3. *habere*—*haban*.—Die alte Streitfrage der Zusammengehörigkeit des lat. *habēre* mit got. *haban* und den entsprechenden Formen der anderen germanischen Sprachen scheint auf Grund der Restworttheorie eine einfache Lösung zu finden. Es wäre Raumverschwendung, hier auf die in Feists gotischem und Walde lateinischem Etymologischem Wörterbuch übersichtlich dargestellte Bibliographie einzugehen. Kluge meint unter *haben*, "an der Identität mit lat. *habēre* kann kaum gezweifelt werden," Walde dagegen sagt, von *habeo* sei "trotz der Lautgleichheit und flexivischen Übereinstimmung zu trennen got. *haban*," und Feist gibt eine objektive Darstellung der Hauptansichten, selbst neutral bleibend. Walde gibt reichliches Material

zur Verbindung von *habēre* mit got. *giban* und zahlreichen verwandten Formen in anderen idg. Sprachen.

Meine Auffassung ist diese: Die normale Entwicklung des idg.  $\chi$  (*gh*) in lat. *habēre* gibt uns natürlich ger. *g*, das in got. *giban*, usw., vorliegt; über den Vokalismus *habēre*—*giban* vgl. Güntert, *Idg. Ablautprobleme*, S. 46 f., und Hirt, *Idg. Grammatik*, II, 213. Da nun *haban* stets als eine Art Formwort auftritt, das ganz oder beinahe als Hilfszeitwort zu betrachten ist, so mag es sich leicht als "Restwort," mit idg.  $\chi$  erhalten haben, über die Zeit hinaus, in der dies zu ger. *g* ( $\gamma$ ) verschoben wurde. Der Anlaut wurde dann ger.  $x$  (bzw. lenis  $\chi$ , s.o.) analog behandelt, d.h., er wurde zu *h*. Got. *haban* und *giban* sind demnach als zwei semantische und flexivische Zweige derselben Wurzel, idg.  $*\gamma e\phi-$  ( $*ghebh-$ ) aufzufassen, mit ähnlicher Bedeutungsspaltung wie zB. in gr.  $\nu\acute{\epsilon}\mu\omega$  'zuteilen': got. *niman* 'nehmen.' (Vgl. Walde unter *habeo*: "Nehmen' und 'geben' vereinigen sich unter der Vorstellung der hingehaltenen Hände.")

4. Slav. *togo*.—In allen slavischen Sprachen mit Ausnahme des Grossrussischen (in Normalaussprache) ist die pronominale Endung des gen. sing. masc. und neut. *-go*, bzw. dessen regelmässige lautliche Vertretung (*-yo*, *-ho*). Grossrussisch hält zwar *-go* als historische Orthographie fest, spricht aber *-vo*. Die allgemein-slavische Endung habe ich *AJPh*, XXXII, 434 f., und XXXVIII, 432 f., auf idg. *-sō* zurückgeführt, das unter Verners Gesetz (darüber Näheres a.a.O.) zu *-yo* wurde (während zB. in gen. pl. *těchъ* < *\*toisom ch* blieb). In der russischen Normalaussprache wurde  $\gamma$  ein Ausnahmelaut, der mit Ausnahme dieser Endung nur in Formen mehr oder weniger feierlicher Rede vorkommt, namentlich in den flektierten Formen von *Bor* 'God,' gen. sing. *Bora* = [*box*, *boγa*], ferner in Zusammensetzungen mit *благъ*, 'Segen, Wohlfahrt,' wo er sich durch liturgischen Einfluss bewahrt haben dürfte. Ich halte nun dafür, dass auch in jener Pronominalendung sich der stimmhafte Spirant länger erhielt als im Sprachdurchschnitt, sodass sie zu einer "Restform" wurde. Aber der Ausnahmelaut erhielt sich zwar in Wörtern feierlichen Gebrauchs, wurde jedoch in Formen so häufiger Verwendung durch [v], einen in der Sprache allgemein gebräuchlichen Spiranten anderer Artikulationsstelle, ersetzt. Vgl. dazu Meillet, *Mém. Soc. Ling.*, XIX, 115 ff., und meinen oben erwähnten Artikel *AJPh*, XXXVIII, 432 ff.

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## CERTAIN OLD NORSE SUFFIXES

### I. THE *ð*-SUFFIX IN *lof-ð-ar:vir-ð-ar:fyr-ð-ar* 'MEN'

THE question as to the origin of the *ð*-suffix in these three words has never, to my knowledge, been treated. Not even Kluge<sup>1</sup> nor Alexander Jóhannesson<sup>2</sup> makes any mention whatsoever of this suffix as occurring in the forms in question.

In the first place, the fact that the *ð*-suffix occurs here in synonymous poetical designations for 'men' is significant. We may therefore connect this *ð*-suffix with the North and West Ger. *ð*-suffix denoting male persons; cf. *\*hal-up-* > ON *hǫl-ðr*: *\*hal-ēþ* > OE *hæle(d)*: OS *heli-ð* 'hero'; and the *nomina agentis* OHG *sceffi-ð* (*sceffan*) 'Schöpfer,' *leiti-d:leitu-d* (*leitan*) 'Führer.'

Of our three words in question it is evident that *virðar* (cf. *verr*) and *fyrðar* (cf. *fjǫrr* < Goth. *fatrhwas*) have undergone *i*-umlaut of the radical vowel.

Noreen assumes<sup>3</sup> that this umlaut is due to a vowel *i* preceding the *ð*-suffix, i.e., *virðar* < *\*wir-id-ðR*; *fyrðar* < *\*firhw-id-ðR*.

There are two serious objections to this assumption. In the first place, after a *short* syllable *i* regularly disappeared without causing umlaut<sup>4</sup> (cf. *\*wal-id-ð* > *valda*). A form *\*wir-id-ðR* (> *virðar*) is therefore untenable unless indeed we assume that the *i* in the syllable *\*wir-* represents the original PG vowel of the stem *\*wir-* (= Lat. *vir*) and not the *i*-umlaut of an original *\*wer-* (i.e., *\*wer-id-ðR* > *\*wir-id-ðR*). The Gothic form *waitr* indicates, however, that the PG vowel was *e* and not *i*.

Second, we know that the *ja*-suffix was often attached to substantive stems to denote masculine agents<sup>5</sup> (cf. *\*herðō-* 'herd': *\*herðja-* 'shepherd'; Goth. *hatrdeis*: ON *hirðir*). There is, therefore, no reason why we should not consider our two substantives *virðar* and *fyrðar* as

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Nominale Stammbildungslehre*<sup>6</sup>, 1926.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Die Suffixe im Isländischen*, Reykjavík, 1927.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Aisl. Gramm.*<sup>4</sup>, §60.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Heusler, *Aisl. Elementarb.*<sup>5</sup>, § 59, 2; Noreen, *op. cit.*, § 66, 2.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Kluge, *op. cit.*, § 7.

original *ja*-stems formed from the substantives *\*wer-* and *\*ferhw-*, i.e., *\*wer-ǵ-jǵR > virǵar*: *\*ferhw-ǵ-jǵR > fyrǵar*.<sup>1</sup> We have here quite regularly the *j*-umlaut of the radical vowel *e*, exactly as in Goth. *hatrd-jǵs > ON hird-ar*.

It seems fairly certain, therefore, that in the forms *virǵar* and *fyrǵar* we have the suffix *-ǵ* without preceding vowel, just as in *lofǵar*.<sup>2</sup>

Of these three substantives in question only *lofǵar* has a singular form (with *ǵ*-extension), namely, *Lof-ǵ-i* (name of a mythical king). We know that the weak declension often denoted persons having certain characteristics and was therefore often used in proper names (cf. *Bog-i*, *Frǵd-i*, *Ber-si*, *Hǵg-ni*, *At-li*, etc.). Assuming the *ǵ*-suffix to denote a male person, we may further assume that the weak inflection merely emphasized the characteristics of this person as denoted by the verbal stem *lof-a* 'to praise.' The name *Lof-ǵ-i*,<sup>3</sup> then, meant 'one who is praiseworthy.' The weak declension here does not imply an active *nomen agentis*, but as is usual with proper names, simply someone who has the characteristics denoted by the stem of the word (cf. *Frǵd-i* 'one who is wise'; so *Lof-ǵ-i* 'one who is to be praised').

The weak declension of the substantive *Lofǵi:lofǵar* has, then, a function similar to that of the *ja*-declension in *virǵar*, *fyrǵar*, *firar*, i.e., 'having to do with,' 'connected with,' 'belonging to,' etc.

It is evident that the plural form *lof-ǵar* 'men' was used as a poetic epithet with a secondary sense. The plural forms *vir-ǵar:fyr-ǵar* 'men,' on the other hand, represent primary senses. Since there already existed many singular forms with primary sense of 'man' (cf. *verr*, *gumi*, *maǵr*, etc.), it is not surprising that in the case of *vir-ǵar* and *fyr-ǵar* the *ǵ*-extension was confined to the plural, especially since isolated plural forms denoting 'men' were quite frequent in poetry (cf. *firar*, *flotnar*, *ǵlar*, etc.).

Our conclusion is that the *ǵ*-suffix in *lof-ǵ-ar*, *vir-ǵ-ar*, and *fyr-ǵ-ar* represents a PG *ǵ*-suffix denoting a male person and that too without preceding vowel.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. likewise *firar* (< *\*firh-jǵR* < *\*ferhw-jǵa*) without the *ǵ*-extension.

<sup>2</sup> Of course it is possible that the *ǵ*-suffix in *lof-ǵ-ar* was originally preceded by the vowel *i* which after a short syllable disappeared without causing umlaut, but there is no necessity for this assumption.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *ǵd-ǵ-i* 'scoffer' from *ǵd* 'scoffing,' 'blasphemy.' The *ǵ*-suffix here evidently denotes a person, just as in *Lof-ǵ-i*.

II. THE SUFFIX *-endis* (*-indis*) IN THE ADVERBIAL FORMATIONS

*bráð-endis* 'SUDDENLY,' *ber-indis* 'CLEARLY,' AND *snemm-endis*: *snimm-endis* 'EARLY,' 'SOON'

According to Alexander Jóhannesson,<sup>1</sup> the suffix *-endis* (*-indis*) in these adverbial formations had its origin in the form *snimm-endis* which he explains as equivalent to Goth. *sniumundô* with the Icelandic adverbial suffix *-is* in place of the Gothic adverbial suffix *-ô*.

This cannot be the correct explanation of this suffix. In the first place, the double *m* in *snimm-endis* (*snemm-endis*) clearly shows that this form represents an extension of the adverb *snimm-a* (*snemm-a*), whereas the Goth. *sníu-* represents the stem of the verb *sníu-an* 'to hasten.'

Again, the Icel. *-mend-* does not accord with the Goth. *-mund-*,<sup>2</sup> for in that case we should expect a form *\*snim-mund-is* > *\*snim-myn-dis*. We must therefore seek some other explanation for the syllable *-end-* in this adverbial suffix *-end-is*.

In the first place it must be noted that alongside the regular form of the suffix *-endis* there occurs the form *-hendis* with initial *h*; e.g., *bráð-hendis*, *snim-hendis*.<sup>3</sup> Jóhannesson does not mention this fact, although it has (in my opinion) a most important bearing upon this question. The disappearance of this *-h-* is easily explained,<sup>4</sup> but how are we to explain its appearance?

I believe that we here have simply the stem *-hand-* 'hand,' which with the adverbial ending *-is* would give us *-hend-is*<sup>5</sup> > *-end-is*<sup>6</sup> > *-ind-is*.<sup>7</sup>

Likewise, semantically this derivation of the suffix *-end-is*: *-ind-is* can be justified. Both *bráð-endis* 'suddenly' and *snimm-endis* 'early,' 'soon' have reference to the idea of 'quickly.' Anything which is "at hand" is *easily* and *quickly* procured; hence in adverbial phrases the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *op. cit.*, § 37: "*Snimmendis* ist eine isländische Weiterbildung des got. *sniumundô* durch Anhängung des adverbialen *-is*. . . ."

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Kluge, *op. cit.*, § 235.

<sup>3</sup> The *-mm-* in *snimm-endis* was often simplified (*snim-endis*), hence the form *snim-hendis* (*Íslendinga bók*, chap. x).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Noreen, *op. cit.*, § 294.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. my article, "Some Adverbial Formations in Old Norse," *Mod. Phil.*, XXV, 138 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *ein-hendis* > *ein-endis* 'straight,' 'off hand.'

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Noreen, *op. cit.*, § 149; § 173, 2.



word for 'hand' often passed over into the sense of 'easily' > 'quickly' (cf. ON *þegar i hönd* 'right at hand'; *ein-hend-is* 'straight,' 'off hand'; OHG *zi henti* 'immediately'; MHG *be-hende* 'adroitly,' 'quickly' > NHG *behende* 'adroit,' etc.). In ON *bráð-end-is:snimm-end-is* the syllable *-end- < -hend- < \*-hand-* simply emphasized the sense of 'quickly,' 'suddenly,' etc., inherent in the stem *bráð-:snimm-*.

Since the adverb *ber-ind-is* 'clearly' (cf. *ber-r* 'bare,' 'clear') did not denote the idea of 'quickly' consonant with the suffix *-end-is*, we may assume that this suffix here is of a secondary nature, added after the pattern of *bráð-end-is:snimm-end-is* but with the original significance reduced to a general adverbial force equivalent to *-s:-is* (cf. *ber-liga*).

Since Jóhannesson's contention that *snim-mend-is* represents Goth. *sníu-mund-ô* with the substitution of the adverbial *-is* for Goth. *-ô* is without foundation, his conclusion as regards the secondary nature of the suffix *-endis* in *bráð-end-is*<sup>1</sup> must also be discarded.

### III. THE SUFFIX *-yfli*

The suffix *-yfli* occurs only in the following three words: *daud-yfli* n. 'corpse,' *inn-yfli* n. plur. 'entrails,' and *van-yfli* n. plur. 'habit,' 'custom.'

Two of these compounds have cognate forms in the other Germanic languages; viz., *daud-yfli*:Goth. *\*daupū-bleis*<sup>2</sup> adj. 'condemned to death' and *inn-yfli*:OE *inn-ielfe*:OHG *inn-ubli*, *-uovili*, *-ôfli* 'entrails.'

There is no reason for separating the suffix *-yfli* in *daud-yfli* from the suffix *-yfli* in *inn-yfli*, but the difficulty here consists in harmonizing the Gothic suffix *-bl-* in *daupū-bl-eis* with the WGer. suffix *\*fl-:\*-bl-* as it occurs in OE *inn-ie-lf-e*:OHG *inn-uo-vil-i:inn-u-bl-i*, etc.

The WGer. suffix *\*-fl-:\*-bl-* in this latter word undoubtedly goes back to the PG suffix<sup>3</sup> *\*-pl-:\*-dl-* denoting concrete objects. With middle vowel *ū* the PG suffix *\*-pl-:\*-dl-* appears in WGer. as *\*-ūfl-*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Jóhannesson, *loc. cit.*: "... und die beiden anderen Wörter sind auf dieselbe Weise gebildet worden."

<sup>2</sup> To Jóhannesson's list might be added *dā-ind-is-* (prefixed to adjectives and adverbs) 'fairly,' 'pretty'; the form *dā-indi-s* represents the genitive singular of the substantive *dā-indi* 'wonder,' 'miracle.'

<sup>3</sup> Recorded only in I Cor. 4:9, *swaswe dauþubljans; ōn tēvθavariōs*; "as men doomed to death."

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Fr. Kluge, *op. cit.*, § 97b, Anm.; *Urgerm.*, § 148b; Ed. Sievers, *Beitr.*, V, 531 ff.

: \*-*ūbl-* in OE *inn-ielfe*: OHG *inn-ubli*, -*uovili*, -*ōfli* 'entrails'; OHG *drisc-ūbli*, -*ūfli* 'threshold' (cf. OE *þersc-old*: ON *þresk-old-r* 'threshold' with PG \*-*þl*-suffix); OHG *wit-uofli*, -*uobili* 'distance,' 'space.'

For OE -*ielfe*: ON -*yfli* in, respectively, *inn-ielfe*: *inn-yfli* we may postulate a Primitive North and West Germanic form \*-*ufl-ja* < PG \*-*uþl-ja*, which must likewise represent the original form of the suffix -*yfli* in ON *daud-yfli*.

But the suffix -*bl-* in Goth. *daup-bl-eis*<sup>1</sup> cannot go back to PG \*-*þl*, because the labialization of *þ* to *f* before *l* does not occur in Gothic. Since we must consider Goth. -*bl-* here as identical in origin with ON -*fl-* in *daud-yfl-i*, Goth. -*bl-* cannot represent the original suffix but must represent a specific Gothic development from PG \*-*þl*. The original form of the Gothic word in question must then have been \**daup-u-þleis* > \**daup-dleis*.<sup>2</sup>

But how could \**daup-dleis* have become *daup-bleis*? Sievers<sup>3</sup> suggests here the possibility of a dissimilation *þ: d* > *þ: b*. I think this possibility is considerably enhanced if we take into consideration the assimilative property of *l*, i.e., the labialization of *d* (written *d*) to *ð* (written *b*) before *l* (cf. \*-*dleis* > -*ðleis*). Folk etymology may also have a factor in bringing about this dissimilation, i.e., through association with the adjective *ubil-s* 'evil,' which idea is naturally connected with death.

Sievers' explanation<sup>4</sup> of Got. -*bl-* in *daup-bl-eis*, as derived from PG \*-*þl*, is in view of ON *daud-yfli*<sup>5</sup> indoubtedly correct. I have here added a few arguments in support of the change Goth. \*-*d*l- > -*ðl-*.

<sup>1</sup> The Gothic suffix -*bl-*, unlike North and West Ger. \*-*ufl-*: \*-*ubli-*, appears here without middle vowel -*u-*.

<sup>2</sup> The change *þ* > *d* is here due to Thurneysen's law of spirantal dissimilation in unaccented syllables (cf. *f* > *b* in the suffix -*ufni*: -*ubni*).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 532: "Darf man hier nicht vielleicht an eine Dissimilation denken?"

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *loc. cit.*

<sup>5</sup> In view of ON *daud-yfli* we must discard both Theo. von Grienberger's and Sigmund Feist's views regarding the origin of Goth. -*bl-* in *daup-bl-eis*. Neither one of these scholars brings the Gothic word in connection with ON *daud-yfli*.

Grienberger (*Unters. zur got. Wortkunde*, p. 55) derives Goth. -*ubleis* from the adjective *ubils*, i.e., \*-*ubil-ja* > \*-*ubl-ja*. But the Gothic vowel *u* belongs to the stem *daup-*, whereas the ON *y* < \**u* (i-umlaut) represents the middle vowel of the suffix \*-*u-þl-*. Besides, Goth. *ubils* does not survive in ON (cf. *illr* 'evil').

Feist (*Etym. Wtb. der got. Sprache*, under *daups*) suggests that Goth. -*bleis* represents the Latin suffix -*bilis* like Ger. *arja*: Lat. -*arius* ("bleis dem lat. Suffix -*bilis* nachgebildet wie germ. *arja*- nach lat. -*arius*"). But ON [daud] -*yfli* = OE -*ielfe*: OHG -*ufl* can certainly not be explained in this way.

The ON suffix *-yfti* denoted concrete objects (cf. *daud-yfti* 'a dead thing,' 'corpse'; *inn-yfti* 'in-sides,' 'entrails'). In the compound *van-yfti* n. plur. we have a *pluralis tantum*, 'customary [cf. *van-r* 'customary'] things' = 'custom,' 'habit.'

#### IV. THE SUFFIX *-mund* IN THE ADJECTIVE *ná-mund-a* 'NEAR BY'

At first blush one is tempted to identify the suffix *-mund* in ON *ná-mund-a* with the PG suffix *\*-mund* as in Goth. *sniū-mund-ō*.<sup>1</sup>

We have a suffix *-mund* also in the substantive *mið-mund-i* m. 'middle.' I believe that the suffix *-mund* in both these words is not derived from the PG suffix *\*-mund* but represents simply the independent word ON *mund* 'point of time,' 'time.'

The ON word *mun-d* is evidently a derivative of *mun-a* (*man: munu*) 'to wish,' 'will,' 'shall' and originally signified simply 'the goal [of one's desire],' 'aim' > 'point [of time or of location]'; cf. the derivative verb *mund-a* 'to aim at' (= Goth. *mund-ōn* 'to direct one's attention toward').

In the compounds *ná-mund-a:mið-mund-i* the idea of time in the word *mund* passed over into the idea of location<sup>2</sup> because of the idea of location inherent in the first member of these two compounds; i.e. *ná:mið-* 'near': 'middle.'

The element *-mund* in these two compounds evidently signified then 'the point, place near or in the middle' (cf. *i ná-mund-a* [subst. adj.] 'in the place near by' = 'near by' and *á mið-mund-a* 'in the place midway between' = 'midway between').

The fact that the suffix *-mund* was here attached to stems denoting a concrete idea (i.e., location) militates against the identity of this suffix with the PG suffix *\*-mund* which was evidently attached only to stems denoting an abstract idea (cf. OS *mād-mund-i*:OHG *mammunt-i* 'gentleness'; MHG *vast-munt* 'courage,' 'boldness'; Goth. *sniū-mund-ō* 'quickly'). Besides, there are no clear traces of the PG suffix *\*-mund* elsewhere<sup>3</sup> in Old Norse.

#### V. THE SUFFIX *-sa* IN *arn-s-a* 'FEMALE EAGLE'

The suffix *-sa* denoting a female animal occurs only in this word *arn-sa* (>*as-sa*). The *s*-suffix here most probably does not represent

<sup>1</sup> So Ernst Wilken in the *Glossar* (p. 141) of his edition of the *Prosaische Edda*, Paderborn, 1913.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. ON *nær* 'near' > 'when'; Swed. *när*; Dan. *naar*.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. my discussion (under *-endis* above, sec. II) of Goth. *sniū-mund-ō*:ON *animm-end-is*.

an original *-s(-z)* as in *gá-s* 'goose,' *lú-s* 'louse,' and in WGer.<sup>1</sup> OHG *chebis-sa*:OE *cefe-s* 'concubine'; OHG *chilbur-ra* 'female calf'; *wali-ra* 'female whale,' etc. The word *arn-sa* is a late formation<sup>2</sup> and hence the suffix *-sa* is most probably due to analogy with the masculine suffix *-si*, as this occurs in the words for male animals such as *ber-si* 'bear,' *gas-si* 'gander,' and *má-si* 'mew' (used as a proper name for a male person).

The suffix *-si* in these words when used as proper names acquired a diminutive force,<sup>3</sup> and we may assume that the suffix *-sa* in *arn-sa* likewise acquired a diminutive force, otherwise we might have expected a form *\*arn-a* (cf. *ber-a* 'female bear') or *\*ern-a* (< *\*arn-jôn*; cf. *birn-a* < *\*bern-jôn* 'female bear'). The suffix *-sa* in *arn-sa* 'female eagle' is therefore most probably identical in origin with the diminutive suffix *-sa* as in *Bleik-sa* (*bleik-r* 'pale'), pet name for a 'pale-colored mare.'

VI. THE DIMINUTIVE *k*-SUFFIX IN *mað-k-r* 'WORM'  
AND *frau-k-r*:*frau-k-i* 'FROG'

The *k*-suffix in these words is not original but of specifically Old Norse origin. For ON *mað-k-r* we have Goth. *maþa*:OE *maþa*:OS *matho*:OHG *mado* without the *k*-suffix. In place of ON *frau-k-r*<sup>4</sup> (< *\*frauð-k-r*):*frau-k-i*<sup>5</sup> (< *\*frauð-k-i*) we have in WGer. the stem *\*frub-* plus the *sk*-suffix, i.e., *\*frub-sk-* > *\*fru-sk-* (cf. OHG *frosc*, OE *forsc*, ON *froskr*).

From an original ON *\*maði* (= Goth. *maþa*) we should have expected a weak form *\*mað-ki* instead of the strong form *mað-k-r* (a-declension).

It is possible that this shift of declension was due to the example of *sná-k-r*:*snó-k-r*<sup>6</sup> 'snake,' since *mað-k-r* 'worm' represents a diminutive idea of 'snake.'

Similarly we may assume that the form *frau-ki* was older than the form *frau-k-r*, the weak declension denoting the *nomen agentis*, i.e., *frau-ki* = 'the frothing one.' The strong form *frau-k-r* may be due to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Kluge, *op. cit.*, § 46.

<sup>2</sup> Recorded neither by Ludvig Larsson (*Ordörrådet i de äldsta isländska handskrifterna*) nor in the Elder Edda.

<sup>3</sup> See my article, "Old Icelandic Notes: The Diminutive Suffix *-si* in Late Icelandic Pet Names," *GR*, II, 65 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Falk and Torp, *op. cit.*, I, 277-78, under *Frosk*.

<sup>5</sup> The *-k-* in *sná-k-r*:*snó-k-r*, however, belongs to the root *\*snak-* < IE *\*snag-* (cf. Falk and Torp, *op. cit.*, II, 1098, under *Snog*; Fick, *op. cit.*, p. 518, under *snēka* [*snáka*]).

the example of the rhyme words *gaukr* 'cuckold,' *haukr* 'hawk.' This is all the more likely in that the word *frau-ki* is the only Old Norse word<sup>1</sup> denoting a male animal which has the diminutive *k*-suffix plus the weak endings.

#### VII. THE SUFFIX *-la* IN *fóer-la* 'DUCK'

The etymology of the word *fóer-la* 'duck' has, so far as I know, never been given, but I think it safe to assume that the end syllable *-la* represents the diminutive suffix *-la*<sup>2</sup> (< \**il-ôn*) which is regularly attached to words denoting animals, as, i.e., in *ert-la* (< \**art-il-ôn*)<sup>3</sup> 'wagtail,' *hind-la* (< \**hind-il-ôn*) 'young hind,' *hynd-la* (< \**hund-il-ôn*) 'little dog,' *mýs-la* (< \**mús-il-ôn*) 'little mouse,' *vemb-la* (< \**vamb-il-ôn*; cf. *vomb* 'belly') 'cow,' etc.

If we assume that the end syllable *-la* in *fóer-la* represents the diminutive suffix *-la* < \**il-ôn*, as in the words for animals just cited, then the vowel *-e-* in the preceding syllable *-er-* must represent the *i*-umlaut of an earlier *-a-*, i.e., \**-ar-* > *-er-*. In the trisyllabic compound *fó-er-la* the syllable *-er-* bore a strong secondary stress<sup>4</sup> and consequently the *i*-umlaut could take place here just as in a syllable with primary stress;<sup>5</sup> hence \**fó-ar-il-ôn*<sup>6</sup> > *fó-er-la*.

The syllable *-ar-* in \**fó-ar-il-ôn* we may identify with *ar(n)* [-*i*] 'eagle'; \**-ar-il-ôn* or \**-arn-il-ôn*<sup>7</sup> > *-er-la* 'little eagle,' 'eaglet.'

The syllable *fó-* in *fó-er-la* may be identical with the *fó-* in *fó-arn* 'crop,' 'maw of a bird'; the root *fó-*<sup>8</sup> (< \**fúh-*) most probably meant 'bird' (cf. Lith. *paũksztis* 'bird'), connected with the root \**flug-* in *fugl* 'bird,' *fljúga* 'to fly,' etc.

The compound \**fó-ar-* in original \**fó-ar(n)-il-ôn* could then have

<sup>1</sup> One other ON word denoting a male animal has the suffix *-ki*, viz., *fal-ki* 'falcon,' but the *k*-suffix here does not have a diminutive force and is of uncertain origin (cf. Falk and Torp, *op. cit.*, I, 203, under *Falk*).

<sup>2</sup> The word *fóer-la* is, however, not listed by Jóhannesson under feminine substantive diminutives in *-la* (*op. cit.*, § 74).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *art-a* (Swed. *ärt-a*) 'a kind of bird.'

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Heusler, *op. cit.*, § 45; Noreen, *op. cit.*, § 51, 2b.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Heusler, *op. cit.*, § 57, Anm. 3; Noreen, *op. cit.*, § 64.

<sup>6</sup> For the syncope of the vowel *-i-* in the third syllable see Heusler, *op. cit.*, § 110b, § 111b; Noreen, *op. cit.*, § 157.

<sup>7</sup> The *-n-* between two consonants would disappear (cf. Heusler, *op. cit.*, § 191; Noreen, *op. cit.*, § 291, 9).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Falk and Torp, *op. cit.*, I, 280, under *Fugl*; Jóhannesson, *op. cit.*, § 26.

come to mean simply 'bird,' both elements, *fó-* and *-ar(n)-*,<sup>1</sup> denoting 'an animal that flies'; hence *\*fó-ar(n)-il-ôn > fó-er-la* 'a kind of little bird' > 'duck' (cf. Gr. *ὄρνις* 'bird' > 'cock').

If my etymology of *fó-er-la* be correct, then we must add this word to the list of feminine diminutives in *-la*.

VIII. THE SUFFIX *-kk-* IN VERBS DERIVED FROM THE  
COMPARATIVE ROOT OF THE ADJECTIVE

Of this type we have *smæ-kk-a*:*fæ-kk-a* 'to make smaller, fewer,' 'decrease'; *stæ-kk-a* 'to make larger,' 'increase'; *hæ-kk-a* 'to make higher,' 'raise'; *læ-kk-a* 'to make lower.'

In spite of the absence of the comparative ending *-r* the presence of the *i*-umlaut of the radical vowel in these *ôn*-verbs proves conclusively that the *ka*-suffix was added to the comparative root of the adjectives in question, just as, e.g., in *grynn-ka* 'to become shallower' (adj. *grunnr*:comp. *grynn-ri*).

These verbs, however, do not all show a parallel development because of the fact that the adjective stem in some cases ended in a consonant but in other cases in a vowel. To type 1 belong *hæ-kk-a* (adj. *høg-ri* 'higher'):*læ-kk-a* (adj. *læg-ri* 'lower'); to type 2 belong *fæ-kk-a* (adj. *fæ-r(r)i* 'less,' 'fewer'):*stæ-kk-a* (adj. *stø-r(r)i* 'larger'): *smæ-kk-a* (adj. *smæ-r(r)i* 'smaller').

In type 1 the suffix *-kk-* can be explained as phonetically correct: thus, adj. stem *hæg-r-*, verb *\*hæg-r-ka > \*hæg-ka > hæ-kk-a*; adj. stem *læg-r-*, verb *\*læg-r-ka > \*læg-ka > læ-kk-a*.

The *r* disappeared<sup>2</sup> between consonants and *-\*gk-* was assimilated<sup>3</sup> to *-kk-*.

Because of the fact that the adjective stem did not end in a consonant the comparative ending *-r* in type 2 did not stand between two consonants and therefore could not phonetically disappear except through the assimilation of *\*-rk-* to *-kk-*: thus, adj. stem *fæ-r-*, verb *\*fæ-r-ka > fæ-kk-a*; adj. stem *stø-r-*, verb *\*stæ-r-ka<sup>4</sup> > stæ-kk-a*; adj. stem *smæ-r-*, verb *\*smæ-r-ka > smæ-kk-a*.

<sup>1</sup> With *ar(n)-i* 'eagle' cf. IE *\*er-* 'to arise' in Gr. *ἐρ-εω-με* (hence *ὄρνις* 'bird'), Lat. *orior*; see Falk and Torp, *op. cit.*, II, 1422, under *Örn*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Noreen, *op. cit.*, § 291, 10.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, § 270.

<sup>4</sup> The form *starka* occurs occasionally. This form is probably not a survival of original *\*starka* but represents a new formation due to association with the adjective *star(r)i*.

But the fact is that *rk* is not elsewhere assimilated to *kk* (cf. *spar-ka*, *dýr-ka*, *þur-ka*, *mur-ka*, etc.), nor is there any reason why we should assume this assimilation in the verbs under discussion.

The most reasonable explanation of the suffix *-kk-* instead of *\*-rk-* in these verbs is that the former replaced the latter through force of analogy with type 1. Since all these verbs were derived from the comparative stem of the adjective it is reasonable to assume that the Old Norse speech-feeling demanded a single type of suffix for such verbs. Originally only the second *k* in the combination *-kk-* constituted the suffix, but in course of time the double *k* in type 1 (cf. *læ-kk-a*) became felt as the suffix for all verbs derived from the comparative stem of the adjective, with the result that we have a leveling of the *\*-rk-* class (2) in favor of the *-kk-* class (1).

This leveling was no doubt strongly favored by the fact that there existed such a large number of verbs with the suffix *-kk-* derived from the positive root of the adjective, such as *prý-kk-a* (< *\*prýð-ka*, adj. *prýðr*), *fri-kk-a* (< *\*frið-ka*, adj. *friðr*), etc. Furthermore, the stem of all these verbs of the type *prý-kk-a*<sup>1</sup> and *læ-kk-a* ended in a long vowel—a circumstance which also may have contributed to the substitution of *-kk-* for *\*-rk-* in the type (2) *smæ-kk-a*.

Since the verbal suffix *-ta* was often interchangeable with *-ka*, a new suffix *-tt-* appeared after the analogy of *-kk-* in verbs derived from the comparative stem of the adjective; hence such doublets as *smæ-tt-a*:*smæ-kk-a* and *fæ-tt-a*:*fæ-kk-a*.

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<sup>1</sup> For a list of these verbs see Jóhannesson, *op. cit.*, § 67, 2.



AUS DEN SCHÄTZEN DER HERZOGLICHEN  
BIBLIOTHEK IN WOLFENBÜTTEL<sup>1</sup>

Ein frage des gan-  
tzen heiligen Or-  
dens der Karten-  
spieler vom Kar-  
nöffel, an das Concili-  
um zu Mantua.  
gebessert.<sup>2</sup>

1537.

Ein frage des gantzen heili-  
gen Ordens der Karten-  
spiler vom Karnöffel,  
an das Concilium  
zu Mantua.

NACH dem wir erfa-/ren, Allerheiligster Vater,/ das E. H. alle  
sachen, das/ Concilium belangend, all-/bereit ausgericht  
haben, den Römisch-/en hofe schon Reformiert [welchs doch/  
vnmüglich sein sol] das gantze Rom/ from gemacht [das ist wol zu  
gleuben] / alle Kirchen vberall wol bestalt [wie/ fur augen ist] vnd  
alle Ketzereien, son-/derlich die Lutherische, ausgerottet, [vnd/ also  
eitel heiligen vnter euch sind,] das/ nichts mehr vorhanden zuthun  
ist, on/ das unser armen brüder vergessen ist./ Haben wir bedacht,  
damit doch E. H. etwas im Concilio zu thun hette, vnd (Seite 2) nicht  
ymb sonst zu samen kemet, eine/ merckliche, furtreffliche vnd hoch-  
wich-/tige frage fürzutragen, da macht ange-/legen ist, der gantzen  
welt. Denn man-/cher grosser vnrat, mord, blut, gewalt/ vnd

<sup>1</sup> Der Druck befindet sich auf der Wolfenbüttler Bibliothek, Qu. 253.1. 4<sup>o</sup>. Vgl. Johannes Voigt, "Über Pasquille, Spottlieder und Schmähschriften aus der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts," *Raumers Histor. Taschenbuch*, IX (1838), 402 ff., und besonders S. 418 ff., wo die Schrift ohne die Zusätze der gebesserten Auflage in modernisierter Form abgedruckt ist.

<sup>2</sup> Ein Exemplar der Originalauflage ebenfalls vom Jahre 1537 befindet sich auf der Wolfenbüttler Bibliothek. Zusätze der gebesserten Auflage drucke ich in eckigen Klammern. Wo der Wortlaut der gebesserten Auflage von dem der Originalauflage abweicht, gebe ich letzteren in Fußnoten.

[MODERN PHILOLOGY, May, 1929]

vnrecht,<sup>1</sup> hierinn wol zuuermeiden/ were, wo man ernstlich drein sehe, als/ seer wol von nōten, Vnd ist nemlich dis/ die frage./

Warumb doch der Karnöffel, den/ Keiser sticht vnd den Babst, So er doch/ nach viel hochuerstendiger leute deut-/tung ein schlechter Landsknecht ist, vnd/ der Oberman ein Reisiger, der Keiser ein Keiser, der Babst ein Babst?/

Weiter./

Warumb<sup>2</sup> der Babst sees od-/der sechse heisse, vnd steche auch den Kei-/ser mit allen Reisigen vnd Landsknech/ten, ausgenommen den Karnöffel, das/ ist, den erweleten Landsknecht?/

Weiter./

Warumb der Teuffel, Teuffels/ frey ist, das jn widder Keiser, Bapst/ (Aij) noch Karnöffel stechen kan, so doch der/ Babst Gottes Stadthalter, ein Herr/ jnn der helle ist?/

Weiter./

Warumb doch das erwelete Taus,/ das geringste vnd erneste stücke<sup>3</sup> auf der/ Karten, der Keiser heisse?/

Viel halten, der Babst habe jm zu/ viel geraubt vnd gestolen, das er ein/ Bettler mus sin, vnd doch der Keiser/ heisse. Denn ein erwelet sechs, hat drei-/mal so viel, als ein Taus, Darumb es/ nicht wunder sey, das die dreifeltige/ Kron, die einfeltige Kron des Keisers/ hin<sup>4</sup> weg sticht?/

[Weiter./

Wie gehets zu, das der Bapst, so/ doch der allerheiligste, vnd ein jrdischer/ Gott ist (wo die Juristen nicht liegen)/ dem Teuffel so nahe sey, vnd viel neher/ denn dem Keiser, Denn so das Sees/ (der Bapst) noch ein Ees hette, so we-/re er, die bösen sieben, der leidige Teuffel/ selbs, gar weit vom Taus, welchs der/ Keiser ist./ (Seite 4.)

Hie heben sich seltzame opinion, vn-/ter den Doctorn vnser Kirchen. Etliche/ halten, der Bapst were gern der Teuffel/ selbs. Die andern sagen, Er sey es gewesen./

Die dritten, mit welchen das/ mehrer teil hellt, glauben, Er sey on mit/ tel vnter dem Teuffel, das er jn reite/ vnd regiere nach seinem

<sup>1</sup> Germania, XX, 45.

<sup>2</sup> Original: doch der Babst.

<sup>3</sup> Original: stucke

<sup>4</sup> Original: hinn.

willen. Die/ vierden, vnd der ist nicht viel, sprechen,/ es sey alles war, das der Babst sey der/ Teuffel gewest, wolts auch gerne wer-/den oder bleiben, lasse sich auch noch/ jmer von dem Teuffel reiten, der sitze/ vber jm, wie das Ees vber dem Sees./ Solchs halten die Lutherischen, Aber/ die sind nu ausgerottet zu Mantua vor/ dem Concilio, Darumb ist jr ding nich-/tes sind auch nicht von vnser Kirchen./]

Weiter./

Vnd warumb<sup>1</sup> doch der faule Fritz,/ die Zehene odder das Panier steche./ Darüber haben sich mancherley Ketze-/reien vnd jrthum, jnn der heiligen Kir-/en der Kartenspiler, da man die gleser/ spület, vnd die todten bein vber die tisch/ lauffen, erhaben./ (Aiiij)

Etliche meinen, der faule Fritz seien/ die faulfressigen Münche, die den reich/en Burgern vnd Bauru jre güter fre-/ssen./

Die andern sagen, es seien die vn-/nützen verdampften Tummen herrn,/ die der Könige, Fürsten vnd Herrn gü-/ter schendlich verzeren vnd verbrassen./

[Es sind auch grosse jrthum, der an/dern bletter halben, Als warumb die/ Dritte den Oberman, die Vierde den/ Vnterman steche? Da hellt dieser Doc-/tor dis, jener das, vnd ist das schifflin vnser Kirchen jnn grosser fahr vnter sol/chen fluten vnd wellen, das schier ver-/sincken mochte. Denn etliche halten, die/ Dritte bedeute die hohen Cardinel vnd/ Bisschoue, die gern vber Könige vnd/ Fürsten schweben. Die vierde seien die/ Ebte vnd Klöster heiligen, die gern vber/ die andern reisigen, als Grauen, Rit-/ter vnd Edelleute faren, denn vber das/ taus, den Keiser, kan dennoch jr keiner/ komen, das ist jn auch nicht leid, das wi-/ssen sie wol. Andere deuten anders,/ das müssen wir leiden./] (Seite 6.)

Vnd sind solcher ferlicher fragen/ jnn obgenanter heiliger Kirchen, der/ Bruder, Kartenspieler genant, seer viel,/ Daraus mancherley jrthum, zwispalt,/ vnd grosser vnradt kompt, bis auff/ rauffen vnd schlagen. Vnd ist kein an-/der mittel hie, denn das ein heilig Con-/cilium zu Mantua, weil sonst nichts zu/ handeln ist, die sache mit ernst fürneme,/ vnd drein sehe, damit solche jrthum ge-/schlicht, vnd jnn gewis Hauptartickel,/ verfasst werden./

<sup>1</sup> Original: worumb.

Gegeben zu Rom, *Ala Campana*,/ bey dem Campflor, hinder dem  
 Tur-/re denona, zwisschen den andern Ta-/bern, jnn die Bulle coenae  
 Domini, hart/ fur der<sup>1</sup> Eclypsi<sup>2</sup> des Concilij, durch den/ deutschen  
 Pasquil Protheum genant,/ Anno 1537. indictione nulla. Anno/ Pon-  
 tificatus Pauli, 4. zc./

Der gantze heilig Or-  
 den der Karten-  
 spieler.

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<sup>1</sup> Original: dem.

<sup>2</sup> Original: Eclipsi.

DAS ZUSAMMENBRENNENDE, ZUSAMMENTREFFENDE  
GANZE IN WILHELM MEISTER

IN THE fourteenth chapter of the first book of *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, Wilhelm, meditating at length upon the fundamental difference between the type of personality represented by himself and that typified by Melina, a meanly utilitarian person, utters these words:

You [i.e., the absent Melina] do not feel *das zusammenbrennende, zusammen treffende Ganze*, which is invented, comprehended and enacted [*erfunden, begriffen und ausgeführt*] solely through the "spirit" [*Geist*]; you do not feel that there is alive in man a better spark, which, if it remain without nourishment, without stimulation, is covered deeper and deeper by the ashes of everyday needs and indifference, and yet is hardly ever extinguished.

The central term in this passage is the most intense expression of totality and unity found in Goethe's works. It is untranslatable. "The totality united together in flaming fusion" may perhaps serve as a paraphrase of it. It is related to the image of the central fusing heat, contained in the words *Innere Wärme, Seelenwärme, Mittelpunkt* in Goethe's *Wanderers Sturmlied* composed about twelve years earlier, at the beginning of Goethe's intimacy with Herder. It was written in the original version of *Wilhelm Meister*, in the early eighties, and retained without any change in the final version published in the middle of the nineties.

This flame-fused totality is throughout *Wilhelm Meister* in both versions the touchstone of personality. Its presence is the crucial sign of the type of personality grouped about Wilhelm, of the creative, imaginative, elevated type, the genius, the *Gefühlsmensch*, the artist and poet, the superior man. The term most frequently substituted for *das Ganze* is *Gefühl*. The latter is, according to the evidence of *Wilhelm Meister*, not merely "emotion," but synonymous with *Geist*, the supreme *locus* of total, organic, individual rationality, superior to the technical reason.

The absence of the *Ganze*, on the other hand, is the essential mark of the type of personality contrary to that embodied in Wilhelm, of

the type without *Geist*, "genius," creative force, the utilitarian *Verstandesmenschen*. The extreme representatives of the latter are Werner and Melina. Melina, who resembles Wagner in *Faust*, is a base utilitarian, without vision, without ideals, without intrinsic interests, without any sense of the deeper, essential relations and unities, and so without any intrinsic standards of value. Werner, also devoid of *das Ganze*, and swayed by utilitarian motives, is not as worthless as Melina, the bad actor; he is a successful and commercially honest business man, but without vision and "genius."

All the other characters are representatives of the one or the other type. As the story proceeds some of the *Gefühl* types and some of the *Verstand* types approach more and more toward the neutral center between the two extremes. But they never blend. The principal type in each is always clearly recognizable.

The story and development of both versions of *Wilhelm Meister* rests thus upon a primary division of all humanity into two opposite types.

*Das Ganze* occurs in a score of major passages, and in additional passages of secondary but corroborative importance. It serves to characterize not only the more significant but also the lesser characters belonging to the one or the other fundamental type; and to the one or the other of the two external conditions of life corresponding to the two antithetical types of personality.

In quoting and discussing some of the principal passages, one should bear in mind the lines quoted above, according to which the *Ganze* is "invented, comprehended and enacted" by the *Geist*, i.e., by the "inner," rational unity of personality. The "inner" wholeness, which occurs in many quotations, is therefore the originator and the *locus* of any objective wholeness. The following quotations have been selected for the purpose of bringing together all the principal characters, functions, relations, elements, factors, and values pertaining to *das Ganze* as they appear in *Wilhelm Meister*.

Wilhelm, in going over his marionette puppets, finds that he does not know anything, for the *Zusammenhang* is lacking, upon which everything depends. In Book II, chapter i, Wilhelm characterizes himself as a *neues, ganzes, liebliches Gemüt*. This passage is particu-

larly interesting, because it is the only instance in which a term bearing on the *Ganze* has undergone an essential alteration from the original version. In the *Theatralische Sendung* the passage reads *ein neues ganz liebliches Gemüt*. By making *ganz* a co-ordinate attribute of *Gemüt*, Goethe revealed that he meant to lay an even greater stress on the *Ganze* in 1794 than in 1780-82.

A very important passage occurs in Book II, chapter ii. Wilhelm's friend Werner, the "practical" man, had advised Wilhelm, who in despair over the loss of Marianne wishes to destroy all his literary papers and give up all his aspirations, to enter business and lead a "useful" life and to continue his literary work as an amateur in his leisure hours. Wilhelm, in a long passage, comes to several conclusions, namely, that the *Ganze* involves continuous unity of concentration and effort, in antithesis to practical discontinuity and division, characteristic of the *Verstand* type, that it demands an uncompromised integrity of the spirit. This integrity requires that the man of genius, the *Dichter*, must rise above any ulterior, external purpose, that he must view all the events of the world *zwecklos*, 'disinterestedly.' To the *Dichter* he opposes the *Weltmensch*, another term for *Verstandes-mensch*, as the man lacking the continuity and integrity of the *Ganze*, and as the slave of *Zwecke*, external purposes. To *Dichtung* he opposes the *kümmerliche Gewerbe* ('wretched trade').

The chief passages are (emphasis mine):

How much you err, dear friend, in thinking that a work, by whose first impression the *whole* soul is to be filled, can be produced in *unterbrochenen, zusammengegeisteten Stunden* ['in broken, anxiously snatched hours']. No, the poet must live wholly to himself, wholly in his beloved subjects [*ganz sich, ganz, in seinen geliebten Gegenständen leben*].<sup>1</sup>

He, who inwardly has been most preciously endowed by heaven, who is guarding within him a treasure that forever multiplies itself out of itself, must live with his treasures in his own quiet happiness, undisturbed by external things. . . . Ordinary persons, seeking satisfaction in external interests and never finding it there, are without knowing it unconsciously pursuing the things with which the poet has been endowed by "nature," namely, the "enjoyment of the world," the *Mitgefühl seiner selbst in Andern* ['sympathetic self-identification with others'], the *harmonische Zusammensein mit vielen oft unvereinbaren Dingen* ['harmonious participation in many mutually incompatible things'].

<sup>1</sup> *Ganz* *sich* underlined by Goethe.



The poet has been placed by fate almost like a god, above all the desires, passions, and confusion of the world. He alone can view *zwecklos*, the "confusion of passions, families, and empires"; he alone can understand by sympathetic participation the sadness and the happiness of every human fate (*er fühlt das Traurige und das Freudige jedes Menschenschicksals mit*). The *Weltmensch*, lacking the master-key, is excluded from this wisdom, which, "inborn" in the poet, grows, a "beautiful flower," spontaneously upon the "bottom of the poet's heart."

The poet thus rises not only above the limitations of space but of time as well, seeing events both as past and future. Hence the true poet is "at the same time teacher, prophet, friend of gods and man." A poet cannot "descend to a *kümmertliches Gewerbe*." He must live in carefree, disinterested aloofness. "Thus did the poets live in those times in which greatness was still venerated. Sufficiently endowed inwardly, they required little externally."

Wilhelm, as the embodiment of the poet, becomes the symbol of the genius, as it was conceived in the eighteenth century, the ideal of complete harmonious creative personality, the personality most fully endowed with the *Ganze*, and not the unbalanced freak constructed by nineteenth-century sociological utilitarianism since Comte. By virtue of the *Ganze* man transcends the limitations of time and space, seeing history and the lives of men, with Spinoza *sub specie aeternitatis*. In *Das Göttliche*, a poem written about the same time as the first version of *Wilhelm Meister*, Goethe expresses this same idea in the beautiful lines:

Er kann dem Augenblick  
Dauer verleihen.

The *Ganze* is the root of *Treue* ('loyalty').

Das ganze Selbst müssen wir hingeben . . . dem Freunde das Gut auf ewig versichern. . . . In welchen seligen Zustand versetzt uns die Treue! Sie giebt dem vorübergehenden Menschenleben eine himmlische Gewissheit; sie macht das Hauptkapital unseres Reichtums aus.

And a little later: "Die Treue ist in diesem Falle ein Bestreben einer edlen Seele, einem Höheren gleich zu werden."

Only the *Gefühlsmensch* is capable of such total loyalty. "How can the worldly man with his scattered life preserve the *Innigkeit*, in der ein Künstler bleiben muss?"

... "It is with talents as with virtue: we must love them for their own sake or entirely [*ganz*] give them up."

It follows that all great virtues as well as talents are rooted in the *Ganze*. The locus of *das Ganze* is *Innigkeit*, *das Innere*, the "soul," the "heart," as well as the *Geist*, intrinsic, disinterested, total individual rationality.

In art also, *das Ganze* is the source of understanding. In discussing *Hamlet* (Book IV, chap. iii), Wilhelm confesses that he has difficulty in arriving at a view of "the whole" of the play; he succeeds only by a study of the whole of Hamlet's personality.

Thus the objective *Ganze* of the world is subordinate to the inward whole, as Wilhelm had already found in his meditation upon Melina's character. This idea is developed a little later, in Book IV, chapter xvi. Aurelie, also a *Gefühlsmensch*, here bases her intimate characterization of Wilhelm upon the predominance and creative force of Wilhelm's inward totality in his dealings with the external world. "Without having ever seen the objects in [external] nature," she begins, "you recognize the truth in the image; there seems to dwell in you a *presentiment of the whole world*, which is aroused and developed by the *harmonious touch of the art of poetry in you*." Wilhelm replies, a little later: "From youth up I have directed my eyes more *inward* than *outward*; it is only natural that I should have learned to understand man to a certain degree, without in the least understanding or comprehending men."

Aurelie concludes: "Do not be concerned about that shortcoming. Anyone can attain to the light of reason [*Licht des Verstandes*], but he cannot acquire externally the fulness of the heart. If you are intended for an artist you cannot guard this darkness and innocence too long: they are the beautiful cover of the young bud."

Thus the *Ganze* is expressly the fulness of the heart, not the light of the reason. It is "obscure," in contrast to the light of reason, and unsophisticated, but it both comprehends and achieves more. It comprehends the fundamental elements of human personality and it prefigures by a totalistic presentiment the essence of all reality, including the external.

This totalistic vision, being essential to the creative mind, compels Wilhelm in a conversation with Serlo, the actor-manager, and a high-class representative of the *Verstand* type who would practice art prag-

matically, to assert that art must *in einem Zusammenhang behandelt werden*.

Thus, according to both versions of *Wilhelm Meister* supreme rationality resides expressly not in the Cartesian "clear and distinct" thought of "the reason" or ratiocination, but in the total individual unity of all the mental processes including, particularly *Gefühl*, sensibility, the *Herz*, the *Geist*.

All these passages were written between 1780 and 1785. They passed from the original version unchanged, except where changes have been indicated above, into the final version of 1794-96. The last four books of *Wilhelm Meister* date from the latter period. In examining the important passages containing *das Ganze*, we shall find that no fundamental change has taken place.

Wilhelm identifies the *Ganze* with the "wholesome" *Einheit*, the inward unity of being. He makes an interesting application of this meaning in Book V, chapter i:

A person cannot be brought into a more dangerous condition than when [literal translation] a great change in his condition has been brought about by external circumstances before a corresponding change in ways of feeling and thinking has taken place within him. There originates in such a case an epoch without an epoch.

Wilhelm tries to avoid such division between the inner and outer by a constant endeavor to "gain unity within" (*mit sich selbst einig zu werden*) and to attain the "wholesome unity."

In his continued study of *Hamlet*, Wilhelm endeavors to develop the *Gefühl für das Ganze* also in the "aesthetic" field (Book V, chapter iv). Our feeling for a revered author, as for a beloved girl, is so *ganz* that we cannot imagine them except as possessing *solche vollkommene Harmonie*. Serlo, on the other hand, the *Weltmensch* or *Verstandes-mensch*, possessed of a *scharfer Verstand*, can see in a work of art only a "more or less incomplete *Ganze*."

The sixth book, containing the "Confessions of a Beautiful Soul," is pervaded with the concept of *das Ganze*. But the term is represented by another characteristic one. The *schöne Seele*, being a mystic, a pietist, absorbed in her inner religious meditations, suffers from contact with the "outer" world. The place of the inner ecstatic *Ganze* is taken by the pietistic name of God, *der unsichtbare Freund*, in whom for her *das Ganze* is contained, and in whom she ultimately finds it.

In both *Lehrbriefe*, in Book VII, chapter ix, and Book VIII, chapter vi, the *Ganze* is of fundamental importance. In the first it is said: "Only a part of art can be learned, but the artist needs the whole of art. He who knows it partly, errs always and speaks much; he who possesses it whole, wishes only to act [create] and speaks rarely and late." In this passage, as in the first one quoted at the beginning of this paper, the "spirit" (*Geist*) is the "highest" source from which the *Ganze* comes. In the second *Lehrbrief* it is said of Lothario, another *Gefühlsmensch*, that he *nur ins Ganze wirkt*.

In a number of passages the *Ganze*, by its absence, is used to characterize the type of personality opposite to the Wilhelm type. Perhaps the most interesting is the description of the *Anempfinderin* (Book II, chap. v.), the type of personality which, though capable of sympathetic participation in many separate details of a work of poetry, has not the power to enter into the spirit of the whole.

Serlo, the actor-manager, as we have already seen, lacks the sense of the *Ganze*.

Therese, the highest type of *Verstandesmensch* (Book VII, chap. vii), is of such goodness and ability that *das Ganze* always fared well with her, "although she seemed never to give it a thought." She always did the thing nearest at hand as it presented itself.<sup>1</sup>

In view of the fundamental function of the *Ganze* in Goethe's major works, as the ultimate standard of his conception of character and personality, of reality and value, it is surprising to find that the term has been little discussed. In the *Goethe-Handbook* it is not even mentioned; in Paul Fischer's *Goethe-Wortschatz*, just appeared, it is treated in such an elementary manner that no light is shed on the specific meanings of the word. Max Wundt, in his *Wilhelm Meister*, doesn't seem aware of the *Ganze* even in his discussion of *Genie*.

Boucke says:

With Goethe himself the concept of totality acquires its highest significance at the time of his strongest Hellenism [i.e., in the nineties], in connection with his discussions of aesthetic education, the art of life, the total consideration of life and other questions.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> As to Natalie, who is supposed to combine in herself both the spontaneous *Ganze* and the critical native faculty of analysis into a final synthesis, see the author's "Cultural Environment of the Philosophy of Kant," in *Immanuel Kant: Memorial Lectures* (London and Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1925).

<sup>2</sup> Ewald A. Boucke, *Goethe's Weltanschauung auf historischer Grundlage*, esp. pp. 420 ff.

This passage reveals Boucke's attitude toward Goethe's philosophy as rationalistic. Boucke throughout his work aims at interpreting the essential parts of Goethe's view of life in terms of the basic concepts set up by Kantian and post-Kantian academic Rationalism, instead of previously defining them as the specific variables characteristic of Goethe's total personality. He does not offer the essence of Goethe's characteristic view of life but only statements of the forms of thought which Goethe's fundamental concepts would have taken if they had not sprung up in the particular man Goethe and grown organically with him, but if they had by some inconceivable and unnatural process lodged in the antithetic type of mind, the *Verstandesmensch* or "rationalist," the antithesis of the Wilhelm and the Faust type. Boucke, by centering his exclusive attention on that part which is not specific, destroys precisely Goethe's fundamental ideas, the ideas which are instinct with the living personality, Goethe. Thus Boucke's, and generally the rationalistic, method of interpreting Goethe's philosophy is to force back Goethe's crucial ideas into that movement of the eighteenth century which is inherently repellent to those ideas; it is, in the present instance, to subordinate the *Ganze* of *Wilhelm Meister* to the very system which it was the inherent purpose of *das Ganze* to combat and subordinate.

The academic opinion, which seems to rule at present, contents itself with the assumption that the *Ganze* as such is one of the chief characteristics of "Irrationalism," a term which is supposed to include the "Storm-and-Stress," Hamann, Herder, Romanticism, and one hemisphere of the "classic synthesis" represented by Goethe and Schiller.

This academic theory is fundamentally Kantian Rationalism. The latter is combined by a group of writers, at the head of whom stands Rudolph Unger, apparently with Bergsonian Irrationalism and with the ethical idealism of R. Eucken. Among this group there appears a tendency to substitute the term "Superrationalism" for "Irrationalism." But in the main, in the essential premisses, in the identification of rationality with Rationalism, and of the technique of rationality with ratiocinative logic, Kantian Rationalism rules. Even for the superrationalistic misinterpretation of the anti-rationalistic movement that aimed above all at extending the term "rationality" to the

total mental functions which form the specific organic equipment of human personality, there is a possible precedent in Kant's preference of the "practical reason," the ethical faculty, to the "pure reason," the faculty of absolute truth or reality.

This rationalistic generalization has caused a far-reaching and complicated confusion in the interpretation of the Storm-and-Stress, the classic era, and Romanticism; and, above all, of Herder and Goethe.

It is contrary to history as well as to logic that the *Ganze* as such should be a specific character of Irrationalism.<sup>1</sup> The *Ganze* has been the goal of every system of philosophy from the beginning of history until the arrival of the theory of Pluralism proposed by William James. The *panta rhei* of Heraclitus seeks the *Ganze*, the fundamental principle of unity, in the flux and conflict of things; the immaterial world of the spirit, assumed by Democritos, the forerunner of all later "idealistic" systems of philosophy from Plato to Hegel, is the *locus* of the rationalistic *Ganze*. In the post-Renaissance Rationalism, whose founder is Descartes, *das Ganze* is identical with the "reason," i.e., ratiocination regarded as the only complete and single judge of reality. *Cogito, ergo sum*: the totality of being is identified with ratiocinative thought. Malebranche, friend of Diderot, developed further the concept of the ratiocinative *Ganze*. Spinoza sought *das Ganze* in the universal, all-penetrating, and all-inherent "substance" (God). Leibniz, in constructing his hierarchy of monads, which culminated in the supreme monad, set up the "pre-established harmony," in which the whole universe is united. Leibniz is partly non-rationalistic, if we consider his interpretation of a monad not as an abstract idea but as an integral complex unit of energy, a vital individual; but since the progress of the monad through its cycle of development is determined by "clear and distinct" thought, i.e., ratiocination, and not by "obscure and confused," i.e., non-ratiocinative mental processes, he belongs essentially in the rationalistic tradition. Kant named the fundamental integral *Ganze* of his system "unity of apperception," which is identical with ratiocinative, or "clear and distinct" thought.

The fundamental significance of the *Ganze* theoretically developed by Herder and taken over from him by Goethe lies therefore not in the

<sup>1</sup> As stated by Petersen, *Die Wesensbestimmung der Romantik* (Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1926), pp. 45-46.

noun but in the attributes. The vast movement led by Herder, which was in the first place a positive fundamental philosophical movement and only secondarily a frontal reaction against Rationalism even in the modified Kantian form, has been disguised by a number of different names, such as "Romanticism," "Storm-and-Stress," "Sentimentalism," *Gefühl* or "Emotionalism," and lately as "Irrationalism." It should be called "Naturalism," because the other movements are all branches of Naturalism. Their ultimate term is "nature," as the source and supreme standard of all their basic terms, including the organic integral conception of totality and individuality, their specific definition of primary types of character and motivation, and finally, fate as the supreme agent of "nature."

It was Goethe's two attributes, coined between 1780 and 1782 in *Wilhelm Meisters Theatralische Sendung*, which included the specifically naturalistic elements of the term *das Ganze*. The attributes, *zusammenbrennend*, *zusammentreffend*, express most intensely the essence of the naturalistic reality.

The final sentence of the *Lehrbrief*: "Die Natur hat sich losgesprochen," is an indispensable part of the interpretation of the naturalistic *Ganze*. It is, as it were, the final recapitulation of the fundamental theme sounded at the beginning.

This Naturalism began very early to develop its characteristic theory of knowledge. Knowledge, rationality, according to Naturalism, extends beyond ratiocinative logic. Rationalism is an incomplete, crippled, and therefore false rationality. The naturalistic, organic *Ganze*, through the integral co-operation of all its mental functions, alone can attain to complete and real knowledge, i.e., to true rationality.

It was Herder who, by defining the fundamental concepts and premisses, developed the complete system of the naturalistic theory of rational, in opposition to rationalistic, knowledge. He began by adopting some of the mythological conceptions of Rousseau, especially that of the original *Naturmensch*, who was supposed to contain instinctively the perfect, harmonious *Ganze*, and that of the Golden Age. Traces of this are ample in the *Fragments*, and in other earlier works, including particularly *Ossian*. But gradually he freed himself from these myths which were contradictory to his idea of development and environment. The complete theory of Naturalism can be traced,



among others, chiefly in his first and fourth *Wäldchen*<sup>1</sup> in *Ossian*, *Ursprung der Sprache*, *Über die Ursachen des gesunkenen Geschmacks*, in which he makes his most outspoken and effective attack on the Storm-and-Stress; in *Über Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele*;<sup>2</sup> in the *Plastik*; and, finally, in his *Metakritik* and *Kalligone*, which were specifically directed against Kantian Rationalism.

Goethe has not added anything essential to the fundamental ideas of this Naturalism. But besides coining the definitive expression of the naturalistic *Ganze*, he, supreme as poet, developed Herder's theories in terms of concrete personality. He put the stamp of the epoch of Naturalism on the creative literature of his age.

He embodied the two fundamental theories of life, the older one represented by Rationalism and the younger one by Naturalism, the former having as its protagonist Kant, the latter, Herder, in two corresponding types of personality.

Goethe's conception and evaluation of his two fundamental types of personality did not remain unchanged. His early naturalistic conception, which inclines toward the extremes of the Storm-and-Stress, is most fully exemplified in *Werther*, *Goetz*, the *Urfaust*, and *Wilhelm Meisters Theatralische Sendung*. After that a subtle turn toward rationalistic compromise makes itself felt, which takes a rather conspicuous form after 1790. It appears first in the final three acts of *Tasso*, completed in Italy. The change is not so much in Antonio's character and motivation, but rather in the author's sympathetic evaluation of Antonio. Goethe's original harsh contempt for the un-inspired practical type has given place to serious regard.

In *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, the revised and greatly extended continuation of *Wilhelm Meisters Theatralische Sendung*, made between 1794 and 1796, many signs of the intrusion of rationalistic modes of thought appear. The representatives of the *Verstand* type become more significant, more elaborate, and more sympathetic. Therese, the last and highest of that type, is a paragon of almost all the virtues and efficiencies conceivable. But she is also very unreal and tiresome. She is less a personality than a theoretic intention, inadequately realized.

<sup>1</sup> See the author's "Herder's Psychology" in the *Monist*, October, 1925.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.* Also the author's "Herder's Conception of 'Bild,'" *Germanic Review*, I, No. 1 (January 1, 1926).

The allegorical figure of Trade contemptuously described in the first part of *Wilhelm Meister*, in contrast to the noble figure of Tragedy, has, as Wilhelm admits toward the end of the revised version, lost much of its sordidness, and the figure of Tragedy much of its grandeur and impressiveness, so that they are not very far apart; and, correspondingly, as implied in the final reference to Saul, the son of Kis, Wilhelm appears to himself as much less superior than at the beginning.

One of the most important changes is the introduction of the *Unbekannten* into the first four books of *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, which correspond to the whole of the original version. The early important conversations between the *Unbekannten* and Wilhelm (Book I, chap. xvii; Book II, chap. ix) are in the main an ethical argument in which Wilhelm represents Goethe's naturalistic conception of the identity of nature, personality, and fate. It is Goethe's fundamental naturalistic doctrine of the *dunkle Drang*, the total, spontaneous impulse of individual personality, which here assumes, as it inevitably must, the function of a personal fate. A further development of Goethe's naturalistic conception of the *Ganze* is his optimistic evaluation of fate, in which he is at opposite poles from the more philosophical Herder. According to Goethe, the *dunkle Drang*, the spontaneous urgency of the *Ganze*, leads to righteousness:

Ein guter Mensch in seinem dunklen Drange  
Ist sich des rechten Weges wohl bewusst.

The *Unbekannten*, on the contrary, plead the Kantian doctrine of the absolute ethical "freedom," of the control of fate by the "practical reason," of the absolute rule of the ethical will.

Schiller felt the unbridged gulf between these two ethical doctrines, and urged Goethe to write a final, eighth book, in which Goethe's ethical views were to be completed. The result was the book *Natalie*. Unfortunately, Natalie, as well as Therese, her counterpart, is chiefly a program, not creatively realized. The "synthesis" of the two conceptions of personality, the naturalistic and the rationalistic, has not got beyond the stage of an inspiration. Goethe, neither here nor in *Faust*, nor in any other major works, accomplished the "classic synthesis" designated by the modern academic Rationalism as the essential character of the classic era.

The dominant creative impulse in *Wilhelm Meister* and throughout Goethe's major works remained naturalistic. All the rationalistic additions and modifications, introduced in the nineties, the period of the ascendancy of Schiller-Kantian modes of thought, do not affect fundamentally Goethe's ruling conception of life and personality. They are incrustations resulting from his endeavor to grasp all the principal systems of thought. He accomplished creative mastery of only one, Naturalism, which corresponded best to his own personality.

The *Ganze* continued to dominate his creative work. In *Wahlverwandschaften*, his final great work of fiction, the distinction between the two fundamental types is maintained. It rises again from the idea of the *Ganze*, which is, however, now modified and contrasted, in the manner of the Romantic Movement, to an extremely inward, fateful, temperamental totality. And in this novel, also, the inward totalistic type is most vivid, most fully realized, whereas the other is the result of deliberate definition rather than of creation. The two *Verstandesmenschen*, in spite of Goethe's emphasis on their ethical superiority, serve chiefly as stage setting for the *Gefühl* type.

Only a few of the other relations of Goethe's concept of the *Ganze* to his numerous interests can be mentioned, and these summarily. The fundamental part of the *Ganze* in Goethe's theories of education, as put into operation in the healing of the mad harper in *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, is obvious. His pedagogic principles are naturalistic. He ranges himself with Rousseau, Herder, and Pestalozzi, the first part of whose *Lienhard und Gertrud* had appeared in 1781, just about the time Goethe began *Wilhelm Meisters Theatralische Sendung*. His principles were, as the story of the mad harper in the second part of *Wilhelm Meister* shows, based on the theory that education is possible only through the training of the total personality and through the development of contacts between that total personality with the whole of nature and normal, natural society; not, as was the traditional rationalistic method, by specialized theoretic indoctrination.

The predominant place of the *Ganze* in Goethe's multifarious scientific generalizations is so obvious that mere mention is sufficient. In his most important scientific work, written simultaneously with the first version of *Wilhelm Meister*, namely, the paper on his discovery of the intermaxillary bone, he laid particular stress on his

proof that the entire animal kingdom constitutes a serial biological *Ganze*, including man. It was this anti-rationalistic conclusion, directly opposed to the Cartesian doctrine of the exclusive rationality of man, and the absolute automatism of all lower beings, which offended the zoölogists of the eighties to such an extent that they refused even to read Goethe's paper. In Goethe's *Farbenlehre*, completed many years later, his adherence to the principle of the *Ganze* led him into the interpretation of the colors as different intensities rather than as divisions of light, and into obstinate and futile attacks on Newton, who had used instruments to split light-rays into their component parts.

We are confronted with a different condition in Goethe's theories concerning the pictorial and plastic arts, the arts of the eye and the tactile sense. Goethe's pictorial sense, including his sense of color, was—all the traditional academic fictions to the contrary notwithstanding—next to his sense for music his least adequate talent; and his laborious efforts, first in drawing, then in formulating an authoritative code of laws for painters and draughtsmen, have left no traces in the history of art. He exemplified unconsciously but strikingly the truth of his own warning in *Wilhelms Lehrbrief*: "Nur ein Teil der Kunst kann gelehrt werden. Der Künstler braucht sie ganz. Wer sie halb kennt, ist immer irre und redet viel; wer sie ganz besitzt, mag nur tun und redet selten oder spät."

The *Propyläen der Kunst* mark Goethe's farthest and most disastrous deviation into rationalistic Classicalism parading as German Classicism. This pseudo-Classicism of Goethe is the third phase in the Classicalism of the eighteenth century. The first was the Classicalism of the French classic era, introduced into Germany by Gottsched. Gottsched accepted the interpretations of the art of Greek antiquity formulated by the great French classic writers. The second phase was Lessing's attempt in the *Laokoon* and other essays on antique art to correct French classic theories by an original study of Aristotle. To him Aristotle was the ultimate and absolute authority on the theories of art. He rejected the French theories whenever he could prove that they differed from those of Aristotle. He substituted Aristotelean Classicalism for classic French Classicalism. He added, however, the naturalistic theory of the specific relations between

certain arts and certain senses. His theories were in the main demolished by Herder in the first *Wäldchen*.<sup>1</sup> The third phase was that represented by Schiller (in the nineties!), Heinrich Meyer, and Goethe, and reached its culmination in the *Propyläen*. This phase combined Kantian Rationalism with the Classicalism of Winckelmann-Lessing. The Kantian addition was chiefly Schiller's theory of the *reinen*, i.e., absolute, a priori, eternal "forms"—forms corresponding to the absolute *Begriffe*, the concepts of the "pure reason," which apparently are supposed to have no inherent forms except those of "pure" logic. These forms, most beautifully addressed in Schiller's *Das Ideal und das Leben*, and with a much more disillusioned tone, in *Die Ideale*, are the absolute models, to be imitated by the art of all times. The difficulty of discovering these forms in the absolute was solved by a naïve identification of the "absolute" with the historical art forms of the Periclean, the Graeco-Roman, and the High Renaissance ages. Heinrich Meyer, a mediocre painter and copious writer of commonplace and reactionary works upon the theory of art, became at the same time Goethe's mentor in artistic matters. Goethe decided to publish a magazine in order to stem the tide of naturalistic and naturalistic-romantic theory, which he himself, with Herder, had done the most to release. The intention of the two authors was to produce a body of mandatory laws of artistic composition. Goethe, the greatest creative spirit in the movement for natural freedom and spontaneity in literature and science, here attempted to dictate to the artists his *sic volo, sic jubeo*!

Here was a new *Ganze*, one of obsolete, rationalistic pseudo-classic dogmatism. Goethe had, for a time, lapsed from essential Naturalism, which had been most fruitful in all the work for which he was qualified, into the extreme opposite of barren Scholasticism.

Goethe had a slight gift of composing and judging pictorial art. The theoretic results of his lifelong laborious study of art are surprisingly scant and unimportant. The pictures produced in the more than twenty years of ardent efforts at drawing and coloring (he never really painted) furnish superabundant evidence of his lack of talent. His drawings are records, poor and clumsy memoranda. They lack every element of artistic competence, of feeling for line,

<sup>1</sup> See my "Fundamental Ideas in Herder's Thought," *Modern Philology*, June, 1920, pp. 1-14; October, 1920, pp. 57-70.

mass, texture, surface qualities, of tone and value, of pictorial creation. He had next to no sense of color (a condition which may account partly for his theory of colors as merely different degrees of intensity of light). His judgments of pictures show no trace of originality but helpless adherence to judgments of his mentors, who are without exception mediocrities, like Heinrich Meyer.

Heinse, in his *Ardinghello*, showed that he was much more gifted as a critic of art than Goethe—in fact, than any of his contemporaries. He was the only writer upon art endowed with a strong and remarkably fine sense of color. He was the first German writer in the eighteenth century who defined painting as specifically the art of color and not of outline drawing. The High Renaissance had regarded the drawn outlines as the essential body of a picture. Paint served the purpose of coloring this outline; it was secondary to “drawing.” The Venetians, especially since Titian, overthrew the practice of the High Renaissance. Their successors, El Greco, Rembrandt, Rubens, the great painters of the seventeenth century, developed the Venetian technique to its highest known point of perfection. The eighteenth century, under the influence of the rationalistic philosophy, lost the gain of the seventeenth. The views of all the leading painters and theorists of the nineteenth century agree in the essentials with Heinse.

Goethe, blind to the real importance of Heinse's book, gave it a bad name (still repeated by the faithful academicians), by directing exclusive attention to the rather offensive mechanism of a type of novel in the French style then popular, by which Heinse had hoped to get his artistic theories before the public.

Fortunately for the progress of art in Germany, the *Propyläen*, in spite of Goethe's immense prestige, made no headway against the historic current of Naturalism. The periodical of the greatest poet of the age was simply ignored, and perished deservedly, in a short time, to leave the field free for the phenomenal success of a little anonymous book by a shy young Berlin jurist entitled: *Herzensergiessungen eines kunstliebenden Klosterbruders*, in which the *Ganze* of Herder's theories and Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*, though modified, restricted, and adapted to the particular, too “inward,” world of the first Romantic school, was re-established at the center of artistic theory.

The crushing failure of the *Propyläen* was a great shock to Goethe.

But it had the wholesome effect of keeping him from further futile pursuit of a career as *arbiter artis*.

The field of the arts, in which Goethe's competence was weakest, was the only one in which he, for a time, completely adopted, from Schiller, Kant, Heinrich Meyer, the rationalistic theory. In the art, on the other hand, of which he was the supreme master, he remained throughout fundamentally a naturalist of the school of Herder. His importations from Rationalism, which begin to appear from about 1790, never reach far beneath the surface, never down to his central creative ideas. They are never creatively synthesized, but remain unassimilated, contradictory intrusions, like the *Unbekannten* in *Wilhelm Meister*. They are never integral and essential, and for the most part they are uninteresting and unoriginal. They are, even in *Faust*, artistic blemishes. The conception of German Classicism, greatly in vogue among academic rationalists of the present day, as a "synthesis" of Rationalism and "Irrationalism," lacks substance. There was no creative synthesis, and the main stem of Naturalism, while anti-rationalistic, was not Irrationalism. It sought a more adequate rationality than that proposed by Rationalism.


All a priori Rationalism rests on the assumption that the most abstract ratiocinative reflection upon an object, as a work of art completed or projected, is the primary essence, the "idea," of that work, and that all the specifically artistic constituents of that work are derivative from that idea. The result of this assumption is that the supposed theoretic intention of the author is accepted in the place of his real creative achievement, a confusion that brings death to art and inflicts sterile speculation and preconceived unverifiable notions on the theory of art. As Goethe's creative power began to decline he leaned, even in literature, more and more on his intentions expressed in the forms of reflective generalizations. In pictorial art, in which he never possessed creative power, he sought a fatal refuge in the easy and futile rationalistic labels.

Throughout his literary work, the work that alone matters for the ages, he was supreme and at home while he guarded the naturalistic *Ganze* as his ultimate standard of reality and value.

MARTIN SCHÜTZE

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
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